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ABSTRACT
This is the first known study of stockmarket reaction to U.K. sell-off
announcements. Earlier U.S. studies have found positive market reaction to sell-off
announcements. Various of these have aimed to relate the magnitude of marketreaction to
factors such as price declaration, completion of agreement and financial strength of
divestor. This study also explores the impact of the above factors and their
inter-relationships. Typical event-study methodology is used in estimating the size of the
unexpected market reaction, the so called abnormal return.
Separate analysis of sub-samples is undertaken in this study to help enhance our
understanding of market response to corporate sell-offs. Examples of such sub-samples
are price/no-price groups and completion/intention groups. This analysis provides
explanations for some of the seemingly contradictory U.S. study results.
A measure of financial distress, namely the z-score, is introduced to explore the
"bankruptcy avoidance" hypothesis. We find a degree of financial distress prior to
divestment to be inversely related to abnormal return - a result consistent with market
approval for such "distress" sales. Relative size of divested part to parent is also shown to
be positively related to abnormal returns. Price declaration seems to be vitally important
in generating positive market response. Announcements of completed sell-offs along with
the price is even more welcome by the market. Announcement of completed sell-offs with
undisclosed price seems to induce market uncertainty and thus negative abnormal returns.
Announcement of intended sell-offs with price disclosure as well as our overall sample
results both provide statistically significant positive shareholder gains. This, latter finding
is in harmony with U.S. studies.
To my family
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION
In the 1960's, US firms viewed mergers and acquisitions as a way of
strengthening their market position. They believed that economic synergy could be
derived from acquisitions. Such thinking resulted in the conglomeration of several
entities that had to survive as a group under a central management The running of such
newly grown corporations introduced problems in every aspect of business, from
finance and personnel, through to upgrading of manufacturing in the face of increasing
technological advances made by the specialized competitors. International
competition exerted pressure on firms to stay fit in their specific sectors. This pressure
resulted in major reorganisation of corporations towards streamlining of their
activities. In the 1970's, managers began to see that divestments could take place
without any overall economic loss to the company, that is, by selling a unit whose
continued presence is causing diseconomies or "negative synergy" in the selling firm
(Linn and Rozeff, 1986, p436). Therefore, beginning a surge in divestment activities
that is still on going.
Academic studies of divestiture in the finance literature have focused on the
impact of the divestiture announcement on shareholder wealth as measured by the
market. For example, an increase in the share price following the announcement of a
sell-off, implies gains to shareholders. Such a sell-off action should in theory take
place if the management expects a positive response from the stock market. The
present study aims to see if this is the case and whether divestment strategies in the UK
have led to increases in firm value.
Divestment is an important part of corporate restructuring and can take a number
of forms which include:
a) Sell-offs where a division is sold to a new parent.
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b) Spin-offs where a division is incorporated as a new and independent entity and is
expected to survive on its own. The new ownership is initially kept within the same
group of share-holders as the parent's.
c) Management buy-outs where the company is sold to the existing management.
Within the context of the shareholder wealth maximisation objective the financial
impact of divestiture may be objectively measured by evaluating its impact on the share
price. Spin-offs are very rare among UK firms and, therefore, not the subject of this
study. Management buy-outs, although a regular method of divestment in the UK, are
also not considered in this study. Market reactions observed on the announcement of
management buy-outs is treated as a separate issue in the academic literature. This is
due to the difference in the internal and external circumstances of management
buy-out and sell-off deals.
Table 1.1 provides data on UK divestments since 1980 and shows the fairly steady
increase over the years in the number of sell-offs and in the average sizes of sell-offs, at
least until 1989.
Research in the United States demonstrates gains to shareholders around the
announcement of sell-offs. It also shows that the magnitude of gain has some
relationship to the relative size of the divested part compared with the parent (Zaima
and Hearth, 1985; Klein, 1986). Price declaration is also shown to be an important
factor in producing positive abnormal returns (Klein, 1986). The certainty of the
divestment deal being completed is also studied (eg. Hearth & Zaima, 1986) but no
clear conslusions have been drawn. Financial strength of the seller as measured by
Standard and Poor' s common stock ranking is found to produce higher gains to
shareholders (Zaima and Hearth, 1985).
TABLE 1.1- Aquisitions, Divestments and Buy-Outs in U.K.
INDEPENDENT	 SELL-OFF OF
	
MANAGEMENT
ACQUISITIONS
	
SUBSIDIARIES
	
BUY-OUTS
YEAR NO.
ACQUIRED
VALUE
£M
AVE.
£M
No. VALUE
£M
AVE.
£M
NO. VALUE
£M
AVE.
fM
1980 368 1,265 3.44 101 210 2.08 107 50 0.47
1981 327 882 2.70 125 262 2.10 124 114 0.92
1982 296 1,373 4.64 164 804 4.90 238 348 1.46
1983 302 1,783 5.80 142 436 3.07 235 365 1.55
1984 398 4,252 10.74 170 1,121 6.59 238 404 1.61
1985 340 6,281 18.53 134 793 5.92 262 1,141 4.35
1986 621 12,279 19.8 221 3,089 14.0 313 1,188 3.79
1987 1187 11,861 10.0 340 4,668 13.7 344 3,214 9.3
1988 1123 17,300 13.1 376 5,534 14.7 371 3,715 10.0
1989 725 21,026 29.0 352 5,340 15.2 359 3,877 10.8
1990 2322 3,068 9.5 183 1,661 9.0 214 1,419 6.6
to June
Source: Business Monitor MQ7 and Center for Management Buy-Out Research of the University of
Nottingham (Wright, Chiplin, Thompson and Robbie, 1992).
This research aims to examine the relationship between sell-off announcements
and security returns in the United Kingdom. It is the first known study that involves the
analysis of UK daily share prices in the divestment context. This study generally
confirms the findings of US studies in that there are gains to the shareholders following
the announcement of sell- offs. However, in addition to replicating the findings of the
US studies for the UK stockmarket environment, it also makes the following original
contributions to the field:
a) The impact of certainty of completion of the proposed sell-off is tested directly and
in isolation by examining a sample of announcements of completed sell-offs.
b) The impact of the initial announcement of divestment on shareholder wealth is
measured in isolation from the deals that have been completed and then announced.
Our results for this intention category show small and
insignificant abnormal returns. Alexander, Benson and Kampmeyer (1984) found
similar results and the discrepancy in their findings compared with other US
studies, up to now, has not been fully explained. Our results for this subcategory
are almost identical to those of Alexander et al (1984), and our consequent ability
to provide an explanation for their contradictory results is another original
contribution in this field.
c) The z-score, as a measure of company financial strength, is used for the first time
in the study of divestitures and the relationship between level of financial distress
of the divestor and stockmarket reaction to sell-off announcements is explored.
d) Several regressions of abnormal returns, as dependent variables, are conducted
against independent variables such as price declaration, completion and intention
of announcement, relative size of divestment to parent, and z-score.
e) On the methodological front, various tests using alternative measures of systematic
risk and alternative assumptions of both dependence and independence in residuals
are carried out and different return generating processes are modeled. Our
empirical conclusions, relating to daily data, are also important for other
researchers attempting to use daily data for event studies in the UK.
The general methodology adopted in this study is similar to that used in the US
sell-off studies, that is, the risk adjusted excess returns surrounding the divestment
announcement event are used in assessing the significance of the announcement
impact. The methodology is based on Brown and Warner (1980, 1985). The relevant
model parameters are adjusted for thin trading by adopting both the Dimson (1979) and
Scholes and Williams (1977) methods and the results compared.
This study builds on and develops further in a UK context the extant US-based
research. As with extant US studies, it focuses on the impact of sell-off announcement
on shareholder wealth on or around announcement day. It does not explore managerial
motivation-related issues (eg Tehranian et al, 1987; Denning, 1988). This thesis
concentrates on sell-offs from 1985 through 1986, and the layout of this thesis is as
follows:
Chapter 2: describes the causes and different forms of divestiture.
Chapter 3: provides a review of the relevant literature and identifies key research
issues.
Chapter 4: discusses the main methodology used in the study, alternative
methodologies and the data.
Chapter 5: reports the initial empirical results.
Chapter 6: describes the effects of applying different methodologies on the results.
Chapter 7: provides the results of regressions of abnormal returns on z-score, relative
divestment size and price declaration for various sub-samples of data as
well as on Intention and Completion dummy variables.
Chapter 8: summarises the results, draws conclusions and suggests directions for
future research.
Chapter 2 CAUSES AND FORMS OF DIVESTITURE
2.1 CAUSES OF DIVESTITURE
The reasons for divestment are not the same for every company. The different
forms of divestiture, namely, sell-off, management buy-out and spin-off, are each
solutions specific to certain problems experienced by the divestor. Such problems
are explored by Coyne and Wright (1986, pp. 1-26). Problem areas that induce a
divestment can be grouped as follows:
1)Managerial Problems
2) The Need for Cash
3) Strategic Change
These categories are very broad and issues within them are inter- related. We aim
to explain the issues within each of these groups separately. Divestment of a specific
form is decided on with reference to the above categories of problems as part of
corporate restructuring. Restructuring refers to liquidating projects in some areas
and redirecting resources to other existing or new areas. The concept of
restructuring has also been applied to changing the ownership structures or
financing patterns in a firm. Divestment can be used as a means of corporate
restructuring.
In traditional finance theory, managers are assumed to act in the interests of
shareholders when divesting an asset or making a new investment. Management
may be viewed as being involved in continual research process for the configuration
of activities which produce the best returns for shareholders (Cable, 1977).
Investment or divestment value is measured by discounting the expected cash flows
arising on such a decision. Shareholder wealth is similarly measured via the
discounted value of the after tax cash flows paid out by the firm, namely, dividends
plus capital gains. Corporate restructuring with a view to maximisation of
shareholder wealth forms the theoretical foundations of our analysis of causes of
divestments.
Furthermore, as mergers and acquisitions are also part of corporate restructuring,
the theories developed in the field of mergers and acquisitions are of assistance to us
in understanding the reasons for divestment. One such theory is the life-cycle
theory. Life-cycle theory has been applied to products as well as industries. It
consists of four stages: development stage, growth stage, maturity stage and decline
stage. At the development stage of a new product or industry, an introduction period
may be required. Such introductions may be associated with losses to the innovating
producers. Growth stage is when consumer acceptance has been achieved and sales
are growing. This stage is associated with high profitability and additional capacity
is attracted into the industry. Maturity stage is when growth rate of sales slows
down. The additions to capacity, stimulated by the record of high profits, may reach
their peak as the growth of sales begins to slow. Excess capacity in the industry may
develop and prices and profits decline. At the decline stage new products substitute
at least in part for existing products. As substitute products are successfully
introduced, they begin to erode the sales of the older product lines and growth rates
for the older firms decline.
A generalised industry life-cycle is used to describe how different stages in an
industry's development may lend themselves to different types of merger activities.
At the introductory and growth stages, new small firms with investment
opportunities but no cash to exploit them may sell out to larger firms from mature
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industries where cash flows exceed investment opportunities. As products reach
maturity stage, growth slows down and competitive pressures increase as excess
capacity develops. This period is more likely to produce horizontal mergers in an
effort to keep costs down via economies of scale (Weston et al, 1990, p.104).
The role of the industry life-cycle in relation to mergers and acquisitions is in
much dispute. Wright and Thompson (1986) test for vertical disintegration and find
no support for the view that such divestment is typical of growing markets. Harrigan
(1979) has shown the importance of divesting product areas in the declining phase
of their life-cycle. Duhaime and Grant (1984) find that life-cycle of the product and
the firm may be influential in determining divestment. The general economic cycle,
however, is not usually found to be a determinant of divestment. The UK experience
shows, on the other hand, that in the case of a deep recession, as in the early 1980s,
divestments may rise steeply (Coyne and Wright, 1982). Lack of finance may cause
parents to sell-off those subsidiaries which are a great drain on resources, or in some
severe cases, those which provide the easiest means of raising funds quickly (Coyne
and Wright, 1986, p.13).
Schendel and Patton (1976, p.240) note that unexpected poor performance and
deepening stagnation pressurise firms to take major decisions such as divestments.
Pashley and Philippatos (1990) found different patterns of divestiture related to the
life-cycle of divesting firms. Firms ending their expansionary phase and those
entering maturity stage divested to reduce debt burdens incurred during
expansionary phases. On the other hand, firms reaching their peak of maturity and
those beginning their decline used divestment primarily to improve profitability by
selling off poorly performing units. The firms in their declining stage were found to
use divestment to improve their liquidity.
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2.1.1 MANAGERIAL PROBLEMS
Maximisation of shareholder wealth by managers on behalf of
shareholders requires effective control and monitoring of management as well as
long term managerial compensation schemes. The related problem of pursuit of
managerial self-interest to the detriment of shareholders is referred to as the
agency problem. Jensen and Meekling (1976) were amongst the first to write
extensively about agency problems of the firm.
Agency problems arise basically because contracts between managers
(decision and control agents) and owners (risk bearers and principals) cannot be
costlessly written and enforced. Resulting (agency) costs include (1) costs of
restructuring a set of contracts, (2) costs of monitoring and controlling the
behaviour of agents by principals, (3) costs of bonding to guarantee that agents
will make optimal decisions or principals will be compensated for the
consequences of non-optimal decisions, and (4) the residual loss, that is, the
welfare loss experienced by the principals arising from the divergence between
agents' decisions, in their own self-interest, and their obligation to maximise the
principal's welfare. This residual loss can arise because the costs of full
enforcement of contracts exceed the benefits.
Despite potential agency problems many organisations are characterized
by separation of ownership and control, where decision agents do not bear the
major wealth impact of their decisions. This separation of risk-bearing and
decision functions is found in large professional partnerships, financial mutuals,
non-profit organisations and open corporations. Open corporations is a term
used by Fama and Jensen (1983) for large corporations whose residual claims
(equity) are least restricted. Following characteristics are identified: (1) They
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have property rights in the net cash flows for an indefinite horizon; (2)
Stockholders are not required to hold any other role in the organisation; (3)
Equity is alienable (transferrable, saleable) without restriction.
Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) hypothesize that organizations in
which ownership and control are separated survive because they have found an
effective means of dealing with resulting agency problems. They argue that
agency problems are controlled by separating decision management and
decision control in complex organisations.
It is generally recognized that the decision process involves at least the
following elements:
1. Initiation of proposals for resource allocation and structuring
contracts.
2. Selection among alternative decision choices.
3. Implementation of ratified decisions.
4. Monitoring - measurement of the performance of decision agents.
5. Incentive and reward system.
Fama and Jensen (1983) hypothesize that the separation of residual risk
bearing from decision management leads to the separation of decision control
(selection, monitoring, and reward systems) from decision management
(initiation and implementation). Their view is that the separation is efficient in
complex organizations. Because the knowledge needed for decisions is diffused
among many agents, (i.e. different levels of managers) decision management is
delegated to agents who possess the relevant information - the hired professional
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managers in the firm. Decision control rests with residual claimants
(shareholders). The advantages to having residual claims in widely diffused
ownership are twofold. First, the large risk of uncertain net cash flows is shared
by many. Second, this enables corporate enterprises to raise substantial funds for
buying assets and for bonding payments to creditors.
The common features of decision control systems involve (1) a decision
hierarchy, (2) a mutual monitoring system among employees and managers, and
(3) top-level decision control which usually resides in the board of directors. The
ultimate source of internal control is the expert board of directors.
Fama and Jensen (1983) observe that open corporations are characterised by
the most complete separation of decision management and residual risk bearing.
This specialisation enhances adaptability to environmental changes. They point
to a number of mechanisms which exist to control agency problems that may
arise. Two of these mechanisms are external. One is the stock market by which
prices signal a wide perception of the effectiveness of internal decisions. The
other external mechanism is the takeover market by which outsiders can oust
incumbent managers by direct appeals to residual claimants.
Control of the agency problem through the market mechanism has been the
subject of a number of studies. Manne (1965) argues in his seminal paper that the
alleged separation of ownership and control is considerably weakened by the
existence of the market for corporate control. This market conveys to small
shareholders both power and protection commensurate with their interest in
corporate affairs.
The market for corporate control requires and presumes a high positive
correlation between corporate managerial efficiency and stock price. The stock
price of a poorly managed company declines relative to its industry or the market
as a whole. A lower stock price facilitates takeover by giving the prospect of a
large capital gain to those who believe that they can manage the company more
efficiently. Thus, the takeover market provides some assurance of competitive
efficiency among corporate managers and thereby affords strong protection to
small, noncontrolling shareholders.
When organisational and market mechanisms are not sufficient to control
agency problems, the market for takeovers provides an external control device of
last resort (Manne, 1965). Mueller's (1969) managerialism theory argues that an
agency problem is not solved through merger activity and that, on the contrary,
merger activity is a manifestation of the agency problem. That is, managers are
motivated to increase the size of their firm. He assumed that management
compensation is a function of the size of the firm, and argued that managers adopt
too low an investment hurdle rate. But in a study critical of earlier evidence,
Lewellen and Hunstman (1970), presented findings that managers'
compensation is significantly correlated with the firm's profit rate, not its level of
sales. The basic premise of managerialism theory, therefore, is doubtful.
Mueller (1972) and Marris and Mueller (1980) have argued that
managerially controlled firms where managers are rewarded on relatively fixed
salaries according to their position within a large hierarchy, may not divest as
readily as those which are owner-controlled, where emphasis is on maximising
shareholder wealth. However, even under a managerialist regime, divestment
may provide a basis for subsequent growth and senior management may wish to
trade-off the benefits of empire building against the problems of controlling large
organisations.
Divestments can be seen as a way of enhancing managerial performance by
separating differing managerial units or by providing some managers with an
ownership interest in the firm. Wright and Thompson (1987) and Wright and
Coyne (1985) explain how selling-off divisions may ease control within the firm
without adversely affecting the units of the firm that remain. The ownership
interest can more effectively motivate managers if it relates to the division or
divisions that are under their control. The management interest in a large and
well established conglomerate where managers each have only a minor influence
is not so effective, in motivating managers, as an interest in a smaller divested
unit or in the remaining parts that they can influence and control.
There are several areas that generate managerial problems to the extent that
divestment might be viewed as a way out:
1) Behaviour of the managers of a subsidiary may not be compatible with the
objectives of the organisation as a whole and hence may be detrimental to its
overall performance.
2) The organisation may become so diverse and large that the central office is
unable to prevent divisional management opportunism occurring in the
divisions (Klein, 1983; Wright, 1986). Opportunism involves self-interest
seeking with guile and includes shirking, cheating and other suboptimal
behaviour. It can involve data distortion or making of self-disbelieved
promises (Weston, Chung and Hoag, 1990, p 29).
3) A rapidly changing environment may hinder the subsidiary management's
ability to adapt to changed circumstances and hence poor performance
results through control loss (Wright et al, 1983).
4) New opportunities may be lost due to the lack of incentive for the
management to take advantage of such opportunities. To revive a spirit of
entrepreneurship may necessitate spinning off of the division concerned so
that management may be rewarded more directly within the new smaller
spun-off unit.
5) There might be incentives for some managers to leave the organisation and
set up in direct competition to the parent. Alternatively, managers may
engage in opportunistic behaviour which cannot be resolved internally by
improved incentives. The parent in such cases may decide to encourage a
management buy-out while protecting the required relationship between the
ex-subsidiary and parent.
Following a divestment there would be the need for a change in the composition
and responsibility of the management team, and incentive structure.
Another area of management literature that is of relevance to organisational
problems and divestment decision is transaction cost efficiency. A transaction
represents the transfer of a good or service across a technologically separable
interface (Williamson, 1971, 1973). The purchase rather than production of a car
component by an automobile manufacturer would be an example of such a
transaction. The transaction at arm's length may be smooth, or the parties to the
transaction may disagree on the quality of the goods or service and haggle over
the terms of exchange. A smooth exchange could be achieved by an
organisational arrangement between the transactors to provide for each other's
needs within the same organisation.
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There are circumstances where the firm might decide not to obtain a
product or service from the outside but rather produce the same internally,
(Williamson, 1971). Williamson (1971, 1975) argues that a set of environmental
factors together with a related set of human factors cause such contracts to be
costly to write, execute and enforce. He attempts to identify these sources of
friction which ultimately lead transactions to be executed within a firm rather
than across a market. He holds that the benefits derived from internalisation of a
transaction are from informational efficiency, particularly where strategic and
operational responsibilities are separated within a multi-divisional (M-form)
structure. This structure is claimed to permit the use of decentralised information
whilst, at the same time, minimising the potential for shirking, opportunism, etc.
The transaction cost model underlines the suitability of internalisation of
transactions in areas where frequent applications of proprietary knowledge are
made; where assets are indivisible (Teece, 1980) and where there is lack of trust
in complex transactions (Butler and Carney, 1983). However, the cost of
coordinating or managing transactions within the organisation may offset the
benefits of a smooth, internally organised transaction. Under these
circumstances the parent might decide to divest, in the form of sell-off, or
spin-off or management buy-out, and purchase the required product or service
from the divested part.
2.1.2 NEED FOR CASH
By the term "need for cash" we refer to the urgent need for funds to finance the
business as a going concern or to boost performance of some divisions in an
attempt to avoid further deterioration of the firm's financial position and ultimate
bankruptcy. Such needs for funds are distinguished from general requirements
for investment funds by their urgency. The requirements for long term
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investment funds are dealt with in Section 2.1.3 on Strategic Change below,
where the parent is considering the reshaping of the investment portfolio of the
group and the requirements for further investments.
The need for cash may be observed at the level of the subsidiary or the parent.
At the subsidiary level there may be demand for a large cash injection to
implement a project with recognised potential. The parent may be either unable
to raise, internally or externally, the required capital and thus lose the opportunity
for growth in that subsidiary. Two options may then be open to the parent: First,
the sale of the whole subsidiary and preferably, at a premium, to a buyer who can
exploit the potential of the subsidiary best. Secondly, the parent may have the
option to divest a different unit to raise sufficient cash for injecting into the
subsidiary with growth potential. In both cases the divestment route is taken.
In cases of severe financial distress, divestment may be the only route to
avoiding bankruptcy. Divestment may be used as means of raising cash and
reducing the debt burden of the group. Such a divestment may follow high
leverage buy-outs or high leveraged acquisitions. For example, in the case of the
Iscoceles bid for the Gateway supermarket chain, an agreement was made prior
to the bid whereby Asda would purchase a certain number of Gateway stores.
The proceeds from the sales were used to reduce the high levels of debt following
this acquisition. An extreme case of such an exercise is total liquidation, as an
alternative to bankruptcy. This would constitute selling assets of the firm
piecemeal to various interested parties rather than selling the whole of the firm to
one buyer. There is also a case for partial or total liquidation when management
believes that the existing management structure is no longer viable and that not
only do the assets have a higher-valued use elsewhere, but they are also more
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valuable divided and sold off in piecemeal fashion, (Hite and Owers, 1986, p.
422). Liquidation is proposed in such a situation as a way of unlocking such
shareholder wealth. The current organisation in this situation is dismantled and
each unit or division is sold as a going concern. Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987)
find highly significant risk adjusted returns to shareholders over the
announcement period of liquidation (12.2% average).
The need for cash, although often stated as a reason for divestment, seems
to be only one of the reasons for divestment as it can be a very expensive way of
raising funds compared with borrowing or issuing equity (Linn and Rozeff,
1986, p.430). The real cause may simply be opportunistic in that the seller feels
it can obtain a good price for the subsidiary. The fact that the newly liquid assets
are used to pay off debt may be a secondary matter and not the sole purpose of
divestment
2.1.3 STRATEGIC CHANGE
Strategic planning as defined by Argenti (1974, p.15) is careful, deliberate,
systematic taking of decisions which affect, or are intended to affect, the
organisation as a whole over long periods of time. Ansoff (1969, Ch. 1) suggests
that strategic decisions are those that arise from the external influences on the
company (ie from its environment) as opposed to tactical decisions which arise
from internal problems. In this study we define strategic change as change in
those strategies that determine financial structure, product and market structure
and organisation structure. Such decisions are a response to environmental
pressures and changes. One of the causes of such pressures could be the industry
life-cycle as explained earlier. Another major influence on the number of
divestments is the level of mergers and acquisitions. Divestment waves are
found to follow merger waves within one to two years (Linn and Rozeff, 1986
p.435).
The parent firm's management may lack the expertise to manage dissimilar
assets. The assets may be creating negative synergy, actively interfering with
other profitable operations of the parent. The process of strategic divestitures
enables selling firms to salvage a portion of their investment by selling assets to
other firms who could exploite them more profitably. Such divestments may
also be planned prior to an acquisition if they are seen to be a poor fit to the
acquiring firm. In cases of acquisitions of undervalued investments or firms with
underperforming management, the acquiror may, after increasing the value of a
segment acquired, sell-off that segment at a profit.
Some divestitures can be made to correct previous investment decisions
(Weston et al, 1990, p.226). Mistakes may occur in connection with internal or
external investments. Such mistakes are likely to occur when companies engage
in efforts to diversify. This is because they are moving into product-market areas
with which they have less familiarity than with their existing activities. Some
divestments represent the harvesting of earlier successful investments. Here the
purpose may be to make financial and mangerial resources available for
developing other profitable opportunities.
Re-structuring of an organisation in an ever changing environment is of
paramount importance. Corporate restructuring in times of crisis might well
result in divestments (Wright, 1985, p.9). Crisis could be manifested in such
areas as:
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a) Finance, that is, severe liquidity problems.
b) Labour contract, when there are insufficient incentives, inability to monitor
the labour force, divisional employees requiring parity with workers in other
divisions, and when there is an inability on the part of the parent to change
pay and incentives structures.
c) Product markets, when there is a long term decline in the firm's markets and
affinities between different parts of the corporation may break down.
d) Organisation failure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), where the functions of
the firm cannot be held together, monitored and managed effectively within
the existing organisation.
In each of the above cases the goal of the management is expected to be the
rescue of the group from the crisis and to maximise market value. Divestment, as
a means of corporate restructuring and regaining confidence within the group
may then be offered to the board in one or more of its various forms, spin-offs,
management buy-outs and sell-offs.
If the announced divestment is perceived by the market as good news, share
prices should increase and shareholders gain. An example of the usefulness of
divestiture as an effective tool in corporate restructuring is in the case of US
divestor Dillingham in 1978 (Hite and Owers, 1986, p419), where managers
orchestrated a remarkable series of structural changes and earned risk-adjusted
returns of 185% for their stockholders. Of this gain more than 160% preceded
the announcement of the leveraged buy-out proposals which included sell-offs,
piecemeal liquidation of assets, spin-offs and management buy-out.
The management of Dillingham started the restructuring following a
take-over threat which was initially perceived as a crisis. However, the
restructuring which was accomplished over a period of four years, was
conducted in a positive spirit of profit maximisation rather than rescue from
disaster. Whereas there are divestments that take place as a response to crisis,
there are also divestments by parents that take place in the absence of any crisis -
where the management can sell a unit at a price they can justify as a good deal.
The market should react positively to such deals and is apparently attracted to a
sell-off announcement when it can see that the parent is likely to remove certain
diseconomies and is shaped for making higher profits.
The sell-off of a subsidiary, division, or line of business, could be viewed as
a mechanism for transferring assets to higher valued users in other corporations.
The buyer of a divested entity may have comparative advantage in monitoring
and controlling the management of the subsidiary or may offer economies of
scale. Such gains from economic synergies are transferred to the seller in part as
a premium and thus one would expect to observe positive market response on
announcement of divestment in these cases. Linn and Rozeff (1984) argue that
there are only two valid reasons for divestitures:
1. The assets are worth more as part of the buyer's organisation
than as part of the seller's.
2. The assets are actively interfering with the seller's other
profitable operations.
2.2 FORMS OF DIVESTITURE
Divestiture can be defined as the sale of a segment of a company (assets, a
product line, a subsidiary) to a third party for cash or for securities (Weston et al,
1990, p.734-). If this part is sold to its management, it is called a management
buy-out. If the ownership is transfered to the same shareholders as the parent's, it is
called a spin-off and if it is sold to an outside party it is called a sell-off. Each of these
categories will be addressed individually. There are, however, other categorisations
of divestiture. Coyne and Wright (1986) divide divestitures into six categories based
on the nature of ownership severance, the relative frequency with which it takes
place and the post-divestment ownership of the part disposed of. They regard
franchising, contracting out and asset-swaps as forms of divestiture and offer the
following definitions (pp.2-4):
"Franchising is the means by which trade can take place. The precise form
varies, but normally involves some kind of competition for the exclusive right
to produce a firm's product or service in a particular area for a given period".
"Contracting out has similarities with franchising in that firms engage in tenders
for the production of a service. However, the distinction may be made that
contracting-out involves the provision of a specific good or service to the parent
company. To all intents and purposes, the contractor obtains a monopoly
position for the period of the contract, and the service or good will be normally
provided by a contractor who is a specialist in that area".
"The case of asset-swap or strategic trade is treated separately because, strictly
speaking, little if any funds change hands. Transfer of ownership is effected by
exchanging some of the assets of one firm with some of those of another". It is
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a match between what one company has which it wishes to dispose of and what
another company is prepared to offer. Although an asset-swap can stem from
the intention to divest a part of a business, it can also be regarded as a
reorganisation of a company's assets with the help of a matching party who
wishes to do the same. The payment, if any, is intended to equate the value of
assets swapped.
It is also necessary to mention equity carve-outs. Equity carve-out is defined
as a transaction in which a parent firm offers some of a subsidiary's common
stock to the general public, to bring in a cash infusion to the parent without loss
of control (Weston et al 1990, p.734). An equity carve-out is the initial public
offering (IPO) of some portion of the common stock of a wholly owned
subsidiary. These are also referred to as "split-off IPO's". The IPO of the
common stock of the subsidiary indicates public trading in a new and distinct set
of equity claims on the assets of the subsidiary.
However sell-offs, management buy-outs and spin-offs are the main
categories of divestitures as far as we are concerned. These all originate from
fundamental crises or opportunities within the internal and external
environments of the parent and affect its shareholders. We analyse in the next
sub-sections reasons for the choice of each method of divestment.
2.2.1 SPIN-OFFS
Corporate spin-off is defined as a transaction in which a company
distributes on a pro-rata basis all of the shares it owns in a subsidiary to its own
shareholders and creates a new company now owned directly by the parent
company shareholders, (Weston et al, 1990, p.745). In the case of a spin-off the
existing owners maintain ownership in and control over the newly divested
entity. Furthermore, the parent neither receives new funds nor incurs any
expenses other than flotation costs in relation to the spin-off.
Corporate spin-offs are more common in the USA and their rate accelerated in
the 1970's. There are also involuntary spin-offs. Commonly, involuntary
spinoffs are the result of complaints filed by a US federal or state regulatory
agency (Kudla and McInish, 1983, p.24). Federal complaints filed by the Federal
Trade Commission or the Department of Justice usually allege violation of
anti-trust laws, especially Section 7 of the Clayton Act. If the complaints are
upheld, the target of the complaint may be ordered to divest.
2.2.2 REASONS FOR VOLUNTARY SPIN-OFF
Seven categories of reasons for spin-offs can be drawn (Kudla and McInish,
1983, pp.12-26):
I- MANAGERIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Often the operations of the spun-off subsidiary are so different from
those of the parent that an independent management will benefit the
subsidiary. Operating as a wholly-owned subsidiary under central
management reduces the profit potential of what could otherwise be a profit
making and growing entity under its own independent management. As an
independent entity, the management would be expected to make the best use
of their skills and environment in order to survive. They can no longer depend
on the parent. The incentive to produce efficiently and profitably is much
greater under the new circumstances of independence. The operational and
financial progress of the spun-off subsidiary will be more visible to
shareholders, the separate business will require executives to generate growth
and profits. There will be a clear basis for evaluation and correspondingly a
more accurate basis for appraisal of performance of the management by
employees, the public, and the investment community.
Schipper and Smith (1983) find that their sample of spin-off firms was
characterised by diversity of operation and recent expansion. They suggest
spin-off was used to segregate distinct business lines, presumably for reasons
of imposed management efficiency. This is supportive of the management
efficiency hypothesis and probably the reason behind the recent spin-off
movement in the USA (Schipper and Smith, 1983, p.443). However, they do
not rule out the possibility of market undervaluation of conglomerate assets
as a reason for spin-off as explained below.
II- CAPITAL MARKET FORCES
The management of the parent might consider spin-off of a subsidiary if
it is believed that the market value of the spun-off subsidiary plus the market
value of the parent after spin-off would be greater than the market value of the
parent with the subsidiary before spin-off (Miles and Rosenfeld, 1984).
Miles and Rosenfeld (1984) found favourable performance of firms'
share prices following a spin-off. They find that firms with multiple lines of
business are difficult to value because of a lack of accounting data and
because few analysts track (or fully understand) multiple-industry firms.
When a spin-off takes place, the spun-off part would need to provide
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information and accounts of its own activities independent of the parent.
Such availability of information could assist investors and market analysts to
evaluate the worth of individual lines of business better than when the parent
is reporting on overall group performance. In cases where the individual lines
of business are undervalued, such availability of information through spin-off
could raise the market value of the divested parts and thus the overall worth of
the parent.
III- RISK EFFECT
In many spin-offs, the spun-off firm's activity is very different from that
of the parent. When the operation of the subsidiary is more risky than the
parent's, the parent management may consider disassociation from the risky
subsidiary. Such a decision is seen to achieve reduced volatility of earnings
and hence stability and reliable forward planning and growth of the parent,
(Kudla and McInish 1983, p.19).
IV- TAX BENEFITS
There are areas of operations that may benefit from tax advantages if
they are made independent of the parent. In the U.S.A., for example, if the
company's principal asset is real estate, it may be able to qualify as a Real
Estate Investment Trust (REIT). REIT may deduct dividends paid to
shareholders from income before calculating taxes (Kulda and McInish,
1983, p.20). Tax related issues relevant to divestments in the U.K. are
discussed later in this chapter under the sell-off Section 2.2.5.
V- MARKETING CONSIDERATIONS
Sometimes, firms spin off subsidiaries whose operations are not closely
related to their primary activities, not for reasons of reducing risk but for
marketing considerations. The reason offered is that such a move can allay
fears of customers, suppliers and others, that these firms were not committed
to, and might end participation in, their particular industries. Another
example of spin-off motivated by marketing considerations is when the
spin-off is designed to separate potentially incompatible product lines.
Division of two incompatible parts is aimed to enhance each division in its
effort to market its products (Kudla and McInish, 1983, p.23).
Incompatibility can arise in marketing organisations and sales back up. For
example, food and electronic products may require different types of
marketing organisations.
VI- REGULATORY FACTORS
Regulatory factors have been the cause of both involuntary and
voluntary spin-offs. Voluntary spin-offs have been made to separate
regulated and unregulated businesses. For example CBS Inc., spun off
Viacom International Inc. to comply with the rules of the US Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), which prevented television networks
from engaging in domestic cable television (CATV) operations and also
severely restricted their ability to do business in the worldwide film
syndication field (Kudla and McInish, 1983, p.24).
VII- LEGAL FACTORS
Voluntary spin-offs are sometimes made by firms as a means of
overcoming legal obstacles which prevent the firm from accomplishing its
objectives. For example the Bank Holding Act 1969, in the USA, requires
companies whose business is not principally banking to divest themselves of
ownership and control of a commercial bank (Kudla and Mclnish, 1983,
p.26).
2.2.3 MANAGEMENT BUY-OUTS
The purchase of a subsidiary from its parent by the subsidiary's own
managers is called a management buy-out. The division is then run by
owner-managers. The buy-out arrangement is applicable to both the private
sector and the public sector and is, therefore, one of the means of privatisation.
There are many instances whereby the management buy the company from
absentee shareholders, a current owner-manager, the receiver, etc. Divestment
by management buy-out is not the focus of attention as far as this study is
concerned.
There are times when purchase of the subsidiary is not directly affordable by
its current management. When the purchase is largely financed by debt the term
leveraged buy-out is often used. If the management is prepared to pay the market
price for the division, the parent may decide to sell the subsidiary to its
management. Often the existing management is prepared to pay a higher price
than an outside firm as their dream of owning their own business can suddenly
come true in a collective way. Managers whose jobs might otherwise be in
jeopardy tend to accept highly leveraged buy-outs. Their hopes for increased
efficiency, productivity and profit stem from the fact that they all now care more
and have no one to rely on for their salaries but their own joint effort.
Furthermore, they have inside information on the real value of the subsidiary and
may thus be prepared to pay a higher price than the market.
Management buy-outs increased during the 80's since: a) the number of
divestments as a whole increased, b) finance was made available for leveraged
buy-outs, c) it was a convenient way of divesting and d) the relationship of the
parent with the subsidiary could still be maintained if needed. Management
buy-outs in the UK grew during the 80's both in total value and average value.
The share of all acquisitions accounted for by buy-outs and buy-ins rose sharply
to almost a third of the total volume at 31.8% in 1989 and 22.1% of value in 1989
(Wright et al, 1992). However, in the first half of 1990, acquisitions of
independent companies and buy-ins both fell sharply. Buy-ins are defined as the
purchase of an equity holding by a new management team. The joint share of
buy-outs and buy-ins in all takeovers by value reached a peak of 26.6%. Their
share of volume was 34.9%, which was the highest since 1985. In 1979 these
were only 3% of all acquisitions (Wright et al, 1992).
According to Stallworthy and Kharbanda (1988): i) management buy-outs may
lead to a revitalisation of the company and later resale or flotation of the company
on the stock market. ii) The time between management buy-out and floatation on
the stock market has been getting shorter. iii) There is a tendency to increased
gearing (debt/equity) ratio in management buy-outs. iv) There are cases where
managers have paid too high a price for the subsidiary and have eventually sold
at a loss to another company or gone bankrupt. v) Based on the US experience,
management buy-outs with the following characteristics have generally been
found to be sound (Stallworthy and Kharbanda 1988, p.174):
1) Strong, stable earnings history with a predictable cash flow.
2) Growth, but not too fast.
3) A well defined niche in the market.
4) Are not too capital intensive and do not require much capital in near future.
5) Have a strong proven management
In general, if the profits of a subsidiary are dependent more on the
management and labour force than on its capital investment and technology, a
divestment by management buy-out would be expected to enhance performance.
From the parent's point of view, the subsidiary would thus be of greater value to
its existing management than to an outside investor as a detached independent
entity. Therefore under such circumstances the parent might choose to divest by
management buy-out in order to fetch higher sale proceeds. Some conditions for
a successful management buy-out from the point of view of the vendor and the
MB 0 team might be:
a) the management is prepared to pay the required price.
b) a quick and quiet internal sale is preferable to the parent.
c) sale to management will better preserve the overall reputation of the parent.
d) there is a personal bond such that the internal management will be
preferred.
e) there is sufficient hope and commitment on the part of the parent and the
future management of the divested part to make the buy-out a success.
UK evidence from two surveys covering the first half of the 1980's (Wright,
1986; Wright, Chiplin, Thompson and Robbie, 1990) shows that almost two
fifths of the bought-out divisions or subsidiaries sold their products and services
to the former parent. Around one quarter of buy-outs were found to purchase
goods from their former parent. However, for the most part, these links account
for a relatively small share of the buy-out's sale and purchases. Buy-outs from
non-UK parents were found, on average, to have a higher portion of sales and
supplies relations with their former owners than was the case with those acquired
from UK parents (Wright, Chiplin, Thompson and Robbie, 1990). UK parents
were generally customers and non-UK parents were suppliers to the divested
part.
2.2.4 SELL-OFFS
However key to this thesis is the sell-off. A sell-off is defined as the sale of
a part of a business to an independent buyer. It is the traditional method of
disposing of a subsidiary. Following a major acquisition the unwanted portions
are often sold off. A sell-off may result from financial, organisational or strategic
considerations raised by internal development and growth, or may follow an
acquisition. In the latter case a single acquired company may be split into several
parts for multiple sell-offs or several acquisitions may be grouped for a single
divestment. In 1980's a new form of acquisition emerged in the US, termed
"bust-up" take-over, in which companies were acquired and quickly
dismembered because the company was valued in aggregate lower than the sum
that could be realised by reselling the pieces separately.
Examination of US data for the years 1963 - 1983 reflects a strong
relationship between annual rate of change in merger activity in any given year,
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and the annual rate of change in divestiture in the years after. Linn and Rozeff
(1986, p.435) find a strong statistical relationship between the annual rate of
change in merger activity in any given year, and the annual rate of change in
divestitures two years after. In other words, if the rate of mergers jumps we
expect that the rate of divestitures will rise sharply within one to two years
thereafter. Conversely, if the merger rate declines we can predict that the
divestiture rate will fall several years later.
Porter (1987) compiled data on a sample of 33 US Companies over the
period of 1950-1986. Each company on average entered 27 new sectors or fields
(e.g. financial services) and 80 new industries within the existing field of the
company (e.g. insurance). About 70% of each entry was made via acquisitions.
On average his sample firms divested 53.4% of acquisitions in new industries
and 60% of acquisitions in new fields. When acquisitions were in fields
unrelated to the companies' existing fields, the rate of divestiture was 71%.
Company divestiture to acquisition ratios up to 1980 range from 87% down to
17%. Similarly W.T. Grimm (1987) data shows divestiture to acquisition ratios
for the years 1975 to 1987 ranging between 35 to 54%. Such high
divestiture/acquisition rates could be interpreted as signs of dynamism among
US firms, and a contribution to resource mobility within an enterprise economy.
A large survey of US acquisitions and divestments by Ravenscraft and
Scherer (1987, pp.159-191) throws some light on the nature of divestment
activity. It shows that units acquired and later divested were on average in robust
good health at the time of their acquisition, but became gravely ill thereafter. It is
estimated that one third of acquisitions made during the 1960's and the early
1970's in the US were subsequently resold. Acquired units were much more
likely to be subject to divestiture, than lines already operated by the parent
company in 1950. Declining profitability at the line of business or company level
or both, characteristically preceded a sell-off. Change in top management
encouraged the divestiture of acquired lines of business as the new management
had less personal attachment to existing lines. On the other hand, a strong market
position, reflected by high market shares and/or a large prior investment in
research, diminished the probability of sell-off. No evidence was found by
Ravenscroft and Scherer to support the argument that R & D and advertising
spending were cut back by the parent disproportionately in anticipation of a
sell-off. Their study finds that sell-off tends to occur in response to profit
performance deemed unsatisfactory by corporate management. They also found
that for both acquired and original lines, sell-off was on average a manifestation
of financial distress, that is, severe financial pressures precipitated the decision to
sell. Following sell-offs, substantial efficiency increases often occurred under
the new organisational structures established following divestiture.
In the UK, Wright (1988) shows that buy-out targets were usually owned only
for a small portion of their lives by the divesting parent before they were
purchased by an MBO team. In respect of sell-offs, Chiplin and Wright (1980)
show that over a quarter of the firms which divested in the two year sample period
they examined engaged in more than one divestment, with 4% undertaking at
least four sales of subsidiaries. From January 1984 to June 1986, some 16% of
the acquiring firms in the UK divested subsidiaries either to another group or to
incumbent management (Wright et al, 1992).
Companies Act 1989 requirements enable the Director General of Fair
Trading to discuss with the parties involved possible modifications to merger
proposals, usually involving the divestment of some of the assets of the merging
business in order to avoid reference to Monopolies and Mergers Commission
(MMC). Divestment may be ordered without reference to the MMC if legally
binding undertakings, to dispose of the required assets within a given period, are not
honoured. Recent recommendations of the MMC in respect of divestment include
requirements to divest the whole of an acquisition; divest the offending part of a
larger acquisition; reduce the shareholding in its target. In many cases the MMC has
sought to obtain undertakings from the parties concerned and has proposed
divestment if such undertakings to dispose of assets cannot be agreed (Wright et al,
1992).
As far as tax issues are concerned, it is comparatively rare for taxation
considerations to be the driving force behind corporate restructuring (Dicker 1990,
p. 99). It is, however, argued that the replacement of equity by debt in the form of
leveraged buy-outs in the United States is tax-driven. There are three ways of
divesting (Attwood,1988):
1. Selling the shares of an existing company.
2. Transferring the divested asset/operation into a new company
and selling shares of the new company to the acquiror, the so called "hive
down".
3. Direct sales of assets.
The divestor is primarily interested in the capital gains cost of selling. No
capital gains will be paid on the sales of assets of the divested part if the divested unit
is sold as an existing company rather than a combination of assets. The
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divested company will cease to be a member of the group with losses or charges
on income transferred to the parent up to the date of divestment. If divestment is
in the form of sale of shares, any capital loss from such sales may be used to
shelter gains arising elsewhere within the group. The parent may choose to pay
an intragroup dividend out of the profits of the divested unit immediately prior to
its sale. This will provide the parent with tax-exempt income and, by depressing
the value of the divested company's shares, reduce or eliminate the chargeable
gain on the sale of those shares. Such taxation considerations affect divestment
decision in terms of form and value to the parent. The parent may decide to delay
or bring forward a divestment decision due to taxation considerations. However,
divestments are unlikely to be triggered mainly by tax issues as there are other
major strategic and economic issues that drive the divestment decision.
This study concentrates on sell-offs in the UK and their impact on
shareholder wealth. As in the US studies, we expect to find that a sell-off
announcement has a clear impact on the market. Chapter 3 reviews the US
research to date and highlights the economic and research issues addressed in the
various studies.
Chapter 2 highlighted the fundamental reasons for divestment such as
strategic change, the need for cash and management problems. Forms of
divestments were briefly explained and attention was focused on sell-offs as the
topic of this research. It was explained that corporate restructuring through
divestments should in principle help put the parent into a shape where it is more
fit to survive, compete and produce profits. One would therefore, in general,
expect the announcement of a divestment to be received as good news by the
market leading to a boost in share prices and produce an "excess" or "abnormal
return" ie abnormal relative to the market. Mathematical definitions and
methods of calculation of the abnormal return metric are discussed in Chapter 4.
In Chapter 3, we review the previous studies that have measured the excess
returns over announcement day or period. Our review will demonstrate that
sell-off announcements, in general, are associated with excess returns which are
also gains to shareholders. However, the magnitude of these gains varies from
case to case. Researchers have sought to explore the underlying relationships
between sell-off characteristics and excess returns by forming various categories
of sell-offs and measuring abnormal returns for each category. For instance,
aggregate abnormal returns from categories of sell-off price declarers and
non-declarers have been compared. Such analysis has revealed many reasons for
differential positive and negative market reactions over the announcement
period.
Chapter 3 will begin by briefly highlighting US sell-off studies and their
overall results. It will then concentrate on the issues researched and report the
findings of these studies. It ends by previewing the issues that are investigated in
this study. The methodology employed is described in Chapter 4.
Chapter 3 REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Chapter 2 outlined the main forms of divestiture and sought to explain the causes of
divestiture. The impact of the divestiture announcement on the stock price of the
divestor has been a focus of interest for researchers. In addition to assessing the general
impact of the announcement on shareholder wealth, researchers have also attempted to
discover the underlying reasons for the impact on stock returns. This chapter will begin
by reviewing the extant research and highlighting key research issues and results. We
shall then define the research areas addressed and framework of this study and explain
our analytical approach. Our hypotheses and research methodology are set out in
Chapter 4. Results then follow in Chapter 5.
Generally, the sell-off announcement has been shown to be associated with risk
adjusted excess returns accruing to the divestor shareholders. With the exception of
Alexander, Benson and Kampmeyer (1984) and Denning and Shastri (1990) sell-off
studies have demonstrated such risk adjusted excess returns to be statistically
significant. These studies include Boudreaux (1975), Hearth and Zaima (1984 and
1986), Zaima and Hearth (1985), Jain (1985), Rosenfeld (1984), Klein (1986),
Tehranian, Traylos and Waegelein (1987), Hite, Owers and Rogers (1987) and
Hirschey, Slovin and Zaima (1990). Similar statistically significant risk adjusted
excess returns are observed for spin-offs (eg, Schipper and Smith 1983; Miles and
Rosenfeld 1983). S chipper and Smith (1986) report the same for equity carve-outs and
Hite and Vetsuypens (1989) demonstrate similar results for MBO' s.
Hite, Owers and Rogers (1987) suggest that these results may be due to
inefficiencies in the current operating policies and/or organisational structure of
divesting firms. Klein (1986) supports the view that asset sales are associated with the
movement of economic resources to higher valued users. Tehranian, Travalos and
Waegelein (1987) find that divesting firms with long-term compensation plans
experience a more favourable sell-off announcement effect than do firms without such
a method of compensation, suggesting that such compensation plans bring the interests
of managers and investors in line with each other and the management sell-off decision
reflects this convergence of interests.
In Chapter 2 we explained how divestiture could be used as a management response
to the need for strategic change. Montgomery, Thomas and Kamath (1984) argue that
voluntary divestitures that are part of clearly identified strategies should create more
value than divestitures that take place in a reactionary or piecemeal manner or
divestitures arising from unidentified or short term performance criteria. They
compare sell-off announcement abnormal returns across five different categories of
divestiture viz:-
1. Strategic divestiture, that is a divestiture related to corporate or business level
strategy, eg. to exit an industry, to move away from or towards "core" businesses or
to realign a firm's product mix within a given industry.
2. Selling undesired units, that is, divestitures as a means of ridding the firm of
unwanted units and with no link with specific strategic aims.
3. Selling in response to liquidity concerns, that is, divestitures in response to
bankruptcies, near bankruptcies or extended period of loss.
4. Forced divestitures, that is, divestitures required by US Federal agencies.
5. Undiscussed divestitures, that is divestitures on which the divestor did not
comment.
Montgomery et al (1984) find that divestitures that were part of integrated, strategic
plans exhibited large positive stock market effects. In contrast, the group of routine,
non-strategic divestitures was associated with negative stock price effects. The
remaining categories of divestitures, including those undertaken because of liquidity
needs, government pressure, or unstated reasons, exhibited non-significant changes in
stock prices. These results support the view that divestiture decisions should be
grounded in careful strategic analysis that links the unit in question to broader firm
goals.
Porter (1976) and Harrigan (1981) have written about structural, strategic and
managerial exit barriers that can delay exit decisions. Porter (1976) found that such exit
bather measures to be important predictors of non-divestment of unprofitable
businesses, suggesting that 'barriers to exit' stand in the way of some divestment
decisions. Even less tangible than exit bathers that can reduce the divestiture prospects
are the subtle costs of disuniting. These factors include emotional issues, such as
employee morale and face-saving and transaction costs (the cost of executing the
transfer of division to the new parent) surrounding separation. Denning (1988), as
explained later in this chapter, also shows that the effect of divestment is significantly
related to the motivation behind it. Where loss making operations are divested,
management may generate a significantly positive impact on shareholder wealth.
Furthermore where units are sold to managers, as a means of dealing with agency cost
problems, positive but insignificant divestor shareholders' wealth improvements
occur.
Jain (1985) confirms higher positive abnormal returns occurring for sellers than for
buyers of divestments. Sicherman and Pettway (1987) found significant positive
announcement effects for acquirers of divestments which had product line relatedness
and negative effects for the acquisition of unrelated divested assets. Acquisitions of
product-line related assets from financially weak divestors produced positive but not
significant abnormal returns. However, purchases of related assets from non-weak
parent firms yields highly significant cumulative abnormal returns. Hite et al (1987)
show positive benefits for both sellers and buyers when transactions are completed.
Rosenfeld (1984) suggests that the weak positive abnormal results obtained by
Alexander et al (1984) may be due to smallness of relative size of the divested part to the
parent. Klein (1986) finds significant positive abnormal returns for relatively large
sell-offs and sell-off announcements that incorporate price. In the absence of price
information on announcement, Klein (1986) finds returns not to be significantly
different from zero. Zaima and Hearth (1985) find relative size of sell-off to parent has
a positive relationship with the abnormal returns produced. Denning and Shastri (1990)
explicitly choose fifty large single corporate divestitures with no other confounding
news releases during the announcement period and found the abnormal returns
obtained to be statistically insignificant across the entire time horizon surrounding the
divestiture announcement and completion. This result was, thus, contrary to all
previous studies except that of Alexander eta! (1984).
Research to date has examined a number of factors that might possibly affect the
magnitude of the market reaction to the sell-off announcement. Such studies have
concentrated on the following areas:
a) The impact of price disclosure accompanying the sell-off.
b) The certainty of the sell-off deal completion.
c) The relative size of the divested part to that of the parent.
d) The movement of the abnormal return at various stages of announcement and
completion.
e) The impact of information on the divestor's long term performance plan for
management.
0 The impact of the declared management rationale for divestment.
g) The confounding effect of other news/divestments.
h) The financial strength of the divestor.
i) Insider trading, ownership structure and market assessment of corporate sell-offs.
j) Financial and managerial factors leading to and influencing the decision to divest
such as debt/equity ratio and personal attachment of managers to the unit being
considered for divestment.
3.1 PRICE DISCLOSURE
Price declaration is an important factor in influencing the magnitude of the
announcement impact on the market for two main reasons. Firstly, it provides the
market with an assessment of the sell-off deal in terms of net present value.
Secondly, the availability of an agreed price demonstrates to the market that
negotiations between parties are well advanced and major issues are clarified and
prices agreed. The availability of price provides some comfort to the market that the
deal will be completed.
Klein (1986) divides her sample of sell-off firms into those that have declared the
price on or after announcement and those that have not declared the price. She finds
that divestment announcements with price declaration produce on average 2.5%
excess (abnormal) returns with t statistics of 3.41 which is significant at the 1% level
and divestment announcements without any price declaration generate mean
abnormal returns of only 0.02% which is statistically insignificant (t-statistic =
0.06). The difference between the returns to the two sub-samples is also highly
significant.
3.2 CERTAINTY ASSESSMENT
Divestment announcements may take the form only of a stated intention to divest,
i.e. an intention announcement, with no certainty of the deal reaching completion
stage. However, if at this stage a price is also announced then as explained earlier
some advance towards the consummation of the deal may be presumed. On the
other hand, announcement of divestment may often be made only after the deal has
been completed i.e. a completion announcement. Such an announcement may not
always contain price information.
Hearth and Zaima (1986) aim to assess the impact of lack of certainty of
completion by studying the movement in abnormal returns before announcement,
between announcement and completion, and after completion. Positive abnormal
returns are found prior to announcement but only random abnormal returns after
completion. The stock market continues to react to a sell-off during the period
between the announcement and completion dates. Unlike the pre-announcement
period, however, the significant total abnormal returns are not positively skewed.
There are positive and negative movements. Hearth and Zaima (1986) suggest that
some uncertaintity with respect to the divesting firm is resolved during the interim
period, though in some cases the resolution leads to negative price movements.
These negative movements could also be interpreted as price adjustments to
over-speculation over share prices during the pre-announcement period. Hearth and
Zaima's (1986) analysis does examine the market response during the overall
divestiture but does not conclusively demonstrate a relationship between the degree
of certainty of a deal being completed and market valuation, as is done in this thesis.
Klein (1986) uses price disclosure as a proxy for the probability of success of a
deal reaching completion stage. This assumption leads to her comparative study of
the impact of price declaration on sell-offs that had been announced at the intention
stage and those that had been announced on completion.
Table 3.1 displays the results of Klein with a slight change in terminology. The
results reveal the highest gains for price declarers on announcement of intention and
negligible gains for the no-price samples irrespective of completion/intention.
Klein then regresses the 3 day cumulative abnormal returns, (CAR's for days -2 to
0), on price as a dummy variable and relative size (see Section 3.3 below) and finds
relative size is also significant.
Table 3.1 - CAR (%) and t-statistics for Klein (1986) Price vs No-Price and
Intention vs Completion sub-samples.
SAMPLE Price No Price
Completion CAR (-2,0) 1.62% 0.02%
t- statistics (2.23)b (0.49)
Sample size N=76 N=87
Intention CAR (-2,0) 6.79% 0.02%
t- statistics (2.97)a (0.03)
Sample size N=15 N=37
Note: (1) a' b indicate 1% and 5% levels of significance.
(2) The term, "intention", is used as a substitute for the term "consideration
stage" and the term "completion" is used as a substitute for "agreement
reached".
A further regression with the addition of agreement reached (completion)/ not
reached (intention) as a dummy variable in the equation results in:
a) No reduction in the explanatory power or the magnitude of the price and
relative size variables. This suggests that the market is not using the price
declaration as a proxy for the probability of deal completion.
b) A negative slope for the agreement reached (completion) parameter.
Klein found these results counter-intuitive and was unable to explain why the
market appears to react more positively to a price declaration without a signed
agreement than to a price declaration with a signed agreement. She is thus forced to
discard price declaration as a proxy for possibility of success, i.e. certainty of the
deal being completed. Klein's study explores the importance of price declaration
and relative size on abnormal return gains. The differential impact of a completion
versus intention on announcement irrespective of price disclosure is not studied. In
this study the analysis of uncertainty is approached by testing:
a) The differential impact of a completion announcement versus an intention
announcement irrespective of price declaration. This tests the impact of the
certainty of the sell-off being completed.
b) The marginal impact of price declaration on sub-groups announcing either
intention or completion. This tests for the certainty over the value of the
sell-off.
Although Klein does subdivide her samples into the same four categories of
price/no-price and intention/completion as we do, she does not test for the impact of
price and completion announcements in the same way as this study does.
3.3 RELATIVE SIZE
The relative size of divestment is the ratio of the divestment price to the market
capitalisation of the divestor. Zaima and Hearth (1985) and Klein (1986), as seen
earlier, demonstrate a positive relationship between the relative size of divestment
and the abnormal return produced on announcement. Such a relationship would
seem plausible as the gains from a larger sale would be absorbed by a smaller
remaining parent thus having a greater relative impact than a divestment of smaller
relative size, ceteris paribus.
3.4 FINANCIAL STRENGTH OF DIVESTOR
Zaima and Hearth (1985) aim to assess the impact of the financial strength and
bargaining position of the divestor on the abnormal returns to sell-off
announcement. Standard and Poor's common stock rankings are used as a rough
guide to the financial status of the seller. These ranks are based on historical trends
of a variety of measures of profitability and financial strength focusing on earnings
and dividends. Sellers are classified as of 'good' financial status if their Standard
and Poor's rankings are A+, A, or A-, while sellers whose rankings are below A- are
classified as having 'poor' financial status. Zaima and Hearth provide evidence that
the stronger the financial position of the seller, the larger the positive excess returns.
The rationale for using financial strength in the study of Zaima and Hearth (1985)
is to assess the impact of the strength in the negotiating position of the divestor in
achieving a more favourable deal, thus finding a positive relationship between
financial strength and excess returns on announcement. In our study we assess the
excess returns in cases where divestment may have originated from a financial crisis
and is aimed at avoiding bankruptcy. This aspect of financial strength, relating
explicitly to bankruptcy avoidance, is an issue of more general concern, than the
focus of Zaima and Hearth's study. In this thesis the Z-score (Altman, 1968) is used
as a measure of financial strength and bankruptcy potential as explained later. (See
Section 4.9).
3.5 INSIDER TRADING, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
Hirschey and Zaima (1989) argue that the market assessment of corporate
sell-off decisions is made within the context of other available information that
facilitates the characterization of the sell-off event as favourable or unfavourable for
divesting firm shareholders. Examples of such information are management
earnings forecasts, ownership structure and insider trading. It would be logical to
assume that if a sell-off announcement is expected to increase the share price, the
management would try to purchase company shares prior to announcement.
Penman (1985), for example, explores the impact of insider trading by evaluating
the information content of managements' earnings forecasts within the context of
insider buy/sell decisions. Penman (1985) finds consistently positive daily mean
abnormal returns when higher management earnings forecasts are accompanied by
high levels of insider net-buy activity. It can also be argued that investment and
financial decisions are indeed more compatible with stockholder interests when
managers hold a substantial ownership interest. The market assessment of
investment or divestment decisions could indeed then vary according to the
ownership structure of the firm.
Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) and Sicherman and Pettway (1987) find
ownership structure of the firm can have important implications for investment and
financing decisions. Specifically, Agrawal and Mandellcer (1987) report that
investment and financing decisions tend to increase the variance of investment
returns when managers have significant common stock and option holdings.
Conversely, these decisions tend to reduce the variance of returns when managers
hold little ownership interest. Both studies conclude that executive holdings of
common stock work to reduce agency problems related to managerial decisions.
Consistent with the findings of Penman (1985), Agrawal and Mandelker (1987)
and Sicherman and Pettway (1987), Hirschey and Zaima (1989) hypothesise that
sell-off decisions by closely held firms with recent insider net-buy activity are
viewed by the market as likely to be compatible with stockholder interests. They
find a highly positive market reaction to sell-offs by firms with net-buy activity in
the six-month period immediately preceding the sell-off announcement. The
positive market reaction is less evident for firms displaying insider net-sell activity
during the same period. Similarly, the market seems to regard more favourably the
sell-off decisions of closely held versus widely held firms.
Hirschey and Zaima (1989) subdivide their sample of sell-offs into four
subsamples of net-buy/closely held, net-buy/widely held, net-sell/closely held and
net-sell/widely held and study the market reaction to the sell-off announcements of
each sub-group. They find the market reaction runs from very favourable for insider
net-buy/closely held firms to neutral for insider net-sell/widely held firms. These
findings demonstrate that insider trading and ownership structure data appear to
convey information that is used by investors in their evaluation of sell-off decisions.
3.6 LONG TERM PERFORMANCE PLAN
Management long term performance plans are designed to help commit
managers to longer term goals when making investment decisions. The interests of
management and stockholders can significantly diverge when firms make
investment decision (Mikkelson and Ruback, 1985). Managers who are not induced
to focus on long term profits may be motivated to aim for short term profit
performance, perhaps at the expense of the longer term, so as to improve perceptions
of their abilitiy and earn higher salaries and bonuses (Narayanan, 1985). Research
shows that the announcement of the adoption of long term performance plans
produces statistically significant positive abnormal returns (Larcker, 1983;
Brickley, Bhagat and Lease, 1985). Tehranian, Travlos and Waegelein (1987)
document the following:
a) Announcement of a sell-off by a divesting firm compensating its executives
with a long term plan is associated with a favourable security market reaction
with average abnormal return of 0.65% for days (-1 to 0) (t = 2.25, significant at
the 5% level).
b) Announcement of sell-offs by divesting firms not compensating their
executives with a long term performance plan is not associated with a
favourable security market reaction producing average negative abnormal
returns of -0.15% for days (-1 to 0) (t = -0.64).
It would be of interest to see how many of the sample sell-offs in Alexander et al
(1984) leading to statistically insignificant abnormal negative returns are companies
that had no long term performance plans for their management. In this research this
issue is not considered due to data non-availability problems.
3.7 MANAGEMENT MOTIVES
Karen Craft Denning (1988) explores the impact of managerial motivations on
the magnitude of abnormal returns surrounding the divestiture announcements by
categorising different managerial motivations for sell-offs and spin-offs and
observing abnormal returns produced before, between announcement and
completion, and following completion of such divestments. Six basic hypotheses
about corporate divestment are considered:
1. No Effect Hypothesis: In perfect capital markets, it may be that the divestment of
a division is no different from the divestment of publicly traded stocks or bonds from
the firm's portfolio. Therefore no abnormal returns would be expected to be earned,
if value additivity is preserved. According to the value additivity principle, the
value of the divested part and that of the remainder of the parent together should not
be any different from the original value of the parent.
2. The Wealth Transfer Hypothesis: As Galai and Masulis (1976)point out, after
divestment there are fewer assets backing the firm's debt and therefore the market
value of debt decreases. Since the value of the firm is the sum of the values of debt
and stock, a constant firm value implies that a decrease in the value of debt must be
accompanied by an increase in stock value. Furthermore, wealth transfers might be
due to the sale or spin-off resulting in an increase in the variance of the parent
company returns.
3. Losing Operations Hypothesis: Costly bankruptcy or financial distress is
regarded as a market imperfection and may be viewed as a motivation for
divestiture. Such a suggestion has been made by Denning (1988), who reports on an
unpublished study by Magiera and Grunewald (1987), and also by Hite, Owers and
Rogers (1987). A firm may divest a unit due to its loss-making operations or due to
a desire to isolate the assets of the firm from unprofitable assets in the unit.
Additionally, assets may be divested to meet debt service payments or to increase
liquidity and thus reduce the bankruptcy probability of the parent.
4. Agency Problem Resolution: As explained in Chapter 2, firms may divest due to
an agency problem, (Jensen and Meekling, 1976). Two such problems are
under-investment and managerial behaviour that does not maximise value. In the
case of under-investment, Myers (1977) presents a theoretical argument that the
presence of debt in firms that are otherwise value maximising can cause firms to
forego profitable investment opportunities because the benefits go to the bond
holders. Therefore the parent may divest in the form of a "spin-off" to enable the
shareholders to benefit from growth opportunities without enabling the bond
holders to do so. In the case of managerial behaviour, divestment can be seen as a
way of enhancing managerial performance by separating differing managerial units
or by providing some managers with an ownership interest in the firm.
5. Good News Information: The market interprets the net present value of a
divestment to be positive. If firm value can be increased by divesting, the parent
receives an economic gain from doing so, and stock values reflect this gain.
6. Bad News Information: The divestment news could be indicative of
management's negative perception of the firms situation such as poor liquidity,
losing operations, inefficiencies, negative synergies, (Linn and Rozeff, 1984).
Denning (1988) examines the stockholder wealth impact in concert with the
rationale offered by corporate management for evidence that the divestment has had
its intended impact. She finds that, when divesting firms are categorised according
to managerial motivations for divestment, as expressed by management, the
market's response to announcements within the same categories are similar.
Denning (1988) finds that:
a) Single major divestments are frequently associated with change in return
volatility but are infrequently associated with significant change in divestor
mean return. There are, however, two exceptions:
i) sell-offs of losing operations lead to significantly positive abnormal
returns during the announcement period (AD -6 to AD +6) where AD is the
announced date of intention to divest;
ii) spin-offs lead to larger mean returns to stockholders during the divestment
period (DD-6 to DD+6) compared with pre-announcement period (DD-25
to DD-7) and post divestment period (DD+7 to DD+259), where DD is the
divested date.
The changes in the return volatility as a proxy for changes in the variance of
returns on the firm's assets also indicate that the divestment impact varies with
categorisation of the sample. A discussion of stock return variance as a proxy for
firm return variance is presented by Eger (1983) and Agrawal and Mandellcer (1987).
The agency problem sample firms generally show a post-divestment variance
decrease, while the losing operations and spin-off categories generally evidence a
post-divestment variance increase.
Denning (1988) concludes that her results indicate that the parameter changes
associated with divestiture vary depending on the motivation for divestment.
Categories appear quite different from one another in mean returns and variances.
When firms are categorised according to managerial motivations for divestment, a
more meaningful interpretation of the divestment effects is feasible.
3.8 CONFOUNDING EFFECT OF OTHER NEWS
Denning and Shastri (1990) examine only firms with single, large divestments
with no other announcement made during the period surrounding the
announcement. Consistent with Alexander, Benson and Kampmeyer (1984), they
find no significant announcement or divestment period excess returns. This result is
contradictory to the findings of other studies reviewed earlier. Denning and Shastri
suggest that the samples of sell-offs used in other studies suffer from confounding
news or events.
In our study only single divestments above £250,000, where price is declared,
are considered without screening for simultaneous release of other non-divestment
news, as in the study of Denning and Shastri (1990).
3.9 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DIVESTMENT DECISION
Duhaime and Grant (1984) consider divestment of whole business units or
divisions of large diversified firms and investigate the impact of the following
factors on the divestment decisions by firms:
a) Firm financial strength: The following measures were selected as indicators
of firms' financial strength or weakness. This is measured by i) return on equity,
ii) debt/equity ratio, iii) dividend paid as a percentage of earnings.
b) Unit strength: This is measured in relative terms to other units and based on
the performance of the divested unit against the budgeted performance.
Persistently under-performing units or loss making operations pressurise
management into considering divestment.
c) Unit interdependency: This is a measure of how much other units depend on
the unit considered for divestment. Duhaime and Grant find that units that are
very little depended upon by other units are divested once the divestment option
is chosen.
d) General economic environment: As one might expect, divestment is more
seriously considered during a contraction than an expansion phase of the
economic cycle. Under economic pressure firms are forced to preserve the
activities they are successful at and dispose of their less successful activities.
e) Managerial Attachment: The personal attachment and involvement of
divestment decision-makers in the affairs of units which are divestment
candidates. One would expect emotional resistance in divestment of units that
the decision makers have personal involvement and attachment to.
Duhaime and Grant (1984) find that financial strength, tested by a number of
alternative measures, yields mixed results. The data shows that divestment
decisions were generally made when firms' performance levels were below those of
their industries. It appears that firms' competitive performance is an important
influence on their decision to divest The hypothesis that divestment decisions
would generally be made in periods of economic contraction is not supported by the
data. More instances of low managerial attachment than high are reported, but the
difference is not statistically significant.
In the UK the recession of the early 1980's is said to have increased the number
of divestment taking place (Coyne and Wright 1982). In a UK study of divestments,
Thomas (1986) pointed out four likely considerations in a decision to divest:
i)	 the scale of resources that would be required if a situation were to be corrected
along side other businesses within the parent.
ii) the expectation as to viability of the problem subsidiary, assuming an
appropriate support can be mounted.
iii) the strategic importance of the group's long term aims.
iv) other options open to the group if it were now to pull out of the activity
proposed to be divested.
3.10 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
All the US studies of divestments have followed the Brown and Warner (1985)
or Dodd and Warner (1983) event study methodology. Details of this methodology,
which is adopted in this study, are explained in Chapter 4. However, some of the
related issues arising from the literature review are discussed below.
3.10.1 SAMPLE SIZE
Jain (1985) used a sample size of 1064 sell-offs but his results are similar to
those of Hite, Owers and Rogers (1987) with a sample size of only 42, suggesting
that sample sizes of about 40 may be adequate for such event studies. Klein
(1986), in fact, makes inferences with a sub-sample of 15 (her "Intention Price
group").
3.10.2 ESTIMATION PERIOD
Estimation period is a period well outside the event period used for
measuring the relationship between a security's price movement and that of the
market. The reason for separating the estimation period from the event period (
also called observation period) is to ensure that the estimated parameters are
measured under normal market conditions and are not affected by the event
under investigation.
Various estimation periods have been adopted in the reviewed studies. Jain
(1985) uses days t=-480 to day t = -360, as his sample of sell-off firms tend to
perform poorly in the period immediately before announcement. To test for any
changes in results due to the different estimation periods, Jain (1985) also applies
parameters obtained from a post-divestment period of 120 days. However,
similar results were found to those obtained using the pre-announcement period
of -480 to -360 days as the estimation period.
Alexander et al (1984) adopt pre-event (-150 to -30 days), post-event (30 to 150
days) and a combination of pre and post event estimation periods. The reason for
using a post-event estimation period is that there is the probability that the firm
has changed following divestment and the same pre-event model of the firm may
not be appropriate for predicting post-event returns. Using the mean adjusted
returns model, they argue that the pre-event data is appropriate for estimating the
pre-event abnormal returns and post-event data is appropriate for estimating the
post-event abnormal returns. Therefore, both periods should be used separately
for estimating abnormal returns. This so called 'both-but-separate' procedure
for the estimation periods is recommended. The reason is that the mean of
standardised residuals obtained during the pre-event period is biased with
respect to post-event standardised residuals and vice versa. However, when
using the market model the tendency is to be content with pre-event data alone
(Zaima and Hearth, 1986; Klein, 1986). Such application assumes no significant
change in betas following divestitures, a view which is supported by Magiera and
Grunewald (1978), Choi and Philippatos (1982) and Klein (1986). In this
research pre-event data from t =-180 to -40 is used to keep well separated the
event and pre-announcement performance of returns although this does not
avoid the problem of post-event 13 change.
3.10.3 CHOICE OF PREDICTION MODEL
A prediction model is a model of the relationship between individual security
and market returns estimated under normal market conditions. Such a model is
used to predict the security return in the absence of an event taking place on a
given date. Any difference between the predicted return and that actually
observed following the event is called the abnormal or excess return.
Studies of divestment have used the Mean Adjusted Model, the Single Index
Market Model and the Market Adjusted Model for predicting normal returns and
hence calculating abnormal returns resulting from the divestment event. We
discuss these methodologies in Chapter 4.
3.11 THE PRESENT RESEARCH
In addition to studying the impact of sell-off announcements on shareholder
wealth, in the present comparative UK based study the following issues are
examined:
1) The effect of the degree of uncertainty of the divestment deal being completed.
2) The effect of the degree of uncertainty about the price of the deal
3) The relationship between the financial status of the divestor and wealth gains to
divestor shareholders.
4) The relationship between the relative size of divestment and the wealth gains to
divestor for shareholder.
The above issues are treated in the present research in the manner explained in the
following sub-sections.
3.11.1 CERTAINTY ASSESSMENT
The effect of certainty of divestment is measured by grouping the
announcements into two sub-groups:
a) Intention Group - those divestors that announce only the intention to
sell-off.
b) Completion Group - those divestors that announce the completion of
divestment first without prior announcement of intention.
Comparison of the results of these two sub-groups is expected to indicate
the impact of the degree of certainty of completion of divestment reflected in the
announcement on shareholder wealth. In the absence of news of sell-off
completion, market reaction will be affected by speculation as to whether the
deal will be consummated or not. Our approach to measuring the impact of
degree of certainty is original and contributes to the field of divestment studies.
Note, however, that in creating a sub-group of completed divestments we make
an inherent assumption that the first public announcement of a completed
divestment has not been preceded by leakage of the news of the intention to
divest. In other words we assume that both the intention and contemporaneous
completion events are separately and clearly recorded. The Intention sub-sample
in comparison includes both successful divestments that are later publicly
declared completed and unsuccessful divestments later abandoned.
We would expect that this Intention sub-sample should give a clear
indication of the impact of an announcement that may or may not be completed.
One would also expect the news of completion of divestment to have leaked
more than that of intention to devest, as in the former case more people, such as
bankers, accountants and solicitors, will have been involved before the deal is
finalised. However, the same source of public announcements is used for
identifying the members of both Intention and Completion sub-groups, namely
Acquisitions Monthly. In doing so we are at least confident that the completion
announcements included in our sample have not been preceded by
announcements of intention to divest.
3.11.2 PRICE DECLARATION, RELATIVE SIZE AND
FINANCIAL STRENGTH
Unlike Klein (1986) who has assessed the impact of price disclosure at
various stages of the divestment process, we study the impact of price disclosure
with sell-off announcement by dividing our sample into Price Disclosure and
No-Price groups and comparing abnormal returns between these two
sub-samples. The impact of price declaration is also similarly assessed within
each of the Intention and Completion sub-samples.
The No-Price sub-samples will probably include cases where price is
announced after the initial divestment announcement. Klein studied the impact
of such subsequent price announcement. However, due to data problems, this
study does not investigate this issue and includes only announcements of
divestments with price in the Price Disclosure group. As in the Klein (1986) and
Hearth and Zaima (1984) studies, the impact of relative size and financial
strength on abnormal returns is explored through regression analysis.
Table 3.2 provides a summary of results and methodology of the main studies
reviewed earlier. In Chapter 4 we shall specify the hypotheses being tested in this
study and the methodology used for testing. This will be followed by results in
Chapter 5.
TABLE 3.2- Results of Selected Divestiture (Sell-off) Studies
Study Methodology CAR(%) Event
Dates
t-Statistics Sample
Size
Hearth & Zaima SIM 3.55 (-5,5) t=3.14a 58
(1984)
Rosenfeld MAR 2.33 (-1,0) t=4.60a 62
(1984)
Alexander et al MAR 0.17 (-1,0) t=0.6795 53
(1984) MKTADJ 0.40 (-1,0) t=1.48
MKTADJ -0.31 (-1,0) t=1.04 39*
Jain SIM -0.40 (-10,-6) t=-2.40" 1064
(1985) SIM 0.70 (-5,-1) t= 4.04a 1064
SIM -0.20 (+1,+5) t=-1.03 1064
srm 0.09 (0) .. t=1.27 1064
Klein SIM 1.12 (-2,0) t=2.83* 202
(1986)
Hite et al SIM 1.66 (-1,0) z=4.08* 55
(1987)
Montgomery et al SIM 7.25 -12 Mths not 78
(1984) +12 Mths significant
at 5%
Denning & Shastri MKTADJ 0.014 (-6,+6) neither 50
(1990) 0.016 (T-6,T+6) significant
at 5%
Hirschey & Zaima SIM 5.12 (-1, 0) t=5.12a 170
(1980)
Hirschey et al MAR 1.46 (-1, 0) t=4.36a 75
(1990)
Linn & Rozeff MAR 1.45 (-1, 0) t=5.36a 77
(1984)
Notes:
1- a'b denote significance at 1% and 5% levels respectively
* denotes single divestments as compared with multiple divestments.
MAR = mean adjusted returns model; SIM = single index model;
MKTADJ = market adjusted returns model.
2- Event days in brackets are defined relative to the announcement date, t=0, or
the completion day. CARs (cumulative average residuals) are those reported
in the original research. Not all authors report CARs for (t = -1,0) separately.
Chapter 4 HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY AND DATA
There are a number of competing theories regarding the corporate divestment
decision and the wealth consequences for the divestor's shareholders are not in the
same direction or of the same magnitude under each scenario. According to the Value
Additivity theory, which assumes strong form efficient capital markets, the value of the
divested part is the same whether it is a stand-alone business or a subsidiary of another
firm. Therefore, the divestment should not lead to any increase in shareholder wealth
of the divestor. On the other hand, a divestment may be regarded as a positive NPV
decision for a number of plausible reasons.
In general, the firm should not undertake a sell-off unless it is likely to benefit its
shareholders. Thus we would expect ceteris paribus a positive change in investors'
beliefs about the firm and upward stock price revision on a divestiture announcement.
In the divestment context, shareholder value creation may arise from a number of
sources. Firstly, it may be that the divested business is worth more to another firm than
to its current owners (Jain, 1985; Linn & Rozeff, 1986). Secondly, the sell-off may be
of a loss making operation that is generating negative synergy. Its disposal thus
eliminates a source of value diminution to the divestor's shareholders. Thirdly,
divestment may aim at narrowing the spread of business activities thereby conserving
valuable management resource, enhancing managerial productivity and eliminating
diseconomies of decision management and management control (Hite, Owers and
Rogers, 1987). By abridging the range of activities, the monitoring and control costs in
managing a diversified set of operations may be reduced. Finally, the sell-off may have
resulted from a carefully thought out strategic redirection of business resources from
low to high yielding activities. As such, a sell-off may constitute a "good news" signal
to shareholders about future prospects and investment strategies of the divestor
(Rosenfeld, 1984). If any of these arguments hold, divestor shareholders are likely to
experience a wealth increment.
Hite, Owers and Rogers (1987) also provide an information argument, derived from
the "sitting on a gold mine' hypothesis of Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983) for tender
offers ie. that an offer by a third party for part of a firm's assets gives credible evidence
for the mispricing of the divesting firm's securities. However, the authors find
evidence that supports Bradley et al's alternative synergy hypothesis. Only if control of
the assets in question is ultimately transferred to the bidder does a permanent upward
revaluation of the divestor's equity occur. Hite et al (1987), in addition, suggest that
such disposals may be undertaken to raise cash and reduce high levels of debt. Here
asset sales are preferred to the sale of new securities given the adverse market reaction
to new equity issues. Milckelson and Partch (1986), Asquith and Mullins (1986),
Masulis and Korwar (1986), and Eckbo (1986), all confirm that stock prices generally
react non-positively to the announcement of a new security offering. The general
explanation offered relates to differential information between managers and outside
investors. Managers have incentives to behave opportunistically and sell new equity
when their private information indicates that the stock is over valued. Consequently,
rational investors discount the value of the firm when new equity sales are announced
(Hite et al, 1987).
The wealth transfer hypothesis (Denning, 1988) posits that within the options model
framework, a sell-off, by reducing the amount of asset backing to debtholders in the
firm or by increasing the variablility of overall return to the firm, may result in a transfer
of wealth from debtholders to stockholders. If such a transfer is engineered by
management to favour equity holders, these latter will experience an increase in their
wealth. On the other hand, if as is possible, the sell-off reduces the volatility of the
firm's returns, the transfer will be in the other direction and shareholders will
experience a wealth decrement. In the case of the "bankruptcy avoidance" motive, a
sell-off may be forced on a management as a way of raising enough cash to maintain
corporate solvency. Such a distress sale, if unanticipated, may signal "bad news" about
the parlous state of the divesting firm's financial condition and the stockmarket will
mark down its equity resulting in its shareholders suffering relative impoverishment.
On the other hand, a sell-off, even by a financially weak firm whose financial condition
is already known, may signify that management is taking decisive action and that the
future performance of the firm is likely to be improved. Such a market perception will
enhance shareholders' wealth.
The foregoing array of theories of corporate divestment suggest that no ex-ante
prediction of the impact on shareholder wealth can be made and that the matter has to be
resolved empirically. In the light of the above set of arguments and theories we
investigate a number of different specific hypotheses and discuss their implications. As
we report in detail in Chapter 3, the extant literature reports not only that the stock
market reacts to sell-off announcements but also that the direction and magnitude of
this reaction is influenced by a variety of factors concomitant with the divestment
process.
4.1 HYPOTHESES
Our first hypothesis concerns the market reaction to sell-offs in the UK and
their general impact on shareholder wealth. The following hypotheses explore the
impact of contingent factors on such market reaction.
Hl: Corporate sell-offs do not lead to any significant change in divesting
company shareholder wealth.
Failure to reject this null hypothesis is consistent with the Value Additivity
theory. Rejecting the null hypothesis is consistent with any of the other theories
described. If there is a significant increase in shareholder wealth we have
evidence in support of one or more of the theories presented above which regard
divestment as a positive NPV decision. A significant decline in wealth will
support the distress sale paradigm or the model that predicts wealth transfer
from stockholders to debtholders. All extant studies with the exception of
Alexander, Benson and Kampmeyer (1984) and Denning and Shastri (1990)
have found statistically significant positive returns accruing to stockholders of
divesting firms on announcement day.
The stock market's reaction may be determined by contingent factors which are
likely to influence the market's evaluation of i) the degree of uncertainty over
the consummation of the divestment and ii) the economic significance of the
sell-off to the divestor.
Price disclosure accompanying a sell-off announcement has a dual role. It may
lend an air of definitiveness to the sell-off decision thereby mitigating the
uncertainty referred to above. However, price disclosure may also have a role
beyond mere affirmation of the certainty of sell-off. It permits estimation of the
relative size of the sell-off which may indicate the economic significance of the
divestment. The information content of relative size may, therefore, be greater
than that of mere price disclosure. Moreover, price disclosure may proxy for
relative size if management divulges price only in respect of large sell-offs or
the financial press selectively reports only large sell-offs. Our second and third
hypotheses relate to these two aspects of price disclosure.
H2: Changes in shareholder wealth are independent of price disclosure at
announcement.
This null hypothesis implies that investor reaction to the sell-off
announcement is independent of whether the transaction price is disclosed or
not. In the context of the signalling hypothesis, it is the divestment
announcement per se which constitutes news, good or bad, about future
investment strategies (Klein, 1986) or the financial condition of the firm. If the
null hypothesis is not rejected no differential market reaction should obtain
between samples of sell-off announcements containing price disclosure and
those without price disclosure. If the null hypothesis is rejected and larger
wealth gains accrue to the former sample than to the latter, we have evidence
consistent with a favourable impact of either or both of the two attributes of the
price information.
Klein (1986) finds significant differential reaction in the expected direction
and suggests that the mixed findings for announcement day excess returns in
other studies may relate to whether the price is disclosed as well as the size of
divestiture. The same hypothesis is tested on a sub-sample of Intentions and a
sub-sample of Completions to gain further insight into the price disclosure
impact.
H3 Changes in shareholder wealth are independent of whether the firm
announces completion of sell-off or only an intention to divest.
In this case the null position, as with price disclosure, is that it is the sell-off
announcement per se that triggers any investor reaction. However, the
announcement of mere intention to divest does not alleviate the uncertainty as
to (a) whether the deal will be subsequently consummated and (b) the ultimate
price at which the deal will take place, whether or not a price is given initially.
Announcement of sale completion, however, mitigates the uncertainty and we
would expect the market to react with greater assurance. Therefore,
shareholder wealth increase (or decrease) is likely to be of a larger magnitude
following the announcement of completion than when only the intention to
divest is announced.
Where the announcement of intention is accompanied by price information
regarding the sale, this disclosure may further mitigate the uncertainty.
Therefore our prior belief is that market reaction to an intention announcement
is likely to be greater with price disclosure than when there is no such
disclosure. In the context of a completion announcement, however, the role of
price disclosure is somewhat more complex. The contribution of price to
uncertainty resolution is likely to be minimal since the deal is already done.
But a completion announcement without associated price disclosure may
diminish the market's ability to appraise the economic significance of the
sell-off, potentially leading to an adverse reaction born of dark misgivings
about the divestment decision.
The same hypothesis is tested on sub-samples with price declared but with
either intention only or completion of divestment announced. Comparison of
these two sub-samples allows the assessment of the level of uncertainty
associated with the stage of completion of the divestment deal independent of
the uncertainty resulting from non-disclosure of price. H3 is also tested on two
similar sub-samples with no-price disclosure.
To assess the joint impact of price and completion we compare the sub- samples
of Intention No-Price (n = 17) and Completion with Price (n = 73) and test for
significant differences in mean abnormal returns. This, we suggest, is the most
effective way of assessing the impact of uncertainty since these two sub-samples
represent the extremes in the level of certainty about the divestment decision.
H4 Size of divestment relative to size of parent is not related to change in
shareholder wealth.
This proposition is a refinement of Hypothesis 2. On the assumption that price
disclosure has information content to the market leading to abnormal returns to
stockholders on sell-off announcement, the null would posit that the relative
size of sell-off is not in itself relevant to the formation of market participant
perceptions.
Inability to reject the null hypothesis would be reflected in the lack of
significant relationship between magnitude of abnormal return and the ratio of
sell-off price to market value of the divestor. If, on the other hand, the degree
of association is statistically significant and positive we would again have
evidence consistent with theories regarding divestiture as a positive NPV
decision. This is particularly so as in this case the larger the sell-off, the greater
the impact on shareholder wealth. If the relationship holds but is in the
opposite direction, a more complex argument is suggested. This is that major
abridgements in the firm's operating structure are viewed adversely and
possibly construed as "a fire sale" under financial distress by market
participants who judge small disposals more positively as embodying an
orderly and deliberative corporate re-structuring strategy.
Klein (1986) finds relative size of sell-off to be positively correlated with
excess return and both Hearth and Zaima (1984) and Klein find their portfolios
of large divestitures significantly outperforming their portfolios of small
divestitures.
H5 The financial strength of the divestor does not affect market reaction to
the announcement of a sell-off.
This null hypothesis relates to the "bankruptcy avoidance" motive, ie that the
sell-off may be forced on the firm's unwilling management to raise cash in an
attempt to ensure survival, thereby constitAAing a distress saIt. if 1.`ntie -is no
evidence of differencial market reaction to divestments by financially healthy
and financially distressed firms then we have no evidence in support of this
hypothesis.
If, on the other hand, the null hypothesis is rejected and sell-offs by financially
weak firms lead to greater increase in shareholder wealth than those by
financially strong enterprises, we would have positive evidence to support the
bankruptcy avoidance proposition. This is on the basis that the ailing firm is
likely to be worth more to shareholders as a going concern than bankrupt. An
alternative, although related argument, is information related in that the
sell-off may be taken as signalling that the company's management is taking
strong action to improve firm performance. On the other hand, the null
hypothesis would be rejected equally if divestments by financially weak firms
generated shareholder wealth losses. In this case, such sell-offs would be
viewed by the market as negative NPV decisions and we would have evidence
consistent with the "harbinger of doom" or "fire sale" interpretations of the
sell-offs.
If, however, corporate disposals by strong firms earn greater abnormal returns
to stockholders than those by financially weak enterprises, we would have
evidence consistent variously with the idea that a strong firm can shop around
and obtain a better price for its assets (Hearth and Zaima, 1.984).
These confounding implications of divestor financial strength have not been
explored in the literature to date. Hearth and Zaima (1984) split their sample of
divesting firms into two of almost equal size on the basis of Standard and
Poor's common stock rankings used to measure financial status. They find that
their sample of good financial status firms exhibit greater cumulative
abnormal returns associated with a sell-off than do their sample of poor
financial status enterprises. Hearth and Zaima use these results to argue that
strong firms are in a better position to obtain good prices for their assets than
weaker firms. Sicherman and Pettway (1987) explore the relationship between
the worsening of the financial condition of the divestor, and a consequent
potential weakening in its negotiating position, and the gains earned by the
acquiring firm and employ downgrading by Moody's and/or Standard and
Poor's within two years of a divestiture announcement as a measure of
financial weakness. However, the authors find no significant evidence to
support their argument.
Rosenfeld (1984) attempts to control the financial condition of his two samples
of sell-off and spin-off firms by categorising them into three classes, again
using Standard and Poor's common stock ratings. Companies in each sample
are classified as high, medium and low quality on the basis of S & P ratings one
year after announcement month. Rosenfeld's results are somewhat mixed with
no clear picture emerging as regards his sell-off sample although spin-offs by
high quality firms appear to earn substantially greater returns for shareholders
than do those by medium and low quality ranked enterprises. He concludes
that because S & P rating is an imperfect proxy for financial condition,
"...additional testing using alternative surrogates seems necessary before
definitive conclusions can be drawn."
In this thesis we focus explicitly on the bankruptcy avoidance motive and
compute z-scores (Altman, 1968; Taffler, 1983) for the firms in our sample, to
measure their bankruptcy risk directly.
4.2 MARKET EFFICIENCY AND MODELS FOR MEASURING
ABNORMAL RETURNS
4.2.1 MARKET EFFICIENCY
The event study methodology in this research is based on a set of
assumptions regarding the behaviour of the stock market. We assume that
markets are "efficient". A definition of an efficient market appeared in Fama
(1970): "It is a market in which prices always 'fully reflect' available
information".
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) states that "new information is
widely, quickly, and cheaply available to investors, that this information
includes what is knowable and relevant for judging securities, and that it is very
rapidly reflected in the security price", (Fama, 1970). Some investors may out
perform the market sometimes but if the EMH holds, such superior performance
cannot be consistently maintained. In an efficient market, as each new piece of
information becomes publicly available and is analysed, there is the possibility
of rapid changes in equilibrium as the new information becomes reflected in
market prices. These equilibrium prices will then hold until the next bit of
information becomes available. It is the speed with which new, relevant
information is reflected in share prices which makes a market informationaly
efficient.
Fama (1970) suggests three levels of market efficiency; the weak, the
semi-strong and the strong form:
a) Weak form efficiency: The information sub-set is past prices or returns.
This form states that the information contained in past share price data is
fully reflected in current prices. Returns in excess of the market average
cannot be earned from a study of historical share price patterns or financial
ratios.
b) Semi-strong form efficiency: The information sub-set is publicly available
information. Such information is speedily reflected in share prices. Current
prices, therefore, fully reflect all public information about the company and
excess returns cannot be made unless the investor has inside information.
c) Strong form efficiency: The information sub-set is all information whether
publicly available or not. The strong form states that share prices not only
reflect what is publicly known but also what is knowable. This form implies
that because of the activities of analysts and others involved in the stock
market, even before investors with inside information can trade based on the
information they possess, share prices will have adjusted so that no
substantial profit can be made from such information. Excess returns cannot
consistently be made by investors who have inside or monopolistic
information.
The following conditions for market efficiency are noted:
1) There are no transaction costs in trading securities.
2) All information is costlessly available to market participants.
3) All participants agree on the implications of current information for the
current price and distribution of future prices of each security.
The above assumptions are sufficient for market efficiency. It is obvious,
however, that a model based on these assumptions is a simplification of real
capital markets. For example, investors do incur transaction costs. A weaker and
economically more plausible version of the efficiency hypothesis says that prices
reflect information to the point where the marginal benefits of acting on
information (the profit to be made) do not exceed the marginal costs (Jensen,
1978). Fama (1991) suggests that due to information and trading costs the extreme
version of market efficiency is surely false. It provides, however, a clean bench
mark for laying out the evidence on the adjustment of prices to various kinds of
information. One can then investigate and judge scenarios where market
efficiency is a good approximation.
Empirical studies generally use the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
as a tool for analysing captital market efficiency. However CAPM and Capital
Market Efficiency are joint and inseparable hypotheses. Therefore any test of
market efficiencey that uses the CAPM to adjust for risk is a joint test of the
CAPM which assumes market efficiency for its derivation and of market
efficiency itself. Various sophisticated empirical tests of the CAPM (e.g:-
Black, Jensen, and Scholes, 1972; Black and Scholes, 1974; and Fama and
MacBeth, 1973) show that the CAPM fits reality surprisingly well. However,
because the theoretical CAPM assumes market efficiency, any empirical results
which show that on the average there are no significant deviations from the
model are merely consistent with market efficiency.
A number of writers have raised doubts about the validity of the EMH. The
Dyckman, Downes and Magee (1975) and Lev and Ohlson (1982) reviews of the
empirical evidence on informational market efficiency contain many studies
which question the EMH. However most major research has come down in
support of the semi-strong form which implies acceptance of the weak-form.
However, certain evidence is inconsistent with the strong form of efficiency
assumption. There are cases where individuals with inside information appear to
be able to earn abnormal returns both when selling and when buying (Jaffe, 1974;
Finnerty, 1976). Block traders also seem able to earn abnormal returns when
they trade at the block price as can purchasers of new equity issues (Scholes,
1972; Kraus and Stoll, 1972; Dann, Meyers, and Raab, 1977). There are, also,
irregularities in the stock price behaviour that can affect the measurement of
abnormal returns in testing market efficiency.
Security analysts provide a great deal of expertise about tax law and
portfolio diversification techniques. For these and other reasons, one can argue
that there is nothing inconsistent with the notion of capital market efficiency and
the existence of arbitrageurs and security analysis (Copeland and Weston, 1980,
p.211).
Tests of market efficiency and their conclusions can be summarised in the
following form:
a) Market efficiency in its weak form is rejected by recent research that is able to
show that daily and weekly returns may be predictable to a degree from past
returns, (Fama, 1991 p.1580).
b) Market efficiency in its semi-strong form can be tested through event studies,
where market reaction to a public announcement is measured. The typical result
in event studies on daily data is that, on average, stock prices seem to adjust
within a day to event announcements. Such quick reaction is consistent with
efficiency (Fama1991, p.1602).
c) Tests of market efficiency in its strong form aim to test whether any investors
have private information that is not fully reflected in market prices. Early work
(e.g. Jaffe, 1974) suggests that insiders may have information that is not reflected
in prices, and that the market may not react quickly to public information about
insider trading, leading to the conclusion that the stock market may not be
efficient. Seyhun (1986), however, confirms that, whereas insiders profit from
their trades, there is no evidence that outsiders can profit from public information
about insider trading.
One way of testing for the availability of private information is to test the
performance of investment managers. Unlike event studies, evaluating the
access of investment managers to private information involves measuring
abnormal returns over long periods. Such tests thus run into the joint-hypothesis
problem: measured abnormal returns can result from market inefficiency, a bad
model of market equilibrium, or problems in the way the model is implemented.
For instance, Ippolito (1989), using single-factor bench marks derived from the
Sharpe-Lintner model, finds that mutual fund managers have private
information that generates abnormal returns. In contrast, using 2- and 3-portfolio
benchmarks that are consistent with mutifactor asset-pricing models, Elton,
Gruber, Das and Hldarka (1991) and Brinson, Hood and Beebower (1986) find that
mutual funds on average have negative abnormal returns.
4.2.2 MARKET ANOMALIES
The Sharpe-Linter-Black (SLB) model predicts that market p suffice to
describe a security's expected returns. Basu (1977, 1983) shows that
earnings/price ratios (ER) can explain some of the expected return in shares. In
his studies, after controlling for p, the expected returns are positively related to
ER. Banz (1981) shows that a firm's size (price times shares) helps explain
expected returns. Given their market Ps, expected returns on small stocks are too
high, and expected returns on large stocks are too low. Bhandari (1988) shows
that leverage is positively related to expected stock returns in tests that also
include market betas. Chan, Hamao and Laldnoshok (1991) and Fama and French
(1992) find that book-to-market value of equity (the ratio of the book value of the
net assets of a firm to its market value) has strong explanatory power; controlling
for 13, higher book-to-market ratios are associated with higher expected returns.
Many seasonal patterns in returns have been observed and are referred to as
anomalies in the sense that asset-pricing models do not predict them. There are a
number of examples. Monday returns are on average lower than returns on other
days (Cross, 1973; French, 1980 and Gibbons and Hess, 1981). Returns are on
average higher on the day before a holiday (Ariel, 1990), and the last day of the
month (Ariel, 1987). In January, the stock returns, especially returns on small
stocks, are on average higher than in other months. Moreover, much of the
higher January return on small stocks comes on the last day in December and the
first 5 trading days in January (Keim, 1983; Roll, 1983). Dimson (1988) reports
various forms of "anomalies" and Keim (1988) reviews this literature.
Chan and Chen (1991) argue that the size effect is due to a distorted-firm factor
in returns and expected returns. When size is defined by the market value of
equity, small stocks include many marginal or depressed firms whose
performance (and survival) is sensitive to business conditions. Chan and Chen
argue that relative distress is an added risk factor in returns, not captured by
market beta, that is priced in expected returns. Fama and French (1991) argue that
since leverage and book-to-market equity are also largely driven by the market
value of equity, they also may proxy for risk factors in returns that are related to
relative distress or, more generally, to market judgements about the relative
prospects of firms. Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991) and Fama and French
(1991) find that size and book-to-market equity are related. Fama and French
(1991) find that leverage and book-to-market equity are highly correlated. Given
that the common driving variable in E/P, leverage, size and book-to-market
equity is a stock's price, it is hardly surprising that these links among anomalies
exist.
Levis (1989) studies the interdependency between size, dividend yield, PE
ratio and share price effect as share price is the common element between them.
The reason for such analysis is to see whether such anomalies are independent of
or related to market size. Reinganum (1981) and Banz and Breen (1986) argue
that the size effect subsumes the PE effect. Basu (1983) suggest the opposite,
that size related anomalies disappear when one controls for the PE effect. Cook
and Rozeff (1984) and Jaffe, Keim and Westerfield (1988) conclude that both PE
and size effect are at work.
There is also evidence of a significant positive relationship between dividend
yields and returns (e.g. Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1979; Blume, 1980;
Gordon and Bradford, 1980; Miller and Scholes, 1982; and Elton, Gruber and
Rentzler, 1983). Some authors attribute this relationship to disparity in the tax
rates for dividend yields and capital gains, others maintain that yield related
effects are due to information bias. Keim (1985) suggests that the positive
dividend yield-return relation is a direct result of concentration of smaller firms
in certain high dividend yield categories. Levis (1989) concludes that the
London Stock Exchange exhibits a number of irregularities in stock price
behaviour and that investment strategies based on dividend yields, PE multiples
and share prices seem to be at least as profitable, if not more so, as strategies
based on market size. Furthermore, the size effect is not entirely independent of
the other three irregularities. The significant market size effect, for example, is
markedly reduced when control over differences in dividend yield is exercised.
Size effect is further addressed in Section 4.8. below.
4.2.3 MARKET EFFICIENCY & EQUILIBRIUM MODELS
As explained earlier, event studies are a joint test of market efficiency and
model employed. Under semi-strong form efficiency we expect new
information to be speedily reflected in share prices. In this study, nevertheless,
to allow for the possibility that no single model may be fully descriptive of the
return generating equilibrium process, we conduct our tests of abnormal returns
with different model specifications.
The use of several return generating models, however, does not solve the
joint-hypothesis problem. Every test within our event study is conditional upon
the joint-hypothesis of the validity of a particular model employed and market
efficiency. Because of the joint-hypothesis problem, precise inferences about
the degree of market efficiency are likely to remain impossible (Fama 1991,
p.1576). Subject to such a limitation, our event study would test the market
reactions to firm specific information.
Nevertheless, Fama (1991) states that the clearest evidence on
market-efficiency comes from event studies on daily returns as they give a clear
picture of the speed of adjustment of prices to information. The results indicate
that prices adjust quickly to information about investment decisions, dividend
changes, changes in capital structure and corporate control transations. The
evidence tilts towards the conclusion that prices adjust efficiently to
firm-specific information Fama (1991, p.1607).
4.3 MODELS FOR MEASURING ABNORMAL RETURNS
In order to measure the abnormal return performance of a security it is
necessary to specify what the normal return is. The normal return may be defined to
be the equilibrium return that is expected from a security in response to changes in
the stock market return in the absence of a specific event. This assumed relationship
between security return and market return is used to predict future returns.
In every model employed in the present study the abnormal return for a given
security is defined as the difference between its actual ex post return and that which
is predicted by the equilibrium return generating model. That is, for security i at time
t:
A R if = R it — E (fi ii )	 (4.1)
where,
Rif = actual return,
u= the return which will be realised on security i in period t,
AR = abnormal return and,
E(I?"' it ) = the expected value of return
The notations used in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 are in line with Brown and Warner (1980
and 1985).
4.3.1 MARKET ADJUSTED RETURN
This model assumes that all securities move with the market at the same
rate. The model thus assumes that ex-ante expected returns are equal across all
securities. Since the market portfolio of risky assets M is a linear combination of
all securities, based on our assumption in this model for any given security i and
day t, the expected return is the same as the expected return for the market, that is:
E(fi,,)= E(E „„) = K,	 (4.2)
where, R„„= return on the market index and K,= bench mark return for security i
on day t.
The ex post abnormal return on any security i is given by the difference
between its return and that on the market portfolio. Using the same notation as
previously, the following formula has been used in this study for calculating
abnormal returns under the Market Adjusted Model:
AR„ =R 1, —R 	 (4.3)
The Market Adjusted Return Model is also consistent with the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (see next section) if all securities have systematic risk of unity
(Brown and Warner, 1980, p208).
4.3.2 OLS MARKET MODEL
This approach is based on finding the parameters oc i and pi by regression of
each security using the following single index model:
E (E- ,I) = sa, +Emt+
	 (4.4)
where,
ai and Pi =OLS slope coefficient for security i
ei,= error term in estimation.
Under this model the abnormal return is calculated as:
Eis AR, Rit Eci OA,/
	 (4.5)
Where ai and oi are OLS values from the estimation period. This model is one
of the most widely used in event studies as it is a variant of the Capital Asset
Pricing Model,(CAPM) discussed in the next section.
In an efficient market and in the absence of an event, the expected values of the
unexpected component,,,, of a security's return cannot systematically differ
from zero. Therefore c, would be equal to the abnormal return for security i at
time r.
4.3.3 MARKET AND RISK ADJUSTED RETURN MODEL
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is a return generating model which
adjusts security returns for both market movements and market related risk. This
economic model was developed almost simultaneously by Sharpe (1963, 1964)
and Treynor (1961), while Mossin (1966), Linter (1965, 1969) and Black (1972)
developed it further. The CAPM makes the following assumptions about
investors and their opportunity set (Copeland and Weston, 1988, p194):
1. Investors are risk-averse individuals who seek to maximise the expected
utility of their end-of-period wealth.
2. Investors are price takers and have homogeneous expectations about asset
returns which have a joint normal distribution.
3. There exists a risk-free asset such that investors may borrow or lend unlimited
amounts at the risk-free rate.
4. The quantities of assets are fixed. Also, all assets are marketable and perfectly
divisible.
5. Markets are frictionless and information is costless and simultaneouly
available to all investors.
6. There are no market imperfections such as taxes, regulations or
restrictions on short selling.
In the CAPM, for every security i :
E(fi ;,) = E(R- ft)+ Pi [E(IL)—E(R- ft )]	 (4.6)
where, Rft is the risk free return (Copeland and Weston, 1979, p179). In this
formulation the abnormal return is calculated as:
AR; =	 [Rft(1 — + PiRmj	 (43)
4.3.4 MEAN ADJUSTED RETURN
The Mean Adjusted Returns (MAR) Model assumes that the ex-ante
expected return for a security is a constant K. That is for each security i:
E(I?' ;,)=K;	 (4.8)
K; is calculated by taking a simple arithmetic average of returns on security
i during the estimation period. The abnormal return once again would be the
difference between the actual observed return R it and the average of returns for
the estimation period, that is:
AR„= R;,—K;	 (4.9)
This model is consistent with the Capital Asset Pricing Model; under the
assumption that a security has constant systematic risk and that the efficient
frontier is stationary, the Asset Pricing Model also predicts that a securities
expected return is expected to be constant, (Brown and Warner 1980, p208). The
Mean Adjusted Return model is simple to use as there is no need for calculating
individual security Ps and adjusting for thin trading (see Section 4.7 below).
4.3.5 COMPARISON BETWEEN MODELS
The MAR model, being simple and consistent with the CAPM, has been
used in various divestment studies such as Alexander et al (1984), Miles et al
(1983) and Rosenfeld (1984). This model can produce results compatible with
and even in some cases more accurate than more complicated models. The
reason is that although by defining the relationship between the security and the
market, in theory, we enhance the accuracy of the prediction model, such refined
models depend on estimations of parameters that in practice cannot be measured
accurately thus reducing the overall accuracy of such models. For instance, in
handling daily share price data one observes (a) non-normality of returns and
excess returns, (b) bias in OLS estimates of market model parameters in the
presence of non-sychronous trading and (c) long period of absence of trading,
particularly in small stocks.
There are several ways of measuring abnormal returns under different variants
of the CAPM. These include OLS market model residuals, Fama-MacBeth
(1973) residuals and control portfolios. The difference in the predictive ability of
these methods can be substantial, (Brown and Warner 1980, p.210).
In this study our data was separately analysed using the Market Adjusted
model, OLS - Market model and the CAPM. The Mean Adjusted Return model
is not used due to the fact that the data for this study is for the period 1985 - 1986
when the market was generally rising. This systematic rise within the market
introduces upward bias (Denning, 1987). Brown & Warner (1980) also find,
using monthly data, that when event dates are randomly selected but clustered in
calendar time, the Mean Adjusted method performed very poorly compared to
those methods which explicitly adjusted for market performance. Brown and
Warner (1985, p.267) also demonstrate, using daily data, that the Market
Adjusted Returns and the OLS Market models also outperform a simpler Mean
Adjusted Returns procedure, which has low power in cases involving event-date
clustering.
4.4 TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE OF ABNORMAL RETURNS -
DEPENDENCE ASSUMPTION
As a consequence of non-synchronous trading, as explained in later sections of
this chapter, daily excess returns can exhibit serial dependence. There may also be
cross-sectional dependence of the security-specific excess returns if there are
common influences on excess returns e.g. industry influence. By using a time-series
of average excess returns (ie. 'portfolio' excess returns), the test statistic presented
here takes into account cross-sectional dependence in the security-specific returns.
However, it ignores serial-dependence. Brown and Warner (1985, p.19) do not find
benefits from adjusting for serial-dependence. The test statistic presented in this
section is referred to as the dependence t-test in contrast to the independence t-test,
where cross-sectional independence is assumed (see Section 4.4.1 below). The
dependence t-test is used throughout the analysis in this study.
AR,
(AR,) (4.10)
S(AR,).I 1=-180
t .,
y, (AR,—X)2
139
(4.12)
i T = 1 ---21-1?—140 -iso	 '
(4.13)
The t-statistics used in this study are based on the Brown & Warner (1985)
methodology. The test statistic is the ratio of the event day mean abnormal return to
its standard deviation. The standard deviation is estimated from the time-series of
mean abnormal returns. The test statistic for any event day T is
where,
1 N,CAR, =— X AR, ,
N, i.1	 '
(4.11)	 .
Where,
N,= number of sample securities and
^ (AR,)= standard deviation of the daily average abnormal return.
If the daily average abnormal returns (AR,) are independent, identically
g
distributed, and normal, the test statistic is distributed Student-t with 139 degrees of
freedom under the null hypothesis. For measuring the statistical significance of
abnormal returns over a range of days surrounding the sell-off event the cumulative
average abnormal returns over the range needs to be calculated. The cumulative
average abnormal return metric (CAR) for M days from day b to day e (beginning to
end of observation period) is given by:
CAR
h' 
= I AR,
t =b
(4.14)
where It 1 b„ is the number of days from day b to day e:
A 1 b,e = e —b + 1	 (4.15)
The test statistic for significance of CAR is the ratio of that return to its estimated
standard deviation with 139 degrees of freedom (Jain 1985, p.215):
CAR
the= 	
S(AR,)A
Given the high degrees of freedom the test statistics may be assumed unit normal
in the absence of abnormal performance (Brown and Warner 1985, p.8 and 29).
4.4.1 CHANGES IN I3S
Divestiture changes the expected cash flow of a company. There is
therefore a possibility that the risk coefficient p, in the market model and the
CAPM for the company might change. Such a change would make the Ps
calculated during the estimation period a biased measure of risk when applied by
the observation period. Larcker, et al (1980) explore the possibility of shift in Ps
during the event period. Klein (1986) finds no statistically significant shift in Ps
following announcement of divestiture.
(4.16)
Klein (1986) separately fitted the market model to her data using a
post-announcement period (+50, +150) to find the model parameters for each
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ASR = — E AR'
N,,.1	 1,1
(4.20)
company. The r3s obtained from the post-announcement estimation period were
found not to be significantly different from those obtained from the
pre-announcement estimation period.
4.4.2 TEST STATISTICS UNDER THE INDEPENDENCE
ASSUMPTION
Abnormal returns observed for each security may be independent of one
another once the marketwide effects have been factored out as in the CAPM. If
so, the t-statistic is calculated differently as shown below.
Under the independence assumption the abnormal return AR E, of each
security i is divided by its estimated standard deviation to yield a standardised
abnormal return, (Brown and Warner, 1985, p.28), that is:
AR;
AR'. = 	
 .S(AR)
where,
t =-41
(AR1,,—AR;*)2
(AR;,;)=	 1=-180
139
1	 -41AR ;*	 I AR;
140 1 =-18o
(4.17)
(4.18)
(4.19)
Average standardised residual (ASR) for day t and cumulative average
standardised residuals (CASR) over the period b to e are calculated as below:
CASR b,e	ASR, 	 (4.21)
where,
Nt =	 number of sample securities at day t
b,e=	 beginning and end of the cumulation period relative to the event
day t=0
ASR= average standardised residual for day t.
Then following Brown and Warner (1985) the t statistics to test for the
significance of ASR, and CASR b,, are calculated as follows:
ZASR = N, ASR,	 (4.22)
ZCASR	 .CASRb,,
	 (4.23)
b,e
where Mb,,= e-b+1 days.
If the standardised excess returns are independent and identically distributed
with finite variance, in the absence of abnormal performance, the test statistic
will be distributed unit normal for large N, (Brown and Warner,1985, p.28;
Tehranian et al, 1987, pp.937-8).
4.5 1-TEST FOR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TWO MEANS
(DEPENDENCE ASSUMPTION)
Based on methodology used by Sicherman and Pettway (1987, footnote 4), and
Miles and Rosenfeld (1983), the t-test for significance of difference in the means of
two sub-samples i and) modified for equal cumulative interval, M b,,,is given by
CAR E — CARE
ti,j _ 	
MI; (S (AR i )2 + S (AR ;)2)2
(4.24)
where,
CAR; , CARJ = Cumulative abnormal return for sub-sample i and sub-sample j
Itlb,e= Time period over which the daily abnormal returns of the two
samples are cumulated.
S(AR;)= Standard deviation of daily abnormal return for sub-sample i
S(AR)= Standard deviation of daily abnormal return for sub-sample j
The degrees of freedom under this methodology are equal to (T 1 + 2), where
Ti and Tj are the number of days in the estimation periods of each of sub-samples.
For this study the degrees of freedom would be 140 + 140 - 2 =278. This test is
appropriate under the assumption that we are dealing with independent random
samples from two normal populations having the same unknown variance, (see
Miles and Rosenfeld, 1983, p.1603).
4.6 PROPERTIES OF DAILY DATA
The first divestment study, that of Boudreaux (1975), made use of monthly
data. Subsequent studies have used daily share price data with obvious benefits in
enhanced accuracy in terms of measuring the impact of the divestiture
announcement on a daily rather than monthly basis. The use of daily data in an event
study, however, introduces certain problems.
a) Non-Normality: In the case of daily stock returns, an individual security
exhibits a substantial departure from normality (Fama, 1976, p.21).
If the cross-sectional excess security returns are independent and identically
distributed drawings from finite variance distributions, the distribution of the
sample mean excess return converges to normality as the number of securities
increases - this is guaranteed under The Central Limit Theorem (Billingsley
1979, pp.308-319). Blattberg and Gonedes (1974) and Hagerman (1978)
provide some evidence that the distribution of the cross-sectional daily mean
return converges to a normal distribution.
Nevertheless Brown & Warner (1985) find that the non-normality of daily
returns has no obvious impact on event study methodology. Although daily
excess returns, for an individual security, are also highly non-normal, evidence
suggests that the mean excess return in a cross-section of securities converges
to normality as the number of sample securities increases.
b) Non-synchronous trading and estimation of the parameters of the market
model:
Not all securities are traded every day. When the trading interval for a security
is more than one day, any estimation of the regression between market return
and security return is distorted by the fact that the market returns are calculated
over one day intervals and the returns of a thinly traded stock are calculated
over a period longer than one day. Therefore, the return on a security and the
return on the market index are each measured over different trading intervals
and this causes ordinary least square (OLS) estimates of market model
parameters to be biased and inconsistent. Such bias is less noticeable in
monthly data than daily data. Treatment of daily data to account for
non-synchronous trading is discussed by Scholes and Williams (1977, p.324)
and Dimson (1979, p.197). In the present study both treatments are applied and
comparisons made.
c) Variance estimation:
The estimation of the variance of sample mean excess return is important for
tests of statistical significance for both daily and monthly data. Several
problems need to be addressed:
i) As a consequence of non-synchronous trading, excess returns can
exhibit serial dependence. Attempts have been made to incorporate
such serial dependence in excess returns into variance estimates in event
studies (see Ruback, 1982) and its implications for event studies are
examined by Brown and Warner (1985). There are also other
time-series properties, such as day of the week or week-end effects (see
French, 1980 and Gibbons and Hess, 1981). When non-synchronous
trading is present, for hypothesis tests over intervals of more than a day,
the failure to take into account autocorrelation in estimating the variance
of the cumulative mean excess return could result in model
misspecification. However, autocorrelation seems to play a minor role
and benefits from autocorrelation adjustmenets appear to be limited
(Brown and Warner, 1985, pp.19-20). Interestingly neither the Scholes -
Williams nor the Dimson procedures purge autocorrelation from the
excess return measure.
ii) Cross-sectional dependence of specific security returns can also exist.
There are advantages in adjusting for cross-sectional dependence (see
Brown and Warner, 1980; Beaver, 1981; Dent and Coffins, 1981).
There are also costs in adjusting for dependence when none is present. If
there is positive cross-sectional dependence, failure to make such an
adjustment results in a systematic under-estimation of the variance of
the mean excess return. This causes too many rejections of the null
hypothesis. Brown and Warner (1985) find that ignoring low levels of
dependence, as in the studies where event dates are not clustered,
introduces little bias in variance estimates.
Explicit use of the independence assumption can increase the efficiency
of the variance estimator. By permitting more precise estimation of the
variance used in the test statistic, the independence assumption can
make it easier to detect abnormal performance when it is present (Brown
and Warner, 1985, pp.20-21).
iii) There is evidence that the variance of stock returns increases for the days
immediately around events such as earning announcements (Beaver,
1968; Pate11 and Wolfson, 1979; and Kalay and Lowenstein, 1983).
Christie (1983) suggests that the variance in daily returns in some
studies could increase by a factor of almost two around event days. This
might lead to too many rejections of the null hypothesis. Brown and
Warner (1985) using a simulation approach show that doubling the
variance results in a rejection under the null hypothesis of 12% of cases,
almost three times the figure of 4.4% obtained with no variance
increase.
4.7 TREATMENT OF THIN TRADING
There are several methods of treating the thin trading problem and arriving at
an estimate of 3 when a security is infrequently traded. Among these we select
Scholes and Williams (1977) and Dimson (1979) methods for treatment of thin
trading in this study. These methods are explained below.
4.7.1 SCHOLES - WILLIAMS METHOD.
This method requires a record of whether and, not when, a share was traded
within a time period. The return is calculated and used only if a transaction is
known to have occurred in consecutive time periods. The market index is defined
(4.26)
to be the mean of all such returns. Using the simple market model regression,
such a definition of the market index overstates the 13s of shares that are as
frequently traded as the market. On the other hand the shares that are
infrequently or very frequently traded tend to have their risk underestimated. 13
is calculated by regressing the market model with either a synchronous, a lagged
or a lead market return.
R t = a +	 OkR .,i+k +e	 k= —1, 0, 1	 (4.25)
k=-1
where,
= estimated return at time t
= estimated market return at time t+k
a and Ok are the OLS values from the estimation period for any of the firms. The
unbiased estimator is given by the sum of the slope coefficients, divided by one
plus twice the autocorrelation coefficient, p, of the index. That is:
The Scholes and Williams (1977) method was utilised in obtaining a set of
alphas and Ps used in estimation of abnormal returns in this study.
4.7.2 DIMSON METHOD (1979)
Also known as the Aggregate Coefficient (AC) method, this consists of a
multiple regression of observed returns on preceding, synchronous and
subsequent market returns and then adding all the slope coefficients to obtain an
overall 13 for the security, that is, where:
-FE
h I =Oc+ i ilich ni,i+ k 	 1
1 3 = ± Ilk
k =-n
(4.27)
(4.28)
where,
h , = estimated security return on day t.
oc- and Ok = estimated slope coefficient.
[3k= 0 of a regression on day k (k = -n to +n).
R„,,, = is estimated market return at time t.
13 = overall [3 for a security.
n = number of lead and lag terms incorporated in the regression.
A combination of lags and leads is used to derive the Dimson adjusted 13s. Lag
terms generally seem to carry more weight in such multiple regressions. In this
study a combination of 5 lags and 2 leads is used. Whereas one would expect the
average [3s of a large number of companies to equal 1, ie be representative of the
market, it is observed that the arithmetic average of such [3s is less than one. Five
lag and two lead terms produced the highest average [3 of 0.92. This was higher
than the average 13s of 0.76 obtained from the Scholes and Williams method.
Comparison of various [3 estimates is made in Chapter 6. Fowler & Rorke (1983)
suggest a correction to the AC method to equate it to the Scholes and Williams
estimator. Although this adjustment was not adopted here, the derived Dimson
betas appear to suffer considerably less from downward bias than the Scholes
and Williams betas, suggesting such an adjustment may be unnecessary.
4.8 SIZE EFFECT
Dimson and Marsh (1986) demonstrate that abnormal returns are distorted
when:
a) the measurement interval, that is the observation period for the event, is long,
b) firms used in the event studies differ in size from the index constituents,
c) the size effect is large and/or volatile.
They discover that the likelihood of such biases is greater with CAPM-type
methodologies such as the models of Sharpe (1964), Linter (1965), Black's (1972)
two factor model as well as the Banz (1981) arbitrage portfolio model than it is with
the Single Index Market Model. Dimson and Marsh (1986) suggest that to measure
Ps without bias, security returns should be regressed not on the market index but on
a portfolio of firms of similar size. Due to unavailability of such data for UK firms,
our methodology has not included treatment for size effect.
Levis (1989) demonstrates that the size effect is not consistent across all dividend,
PE or share price quintiles. Furthermore, it is hard to distinguish between size and
share price effect - share price being the common factor between size, dividend yield
and PE ratio. It is found that size effect is significantly reduced when control over
the differences in dividend yield is exercised. (See section 4.2.2).
According to Dimson and Marsh (1986) even when bias is present, its magnitude
will depend on the length of the observation period. Over very short periods such as
days or even months immediately following an event, bias from benchmark
misspecification is likely to be small. As the observation period is extended,
however, the bias will be magnified, so that over longer periods, it becomes
dominant and assumes (apparently) economically significant proportions.
In our study although abnormal returns over various long intervals are also
reported, we test our hypotheses using relatively short time periods (only 1 to 3 days)
that is (-2 to 0). The bias in estimated abnormal returns is thus reduced and is not
expected to affect the general direction of the results reported.
4.9 Z-SCORE
Financial status of the divestor is measured by the generic z-score "bankruptcy
model" approach (Altman 1968; Taffler 1984). The z-score model measures a
firm's insolvency potential based on its degree of similarity with samples of
previously failed and solvent firms using financial ratio data. If a company has a
negative z-score, it is at acute risk of financial distress. However, if the company has
a positive value it is not at risk (Taffler, 1983).
Two models are used, both developed using discriminant analysis techniques
and of the form,
Z = Co + c. v.; + c2x2 + c3x3 + • • +cnxn
	(4.29)
where, x1 ... xn are financial ratios and c1 , 	 c„ coefficients and co is a constant. The
first model is for analysing industrial companies with the following ratios: profit
before tax/current liabilities, current assets/total liabilities, current liabilities/total
assets and no-credit interval. The second model, for the analysis of the wholesale
and retail sectors etc., has ratios: cash flow/total liabilities, debt/quick assets, current
liabilities/total assets and no-credit interval. Taffler (1984) reports the performance
of the two models in practice and their true ex ante predictive ability. His results
suggest the use of a negative z-score as an accurate measure of bankruptcy risk
potential.
4.10 DATA PREPARATION
4.10.1 SOURCE OF DIVESTOR INFORMATION
Names of divestors and the information on divested parts along with the
declared price, if any, veie obtained ft= tiie ikocivisitions MoiNtf\C Tf\e,
information in Acquisitions Monthly is obtained in the majority of cases from the
press such as the Financial Times or the Daily Telegraph. In some cases
Acquisitions Monthly also receives press releases direct from parent companies.
Therefore, the announcement day reported is, in the great majority of cases, is the
press day, defined as day '0' and the actual day of announcement to the market is
likely to be day-1. However, if information is released after trading hours but is
published in the press the next day, the actual announcement will be day '0'.
Similar considerations also apply to completion announcements.
4.10.2 PERIOD OF STUDY
The study covers divestments announced during January 1985 through to
December 1986.
4.10.3 METHOD OF SAMPLING
Observation period surrounding the divestment event has been taken as -40
to 40 days centered on the event day. With this requirement the following
criteria have been used for screening the data:
1) Where prices were declared only divestments valued at higher than
£250,000 are selected. The reason for use of such a criterion is to avoid very
small size divestments.
2) The divestors' shares have been trading on the stock market for the whole of
the estimation period (days -180 to -41) and observation period (days -40 to
+40).
3) Although all divestors must be UK registered listed companies, divestments
of foreign subsidiaries are included. In this latter case, the value of the sold
off part is converted to sterling pounds at the rate of exchange prevailing at
the time of divestment.
4) To avoid the impact of other events on the observed returns, any divestor
involved in other divestments, take over bids, mergers or acquisitions during
the observation period -40 to +40 was excluded from the sample. However,
if two divestments were declared on the same day, the values of the two were
aggregated and the two were treated as one divestment and included in the
sample on this basis.
With the above selection criteria we arrived at a final sample of 178 out of
742 divestments in the UK announced during 1985 - 1986. Table 4.1 shows the
monthly distribution of publicly announced sell-offs.
Table 4.1- Distribution of the UK Sell-offs and Sell-offs in the Sample
(1985-1986).
1985 1986	 I
All Sampled All Sample
d
JAN 30 8 24 7
FEB 31 9 37 9
MAR 21 7 31 9
APR 19 3 22 2
MAY 14 1 27
JUN 28 2 37 5
JUL 33 12 27 7
AUG 42 8 37 9
SEP 33 8 28 7
OCT 36 6 42 16
NOV 41 6 33 10
DEC 28 4 41 23
,
Total 356 74 386 104
4.10.4 SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
Our sample of 178 divestors drawn from 742 divestments by UK firms in
1985-86 covers a wide spectrum of industries and is not biased towards particular
sectors as shown by the industry distribution of our sample in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 Distribution of Divestor's Industry Sector
Industry Sector
,
NO
Oil Exploration and Production
_
5
Building & Construction 3
Building Materials & Merchants 5
Chemicals 4
Electronics & Electrical Equipment 7
Engineering 25
Engineering, Vehicles 3
Printing, Paper & Packaging 7
Textiles & Apparel 4
Breweries 2
Food Manufacturers 7
Household Goods 2
Health Care 1
Pharmaceuticals 2
Tobacco 4
Distributors 1
Leisure & Hotels 8
Retailers, Food 2
Retailers, General 6
Transport 3
Banks 4
Insurance 7
Merchant Banks 1
Other Financial 3
Property 4
Other Services & Businesses 50
Total number of divestors: 178
In Table 4.2 industry sectors were found from Acquisitions Monthly and
grouped under the Financial Times presentation format. They correspond to
Financial Times classification.
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Table 4.3 shows the distribution of divestors' market capitalisation in different
size categories. From this table, our sample appears to be representative of
different sizes of divestors. Table 4.4 provides a similar distribution for
divestment size. This tables suggests that divestments are concentrated at the
lower end of the size range. This is consistent with the mean relative divestment
size of 10% and median of 4.4% reported in Table 7.1 (see below).
Table 4.3 Divestors Market Size Distribution in Million £.
Range in £m
,
Number in the
sample
0 - 5 12
5 < 10 20
10 < 50 43
50 < 100 18
100 < 500 40
500 < 1000 21
1000 24
Total
/
178
Table 4.4 Divestees Size Distribution
Range in £m Number in the
sample
.25 < 1 40
1 < 5 48
5 < 10 16
10 < 50 29
50 < 100 4
,
100 < 500 4
500 < 1000 1
Total	 number	 cif	 price
declarers
142
Note: There are only 142 cases of price declarers out of a total of 178
announcements. Price of sell-off was not announced in 36 cases.
4.11 DAILY SHARE PRICES
Daily share price data is obtained from Datastream. These share prices are
end-of-the-day share prices. Where no trading is recorded for a share on a specific
date, the last traded price is recorded. This may result in a sequence of unchanged
prices for a number of days, giving rise to the problem of thin or non-synchronious
trading. Logarithmic stock returns were calculated viz:-
P. +D.
R= 1n 	
	 (4.30)
R„,,= In
FTi
FT,+ DY
(4.31)
where
Pu = price of security i at time t
Du= dividend paid during time interval t.
The dividend was added to the ex dividend day price as this would be expected to
drop by the value of the dividend on the ex dividend day. Rights and scrip issues
are already adjusted for by Datastream. The market return is calculated from the
F.T. All Share Index incorporating dividend yield as
Where
R„,,= Market return at time t,
F.T:= F.T. All Share Index at time t,
DY  Annual F.T. Dividend Yield
The reason for dividing annual dividend yield by 260 is that there are 260 trading/data
days in a year i.e. 52 weeks x 5 days.
Relative size was calculated by dividing the value of the sell-off to the market
valuation of the parent on the last day of the month prior to the divestment date.
The reason is that the market value is best measured outside event days so that it is
not affected by the event.
(1) Intention
(n=86)
(2) Completion
(n=92)
(3) POCEI Group
(n=142)
(4) No-Price Group
(n.36)
4.12 SUB-SAMPLES
As explained in Chapter 3 to find the impact of price declaration and the certainty
of deal completion, our sample is divided by price and completion announcement
criteria. This categorisation leads to the following sub-sample sizes:
Total Sample n = 178
Sub-Sample 1 - Intention Group n = 86
Sub-Sample 2 - Completion Group n = 92
Sub-Sample 3 - Price Disclosure Group n = 142
Sub-Sample 4 - No-Price Group n = 36
Sub-Sample 5 - Intention Price Group n = 69
Sub-Sample 6 - Intention No-Price Group n 17
Sub-Sample 7 - Completion Price Group n = 73
Sub-Sample 8 - Completion No-Price Group n = 19
Chapter 5 will report the results for each of our sub-samples. The following tree
provides a visual picture of how our sub-samples fit together.
Fig.4.1 Tree of Sub-samples
All Anouncements
(n=178)
(5) Price
(n=69) (6) No-price(n=17)
(7) price
(n=73)
(8) No-Price
(n=19)
CHAPTER 5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Chapter 4 discussed our hypotheses and described the methodology employed to test
these. This chapter reports the empirical results for various sub-samples using the Market
Model and Dimson's method of adjusting for thin trading and based on the dependence
assumption concerning the abnormal returns. Results based on alternative models and
the Scholes and Williams method are reported in Chapter 6 for comparative purposes.
5.1 ALL ANNOUNCEMENTS
The hypothesis being explained in sections 5.1 to 5.4 is
Hi: Corporate sell-offs do not lead to any significant change in divesting company
shareholder wealth.
If the UK stock market is informationaly efficient in a semi-strong sense we would
expect instantaneous impounding of new public information with respect to any
particular event. We have no information on Financial Times reporting lags. However,
characteristically financial press reports are based on press releases which tend to be
issued during market trading hours, leading to reporting in the Financial Times and
the City pages of other newspapers the following morning. London Stock Exchange
Yellow Book rules also allow disclosure of price relevant information between 3.30
p.m. when the market closes and 5.30.p.m., similarly permitting reporting in the
financial press the following day. As explained in Section 4.10.1, the announcement
dates are the press announcement days compiled by Acquisitions Monthly and defined
as day '0'. Therefore, the actual event day may, typically, be day - 1, the rading day
before the formal press announcement day. An added argument for considering day
-1 as the event day is the likelihood of information leakage around the time of the
divestment event even in advance of formal notification to the market. We thus focus
on day -las the event day in our analysis as the most appropriate single day. However,
due to the possibility of information leakage and problems of reporting lags, we may
also be justified in considering (-2 to 0) as the event period (eg. Klein, 1986). In this
study we report both the results for day -1 and days (-2 to 0).
Table 5.1-Time Series CARs and t-Statistics
All Announcements (n=178)
..
Interval (days) CAR t-statistics
-40 to +40 0.24 0.17
-40 to -11
-0.93 -1.08
-10 to +10 0.86 1.15
- 5 to + 5
-0.02 -0.03
- 5 to - 1 1.18 3.23'
- 5 to
	 0 1.05 2.44'
0 to + 5
-1.20 -2.99'
- 2 to
	 0 0.68 2.41'
- 1 to
	 0 0.65 2.82'
- 1 0.85 5.23'
0
-0.20 -1.24
. .
Note: a'b'' indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance
Summary results are shown in Table 5.1. This explores whether undifferentiated
sell-off announcements per se impact on shareholder wealth and provides daily and
cumulative average excess returns for the full 178 firm divestment sample for the 81
day period surrounding the press announcement day, day 0.
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Table 5.1 shows highly significant positive average excess returns of 0.85% (t
= 5.23) for day - 1, followed by immediate and significant reversal in returns totalling
1.2% (t = 2.99) for the six day period from day 0 to day + 5). Days (-2 to 0) also show
a CAR of 0.68% significant at 5% (t = 2.41). These results support the hypothesis
that sell-offs per se lead to short term positive abnormal returns for shareholders of
the divesting company. However, significant post-event performance reversal will
be noted as will the lack of permanent revaluation of the firm. For the overall sample,
considering the period around the event day (-5 to +5) or (-10 to +10) no significant
abnormal returns are observed. Thus, we consider these results consistent with the
value additivity postulate. However, such aggregate results may mask more interesting
sub-sample reactions.
5.2 PRICE DECLARATION IMPACT
To examine the impact of price declaration on sell-offs we divide the sample into
two groups: those that have declared the price for sale of the divested part and those
that have not.
This division is irrespective of whether the announcement is one of intention or of
completion as set out in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Out of the sample of 178 divestments only
36 are unaccompanied by price information. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show that in almost
80% of all sell-off cases the price is declared. They also show that irrespective of
type of announcement almost the same percentage (ie. 80%) declare the price of the
divested part.
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Table 5.2- Breakdown of Sample in Terms of
Price Declaration
Intention Price 69
Completion Price 73
Total Price Declared 142
Intention No-Price 17
Completion No-Price 19
Total Price Not-Declared 36
% of Price Declarers 79.7%
Table 5.3- Breakdown of Intention and Completion samples
in Terms of Price Declaration
Intention Group
Price Declared
Price not Declared
Total Intentions
69
17
86
% of Declarers 80%
=
Completion Group
Price Declared 73
Price not Declared 19
Total Completion 92
,
% of Price Declarers 79.3%
5.2.1 PRICE DISCLOSURE GROUP
Table 5.4 summarises the abnormal return results for the Price group that includes
samples from the Intention as well as the Completion groups. From this table of
results we note a CAR of 0.96% (t 3.01) for days (-2,0) and AR of 1.06% (t
5.66) for day (-1), both highly significant (at 1%). Thus we conclude that sell-off
announcements incorporating price are associated with an increase in divesting
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company shareholder wealth. However, as with the full sample, there is major price
reversal over days (0 to 5). Nevertheless, over the 21 day period around the press
day, we find a positive CAR of almost 2%, significant at the 5% level, which
suggests that sell-off announcements with price declaration may be viewed as a
positive NPV decision, good news and not in harmony with the value additivity
principle.
Table 54-Time Series CARs and t-statistics
Price Disclosure Group ( n= 142)
Interval (days) CAR (%) t-Statistic
-40 to +40 1.10 0.65
-40 to -11 -1.48 -1.45
-10 to +10 1.98 2.321'
- 5 to+ 5 0.49 0.79
- 5 to - 1 1.74 4.17'
- 2 to
	 0 0.96 3.01'
- 1 to
	 0 0.87 3.32'
- 1 1.06 5.66'
0
-0.18 -0.97
0 to + 5 -1.25 -2.73a
, ,
Note: a'b.c indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance
5.2.2 NO-PRICE GROUP
Table 5.5 summarises the abnormal return performance for the No-Price group
that includes the Intention as well as Completion announcement cases. Inspection
of the t-statistics for days (-2 to 0) and day (-1) for the No-Price group in the above
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table shows that there is statistically insignificant negative and positive cumulative
average abnormal returns of -0.23% and +0.05% respectively. These results suggest
that sell-off announcements not incorporating price of the divested part are not
associated with any significant change in divesting company shareholder wealth.
This is in line with the value additivity principle and consistent with the null
hypothesis that investors do not assume a positive NPV resulting from the
divestment of an unknown value and classifying such an event as good news.
Table 5.5-Time Series CARs and t-statistics
No-Price Group ( n= 36)
-
Interval (days) CAR (%) t-Statistics
-40 to +40 -3.17 -1.00
-40 to -11 1.24 0.64
-10 to +10 -3.59 -2.23b
- 5 to+ 5 -1.97 -1.73
- 5 to - 1 -0.97 -1.31
- 2 to	 0 -0.46 -0.74
- 1 to	 0 -0.23 -0.46
-1 0.05 0.16
0 -0.28 -0.82
Oto+ 5 -1.00 -0.74
Note: b indicates the level of siginificance at 5%.
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The CAR for days (-10 to +10) is -3.59% with t = 2.23 (significant at 5% level).
This definite negative market reaction to a No-Price disclosure divestment is not
in line with the value additivity principle and suggests the market may actually
consider such informationally deficient divestments as bad news.
5.3 INTENTION GROUP
We now examine the results for our sub-group of firms announcing only intention
to divest. The sample size is 86 and includes announcements that incorporate price
and announcements that do not incorporate price. Table 5.6 summarises the results.
Table 5.6-Time Series CARs and t-Statistics
Intention Only ( n=86 )
Interval (Days) CAR%
,
t-Statistics
-40 to +40 -1.39 -0.66
-40 to -11 -1.97 -1.54
-10 to +10 1.16 1.09
- 5 to+ 5 0.90 1.16
- 5 to - 1 1.36 2.61'
- 2 to	 0 0.78 1.94'
- 1 to	 0 0.40 1.23
- 1 0.21 0.92
0 0.19 0.82
0 to +5 -0.24 -0.80
Note: a'b.c indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance.
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The average abnormal return for day (-1) is only 0.21% which is statistically
insignificant. However, the CAR for days (-2 to 0) is 0.78% with t = 1.94, which is
statistically significant at the 10% level. Days (-10 to +10) produce a CAR of 1.16%,
which is statistically insignificant. We do not really have strong evidence to conclude
that in general the anouncement of Intention of sell-off alone is regarded as good news
and a positive NPV decision.
The Intention subsample of 86 cases includes divestments which have the price
declared (n = 69) and divestments without price declaration (n =17). Considering that
80% of cases in the sample of 86 have declared the price, we may suspect that the
implied certainty of the deal being completed denoted by price disclosure in the 69
cases, or information on relative valuation, may be affecting our results. We thus
examine the abnormal returns for the two sub-samples of Intention - Price and Intention
- No Price firms.
5.3.1 INTENTION-PRICE GROUP
The abnormal return results for the sample of 69 cases of intention
announcement that incorporate price are set out in Table 5.7. It is interesting to
note CAR for days (-5 to -1) is 1.82%, statistically significant at 1%, whereas the
AR for day (-1), is statistically insignificant. The CAR for days (-2 to 0) is 0.96%,
siginificant at 5% level. The CAR for days (-10 to +10) is 1.96% and significant
at the 10% level. Based on these results, we conclude that sell-off intention
announcements incorporating price are associated with positive changes in
divesting company shareholder wealth.
This result is not in line with the value additivity theory and suggests a positive
NPV estimate by the market. Despite the lack of certainty of the deal being
completed, there may be some confidence in the deal being consummated as a
price is indicated possibly suggesting an advanced negotiation stage between the
two parties.
Table 5.7-Time Series CARs and t-Statistics
Intention-Price Group ( n=69 )
Interval (Days) CAR% t-Statistics
-40 to +40 -1.28 -0.55
-40 to -11 1.92 1.35
-10 to +10 1.96 1.66c
- 5 to +5 1.02 1.19
- 5 to -1 1.82 3.13'
- 2 to 0 0.96 2.14b
- 1 to 0 0.53 1.49
- 1 0.30 1.19
0 0.23 0.91
0 to +5 -1.02 -1.25
NOTE: a'b.c indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance.
5.3.2 INTENTION NO-PRICE
The summary of CARs for Intention announcements with no price declaration
is provided in Table 5.8. There are 17 cases of announcements of sell-offs without
price declared. This sample is rather small to draw definite conclusions from.
However, Klein (1986) conducts tests on a sample of only 15 companies. We
observe a CAR of 0.06% for days (-2 to 0) and a AR of -0.15% for day (-1). Both
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CARs are insignificant. CARs of -2.09% for days (-10 to +10) are also insignificant.
Therefore, noting the limitations of the size of our sample of 17 firms, we conclude
that we have no evidence that sell-off intention announcements not incorporating
price are associated with significant change in divesting company shareholder
wealth. This is in line with the value additivity theory and may suggest that too
little is known by the market to attach a positive NPV to the particular decision to
divest.
Table 5.8-Time Series CARs and t-Statistics
Intentions No-Price Group ( n=17 )
Interval (Days) CAR% t-Statistics
-40 to +40 -0.38 -0.37
-40 to -10 -0.23 -0.07
-10 to +10
-2.09 -0.81
- 5 to +5 0.42 0.22
- 5 to -1 0.28 1.82c
- 2 to 0 0.06 0.06
- 1 to 0
-0.14 -0.18
- 1
-0.15 -0.28
0 0.009 0.01
0 to +5 0.88 0.64
NOTE: a'll 'c indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance.
5.4 COMPLETION GROUP
In this section a sub-sample of companies that first announced the completion of
a divestment is examined. This sub-sample consists of 92 divestments of which 73
include price declaration and 19 do not incorporate price disclosure. Table 5.9 provides
a summary of overall completion sub-sample CARs.
Table 5.9-Time Series CARs and t-Statistics
Completion Sample Only ( n=92 )
Interval (Days) CAR% t-Statistics
-40 to +40 1.72 0.84
-40 to -11 0.04 0.03
-10 to +10 0.55 0.53
- 5 to + 5 -0.87 -1.16
- 5 to - 1 1.01 1.99'1
- 2 to	 0 0.58 1.49
- 1 to	 0 0.87 2.73'
1 1.44 6.39'
0 -0.57 -2.52')
0 to 5 -1.89 -3.73'
NOTE: a'b 'c indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance.
Table 5.9 shows highly positive abnormal returns of 1.44% on day (-1) with t-statistic
of 6.39, which is significant at the 1% level. Therefore, based on day (-1) results we
can conclude that announcement of completed-sell offs is associated with a significant
increase in divesting company shareholder wealth. However, CARs of days (-2 to 0)
and days (-10 to +10) do not confirm the same results. In addition there is significant
CAR reversal on days (0 to 5). We thus need to disaggregate the full sample to seek a
possible explanation.
5.4.1 COMPLETION-PRICE GROUP
The Completion-Price firms constitute a sub-sample of 73 cases out of the overall
sample of 92 cases in the Completion group. A summary of abnormal returns is
shown in Table 5.10.
Table 5.10- Tirne Series CARs alld t-Slatistics
Completion-Price Group ( n=73)
Interval (Days) CAR%
,
t-S tatis tic s
-40 to +40 3.32 1.41
-40 to -11 -0.27 -0.18
-10 to +10 1.99 1.66'
- 5 to	 +5 -0.01 -0.02
- 5 to	 -1 1.62 2.86a
- 2 to	 0 0.99 2.16b
- 1 to	 0 1.17 3.20a
- 1 1.74 6.74a
0 -0.57 -2.24b
0 to +5 -1.68 -2.63'
NOTE: Lb 'c indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels.
The CAR result for days (-2 to 0), showing an almost 1% positive abnormal
return, is significant at the 5% level and AR for day (-1) and days (-1 to 0) are
significant at 1% level. The CAR for days (-10 to +10) is also significant at the
10% level. Therefore we conclude that completion announcements incorporating
the sell-off price are associated with significant changes in divesting company
shareholder wealth. The market seems to consider a completed sell-off with a
definite price as good news. The market indeed appears to overreact to such good
news and corrects itself on day (0) by producing -0.57% abnormal return which is
significant at the 5% level, and a -1.68% CAR (significant at the 1% level) for days
(0 to 5).
5.4.2 COMPLETION NO-PRICE
Table 5.11-Time Series CARs and t-Statistics
Completion No-Price Group ( n=19 )
-
Interval (Days) CAR% t-Statistics
-40 to + 40 -4.33 -1.11
-40 to -11 2.16 0.91
-10 to +10 -4.94 -2.48b
-5 to +5 -4.20 -2.92'
-5 to	 -1 -1.53 -1.58
-2 to	 0 -0.91 -1.22
- 1 to	 0 -0.30 -0.49
-1 0.25 0.57
0 -0.55 -1.28
0 to +5 -2.68 -2.63'
NOTE: '‘.b.c, indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels.
A sub-sample of 19 completed sell-offs without price declaration is drawn from
92 completion announcements. Cumulative abnormal returns for this category are
calculated and summarised in Table 5.11. The t-statistics for days (-2 to 0), day
(-I) and day (0) show weak and non- significant cumulative abnormal returns.
Abnormal returns on day (-1) is only 0.25%. However, CARs for days (-5 to +5)
and (-10 to +10) at -4.2% and -4.9% respectively, both highly significant, suggest
strong negative market reaction which may relate to the uncertainty about the price
or the lack of information disclosure.
5.5 PRICE DISCLOSURE IMPACT
To examine the impact of price disclosure per se we test statistically the significance
of price disclosure on the overall firm sample as well as on the separate Intention and
Completion sub-samples.
5.6 PRICE DECLARATION IMPACT ON THE ALL SAMPLE
We test our hypothesis
H2: Changes in shareholder wealth are independent of price disclosure at
announcement.
To test this, the difference in CAR is measured between two sub-samples of Price
(sub-sample 3, n= 142) and No Price (sub-sample 4, n=36) - for sub-sample numbering
see Section 4.12. The period of test is over days (-2 to 0). The reason for testing over
a three day interval is to incorporate any leakage of information in the most immediate
period surrounding the event. CAR; (-2 to 0) represents the CAR for days (-2 to 0) of
sub-sample i and denotes the t-statistics for difference between sub-sample i and j.
The test statistic for the differences in cumulative abnormal returns between two
sub-samples is discussed in Chapter 4.
Table 5.12: Price Impact Analysis - CAR (%) for Days (-2 to 0)
_
Sample Price No-Price Difference
t-statistics
All 0.96 -0.45 2.09'
Intention 0.96 0.07 0.84
Completion 0.99 -0.91 1.90c
Note: b indicates significance at the 5% level
Based on Table 5.12: CAR3(-2 to 0)— 0.96%
CAR4(-2 to 0)=-0.45%
The t-statistics for difference in mean CARs is:
t3,4-2.09 (significant at 5%).
The null hypothesis is clearly rejected. We conclude that price is of key importance
in producing positive abnormal returns on divestment announcement irrespective of
whether the announcement is of intention to divest or of completion of divestment.
However, to assess the pure impact of price disclosure, we need to test the impact of
price on sub-samples of Intention and Completion firms separately. As far as certainty
of the value of the deal is concerned we need to test for price disclosure on a sub-sample
of completion announcement in order to have accounted for certainty of completion
impact on announcement abnormal returns.
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5.6.1 PRICE DECLARATION IMPACT ON INTENTION
SUB-SAMPLE
H2 is now tested on the two sub-samples of Intention-Price and Intention-No
Price Groups.
t-statistics are calculated for differences in the CARs for the two sub-groups of
the Intention sample (n=86): the Price group (sub-sample 5, n = 69) and the
No-Price group (sub-sample 6, n = 17). Based on Table 5.12, CARs for day (-2 to
0) are:
CAR5 (-2 to 0) = 0.96%
CAR6 (-2 to 0) = 0.07%
The t-statistic for difference in mean CARs is t5,6=0.84 which is not significant at
conventional levels.
The null hypothesis cannot be rejected and we therefore conclude price declaration
does not seem to have a significant positive impact on abnormal returns at
announcements of sell-off intentions.
5.6.2 PRICE DECLARATION IMPACT FOR COMPLETION
SUB-SAMPLE
H2 is now tested on the two sub-samples of Completion - Price and Completion
- No Price groups.
The difference between the CARs of the two sub-samples of Completion (n —
92) are calculated. That is the difference between Completion-Price (sub-sample
7, n = 73) and Completion-No Price (sub-sample 8, n = 19), based on Table 5.12:
CAR7 (-2 to 0) = 0.99%
CAR8 (-2 to 0) = -0.91%
The t-statistic for the difference in CARs is t7,8 = 1.90 (significant at 5% level).
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The null hypothesis H2 is thus rejected based on the above analysis and
comparison. We, therefore, conclude that despite the news of completion of the
deal the price declaration has significant positive impact on abnormal returns
produced on announcemnt of a completed sell-off. This suggests that although the
market is certain of the deal being completed, provision of price information is of
great significance in enhancing shareholder wealth.
The above hypothesis, which is tested for the pure impact of price disclosure
within a completed deal sub-sample, constitutes an original contribution to the
field of sell-off studies.
5.6.3 PRICE DECLARATION IMPACT -FURTHER
ANALYSIS.
Further analysis of difference in CARs is conducted on the full Price and No-Price
sub-samples irrespective of Intention and Completion division. This analysis is
conducted by examining the CAR difference over other time intervals than (-2,0)
as shown in Table 5.13.
The differential impact of price declaration is quite dramatic with event day
average excess returns a highly significant 1.06% for the price declaration sample
(t --- 5.67) but a negligible 0.06% (t =0.16) for the No-Price sample. This difference
is significant at the 1% level. Over the 21 day period, -10 to +10, surrounding the
announcement event, CARs are 1.98% for the price group and -3.59% for the
No-Price group, both significant at the 5% level with the difference between the
CARs significant at the 1% level. Because the price non-declarers only account for
20% of the overall sample, we can see how the ALL sample results reported earlier
are driven by price disclosures alone. We are thus forced to conclude that only
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sell-offs with prices announced lead to positive abnormal returns on the event day
and a price declaration is necessary for significant abnormal returns to be generated.
The overall impact of price disclosure is consistent with the interpretation that it
serves to reduce uncertainty in the divestment process.
Table 5.13- Time Series CARs (%) for Various Intervals,
Price and No-Price Groups
Sample
Interval
(days)
Price
(n=142)
No Price
(n=36)
Difference
Price-No-Price
-40 to +40 1.10 -3.17 4.27
-40 to -11 -1.48" 1.24 -2.72
-10 to +10 1.98" -3.59b 5.57'
- 5 to + 5 0.49 -2.03' 2.52'
- 5 to - 1 1.74a -1.03 2.77'
- 2 to	 0 0.96' -0.45 1.42"
-) 1.06 0.05 1.00a
0 -0.18 -0.29 0.11
0 to + 5 -1.25" -1.00 -0.25
,
Note: 8.1''' indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance
Is it the sell-off announcement itself that is generating the abnormal return or is
it the decision to announce the price that leads to reduced market uncertainty and
positive abnormal returns as a result? If it were the divestment announcement per
se that represented "good news" then we would expect our No-Price sample to
behave in a similar manner.
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15.7 COMPLETION ANNOUNCEMENT IMPACT
We can test for the impact of announcement of completion of the divestment by
finding the statistical significance of the differences in mean CARs between:
1) the Intention and the Completion sub-samples (see Section 5.7.1),
2) Intention-Price and Completion-Price groups (see Section 5.7.2),
3) Intention-No Price and Completion-No Price group (see Section 5.7.3).
Table 5.14-Time Series CARs (%) for Various Intervals:
Completion and Intention Only Samples
Sample
Interval
(days)
Completion
(n=92)
Intention
(n=86)
Difference
Comp.-Int.
-40 to +40 1.73 -1.40 3.13
-40 to -11 0.04 -1.97 2.01
-10 to +10 0.56 1.17 -0.61
- 5 to + 5 -0.88 0.90 -1.78'
- 5 to - 1 1.01b 1.36a -0.35
- 1 1.45' 0.22 1.23'
- 2 to	 0 0.58 0.78 -0.20
0 -0.57 0.19 -0.76"
0 to + 5 -1.89a -0.46 -1.43'
,
Note: a'b.c indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance
5.7.1 COMPLETION ANNOUNCEMENT IMPACT ON ALL
SAMPLE
The null hypothesis being tested is
H3: Changes in shareholder wealth are independent of whether the firm
announces completion of sell-off or only an intention to divest.
We would expect potential uncertainty surrounding the sell-off event to be
reduced substantially in the case of a finalised agreement compared with one where
negotiations are presumably not concluded. To test this hypothesis the entire
sub-samples of Intention (1) and Completion (2), are compared and the difference
in mean abnormal return over the period (-2 to 0) is tested for statistical significance.
Based on Table 5.14:
CAR, (-2 to 0)= 0.78%
CAR2 (-2 to 0)= 0.58%
t-statistics for the difference in mean CARs is t1,2=0.35.
The null hypothesis cannot, therefore, be rejected when tested for days (-2 to 0).
However, the same hypothesis tested for day (-1) is rejected with 1% level of
significance (see Table 5.14). We clearly see that the abnormal return reversal on
day (0) for the Completion sub-sample reduces the CAR for the days (-2 to 0) to
the extent that the same hypothesis cannot be rejected.
As the actual market announcement day is day (-1), we would suggest that the
impact of Completion should be assessed on this day alone. This is borne out by
Table 5.14 which shows highly significant event day CAR = 1.45% (t = 6.39) for
the Completion group but only 0.22% (t = 0.93) for the Intention group with the
difference in the two CARs significant at the 1% level.
This leads to the conclusion that the removal of uncertainty of the deal being
consummated increases the abnormal return indicated on the divestment.
Table 5.14 highlights a degree of ambiguity in our results in that for the immediate
post event period, day 0 to day +5, the relative peiformance of the two samples
reverses with the Completion sample significantly underperforming the Intention
sample at the 10% level. Similar reversal was observed earlier with the ALL price
disclosure samples (see Table 5.4). One might explain such reversal in terms of
market correction on removal of uncertainty after receipt of Price or Completion
information.
5.7.2 COMPLETION ANNOUNCEMENT IMPACT ON PRICE
SUB-SAMPLE
The null hypothesis being tested is
H3: Changes in shareholder wealth are independent of whether the firm
announces completion of sell-off only an intention to divest.
H3 is now tested separately on the Price Disclosure sub-samples. Here the
statistical significance of the difference in mean cumulative abnormal returns
over(-2,0) for the Intention-Price sub-sample (5) and Completion-Price sub-sample
(7) is compared. Based on Table 5.15A:
CAR5 (-2 to 0) = 0.961%
CAR7 (-2 to 0) = 0.994%
The t-statistic for the difference in mean CARs is t5,7= 0.05.
The null hypothesis cannot be rejected. This suggests that when the price is
declared the market is fairly certain of the deal reaching completion and the
additional information content of the completion of sell-off as against mere intention
to sell may be small and insignificant.
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5.7.3 COMPLETION ANNOUNCEMENT IMPACT ON
NO-PRICE SUB-SAMPLE
H3 is tested, this time using the two No-Price sub-samples of Intention and
Completion. The statistical significance of the difference in mean cumulative
abnormal returns over (-2,0) between the Intention No-Price sub-sample (6) and
the Completion-No Price sub-sample (8)is considered. Here, based on Table 5.15
Panel A, in Section 5.8:
CAR6 (-2 to 0) — 0.065%
CAR8
 (-2 to 0) =-0.91%
t6.8 = 0.80
The t-statistic for the difference of mean of subsample 6 and 8 is t6.8 =0.80 which
is clearly not significant and we therefore conclude that the announcement of
Completion does not make a significant impact on CARs in the absence of price
information.
5.7.4 COMPLETE CERTAINITY
As far as the market is concerned there are two elements that may cause uncertainty
a) unknown price of divestment
b) doubt about completion of divestment.
To assess the value of certainty to the market two extreme sub-groups are compared
with each other:
Completion-Price (n=73, sub-sample 7) and Intention-No Price (n=17,sub-sample
6). Where AR(-1) is average abnormal return on day (-1), based on Table 5.15
Panel A, in section 5.8, we find:
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AR6(-1) =-0.16%
AR7(-1) = 1.76%
t7,6 = 2.54
The t-statistic for the difference of mean of sub-sample 6 and 8 is t 6,7 =2.54
which is almost significant at the 1% level. The results indicate marked differences
between the CARs of the Completion-Price and Intention-No Price samples and
demonstrate that confirmation of price on Completion announcement, enhances the
shareholder wealth materially. This test, we suggest, assesses the value of complete
certainty to the market in terms of price and consummation of a sell-off. The choice
of abnormal return on day (-1) rather than over the days (-2 to 0) assists in assessing
the impact of the information available to the market on announcement day (-1).
In this respect it is a test which is sharper and more appropriate for our analysis
than the test over (-2 to 0). The t-statistic for the differences in mean over the day
(-2 to 0) is only t = 0.46 and not significant.
5.8 PRICE - NO PRICE AND COMPLETION - INTENTION
INTERACTIONS.
Results so far indicate that price disclosure has a decisive and positive impact on
shareholder wealth whereas the stockmarket impact of a completion as opposed to an
intention announcement is more ambiguous. From our earlier discussion of these
contingent variables it was hypothesized that the impact of price disclosure was a
function of whether the film announced intention or completion, together with price.
To explore the interaction between price disclosure and divestment status CARs for
four sub-samples are examined, over various intervals. That is:
i) Completion with price (n = 73),
ii) Completion with no price (n — 19),
iii) Intention with price (n = 69),
iv) Intention with no price (n = 17).
Panel A of Table 5.15 provides summary event day and cumulative average abnormal
return information for the Completion Price and Intention Price sub-samples and
similar details for the two non-price samples. In Panel B the difference in CARs for
different intervals between pairs of the four sub-samples is shown.
Table 5.15- Impact of Price Disclosure and Intention/Completion on CARs (%)
Panel A: CARs of Sub-samples
Completion (2) Intention (1)
Interval Price (3) No-Price (4) Price (5) No Price (6)
(days) (n=73) (n=19) (n=69) (n=17)
-
-40 to +40 3.21 -4.34 -1.29 -1.88
-10 to +10 1.99' -4.94' 1.97' -2.09
- 5 to + 5 -0.01 -4.21a 1.02 0.42
- 5 to - 1 1.67" -1.53 1.81a -0.47
- 1 1.76" 0.25 0.31 -0.16
- 2 to	 0 0.99" -0.91 0.96" 0.07
0 -0.58" -0.56 0.24 0.01
0 to + 5 -1.68' -2.68' -0.79 0.89
Panel B: Difference in CARs between Sub-samples
Interval
(days)
Completion
Price - No Price
Intention
Price - No Price
Price
Comp.-Int.
No Price
Comp.-Int	
.
-40 to +40 7•55' 0.59 4.50 -2.46
-10 to +10 6.93' 4.06 0.02 -2.85
- 5 to + 5 4.20' 0.60 -1.03 -4.63"
- 5 to - 1 3120' 2.28' -0.14 -1.06
- 1 1.5P 0.47 1.45a 0.41
- 2 to	 0 1.90" 0.89 0.03 -0.98
0 -.02 0.23 -0.82" -0.57
0 to + 5 1.00 -1.68 -0.89 -3.57"
Note:	 indicate the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance.
Numbers in brackets indicate sub-samples (See Section 4.12).
Event day excess return is significant only for the Completion Price sample with
AR = 1.76% (t = 6.75), although the 5 day interval CAR from -5 to -1 is of a similar
magnitude for the Intention Price sample with CAR = 1.81% (t = 3.14%). It would
appear that provided price is disclosed, both types of announcement convey new
information, although in the Completion case excess returns are earned primarily on
the event day whereas for the Intention sample these are earned in advance of the
formal announcement date. That the -10 to -2 day CARs for the two samples not shown
in this table 1.26% (t=1.61) and 2.18% (t=2.79) respectively, may serve to emphasise
this point.
In both cases, reversal in returns occurs after the event day with CARs for days 0
to 5 of -1.68% (t = -2.63) for the Completion sample and -0.79% (t = -1.25) for the
Intention sample. However, overall both samples earn almost identical cumulative
excess returns of 1.99% (t = 1.66) and 1.97% (t = 1.67) in the month (21 trading days
) centred on the press date.
Turning to the two small price non-disclosure samples, we firstly note a seemingly
random pattern in returns for Intention only announcements with apparently little
impact on shareholder wealth. On the other hand, Completion announcements not
accompanied by price disclosure are associated with substantial negative cumulative
average excess returns of -4.21% (t = 2.93) over the 11 trading day period (day - 5 to
+5) centered on press day 0. Overall, there is a 7.55% difference in CARs, significant
at the 10% level, between Completion samples with price and without price between
day - 40 to day + 40 (Panel B).
Results in Panel B make interesting reading. While price declarers generally register
a superior performance over non-declarers, the magnitude of the difference is clearly
greater for the Completion group except on day (0) (see columns 2 and 3 in Table
- 139.-
5.15, Panel B). Where both groups declare price the Completion group performs better
on the event day but the Intention group outperforms on the press announcement day
(see columns 2 and 3 in Table 5.15 panel B). Over other intervals (e.g. - 10 to + 10
days) the performance of the two groups is statistically indistinguishable (see column
4, Table 5.15, Panel B). With price disclosed, therefore, the divestment status -
completed or intented - seems to have an ambiguous impact.
The last column in Panel B shows that in the absence of price the Completion
sample significantly underperforms the Intention only sample over the period day -5
today +5. This is consistent with our speculation that the market, being unable to assess
the economic significance of the completed divestment, may be tending to place the
saturnine "skeleton in the cupboard" interpretation on the divestment decision amd
marking down the divestor's stock. With the Intention group the market seems to
suspend judgment on the merits of the sell-off in the absence of price. Indeed, in the
Intention case, the absence of price disclosure may be part of the uncertainty about
the consummation of the sell-off and may, therefore, not be viewed particularly
seriously by the stock market. This interpretation is consistent with the relatively
weak statistical results for the difference in CARs between the Intention Price and
Intention No-Price sub-samples (column 2, Table 5.15, Panel B).
Table 5.16 summarises the statistical results so far in terms of event day AR and
CAR for the month surrounding the press day arranged in decending CAR magnitude.
As can be seen the three sell-off samples disclosing price information head the table
and the three no-price samples are at the foot with an almost 7% difference in CARs
exhibited over the trading month between the Completion Price sample and the
Completion No-Price, ranked last. Table 5.16 confirms the over-riding importance
of price disclosure to the market's evaluation of the firm's divestment decision.
Table 5.16- Event Day ARs and 21 Trading Day CARs
For Various Samples in Descending CAR Magnitudes
Sample n AR-1
(t)
CAR -10 to +10
,	 (t)
Competion Price 73 1.76 1.99
(6.74a) (1.60
All Price 142 1.05 1.98
( 5.66a) (2.32b)
Intention Price 69 0.31 1.97
(1.20) (1.67c)
Intention 86 0.22 1.17
(0.93) (1.09)
All firms 178 0.85 0.86
(5.23a) (1.15)
Completion 92 1.45 0.56
(6.39b) (0.54)
Intention 17 -0.16 -2.09
•No-Price (-0.28) (-0.81)
All No-Price 36 0.06 -3.59
(0.16) (-2.24b)
Completion 19 0.25 -4.94
No-Price (0.58) (-2.49a)
Note: a,b,c Indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance for the t-statistic figures in brackets.
In this chapter we reported ourresults based on Dimson adjusted betas and market
model, there are, however, alternative methodologies for adjusting betas for thin
trading such as Scholes and Williams method. There are also other models for
generating abnormal returns asexplained in Chapter 4. These alternative
methodologies have also been used for testing our data. Results of such tests are
reported in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 6: IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE
METHODOLOGIES
The impact of varying the methodology on the results reported so far is examined
from the following angles:
1) Calculation of I3's in the OLS - market model.
2) Choice of prediction models.
3) Assumptions concerning the residuals.
The general impact of choice of methodology on event studies has been investigated
by Brown and Warner (1985) using a simulation approach. This study aims to evaluate
the impact of choice of methodology on our results so far. Assessment of the impact
of methodology on sell-off study results has been ignored in most previous studies
reviewed in Chapter 3.
6.1 IMPACT OF CHOICE OF ps
Ps calculated in this study so far as reported in Chapter 5, are derived from
daily share price data Dimson adjusted with 5 lags and 2 leads. As explained in
Chapter 4, due to the presence of thin trading in the UK stock market, Ps should
be calculated using methods developed for treating the thin trading problem.
Dimson (1979) and Scholes-Williams (1977) methods are both used to calculate
Ps here. The Dimson method, consists of multiple regressions of observed returns
on preceding, synchronous and subsequent market returns with the derived
coefficients summed to obtain an overall beta for a security. In this study various
combinations of lags and lead terms were used to derive the Dimson adjusted Ps.
Lagged terms generally seemed to carry more weight. For this reason there are
more lagged terms than lead terms in our regressions.
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As the weighted average of all Ps in the market should be 1, a search for a
combination of numbers of lagged and lead terms that produced an average 0 closest
to 1 was undertaken. The simple average unadjusted OLS beta for our sample firms
at 0.74 is well below 1. This finding confirms those of Dimson (1979) and
Scholcs-Williams (1977), that in the presence of non-synchronous trading, average
betas across securities are biased downwards and less than one. The inclusion of
up to 5 lag terms brought Ps closest to 1. Similarly the inclusion of lead terms
increased the average Ps for up to 2 lead terms. The highest average was obtained
by choosing 5 lag and 2 lead terms as shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1- Average Betas Obtained from Combination of Lag and Lead
Terms using the Dimson Method.
NO. OF
LAGS
NO. OF LEAD
TERMS
AVERAGE
P
o
1
o
o
0.742
0.885
1 1 0.748
2 1 0.904
2 2 0.887
3 2 0.890
3 1 0.906
4 2 0.922
5 3 0.921
5 2 0.923
Table 6.2 shows the comparison between average Ps not treated for thin trading
and those treated by the Dimson and Scholes-Williams methods.
Table 6.2- Comparison of Average Ps
Method Average P
OLS Market Model 0.742
Dimson (5 lag,2 lead) 0.923
Scholes-Williams 0.760
We can see from table 6.2 that the Scholes-Williams method improves the
average betas only slightly ( from 0.742 to 0.760 ) whereas the Dimson (5 lags, 2
leads) method improves the average betas considerably (from 0.742 to 0.923 ). For
this reason all the results reported in Chapter 5 were based on this adjustment. Using
the ALL samples the evaluation of abnormal returns was repeated for:
1) a set of p's obtained from the Scholes and Williams model adjusting for thin
trading.
2) a set of unadjusted 13's formed by the OLS - market model.
3) the assumption of market adjusted P's - that is all P's equal 1. In this model
all share prices move in harmony and at the same rate as the market, (see
Chapter 4).
Comparisons of results of each P adjustment method is made under the dependence
assumption and reported in Tables 6.3.
The results demonstrate that over the days -2 to 0, the 5% level of significance
is only reached by adjusting Ps for thin trading - i.e. t-statistics above 1.96. Student's
t-statistic results for day 0, where negative abnormal returns are observed, are also
listed in Table 6.3. It seems that adjusting Ps for thin trading creates a positive
shift in values of average abnormal returns. However, making Scholes and Williams
or Dimson thin trading adjustments does not change the direction of the results. The
only difference observed is in the magnitude of the abnormal returns and the
t-statistics. The ps derived from the Scholes and Williams treatment of thin trading
show smaller abnormal returns and t-statistics for positive CARs for days (-2, 0)
and larger magnitudes of negative CARs for day 0.
Table 6.3- Comparison of CARs and t-statistics Obtained from Differentl3Estimates
for the All Sample under dependence assumption.
p Estimation Method Day(-1)
AR%
(t)
Day(0)
AR%
(t)
Days(-2 to 0)
CAR%
(t)
DIMS ON 0.85 -0.20 0.68
(5.23)a (-1.24) (2.41)h
SCHOLES & WILLIAMS 0.81 -0.23 0.60
(5.00)a (-1.43) (2.13)h
OLS - Market model,
unadjusted p
0.79
(4.89)a
-0.26
(-1.58)
0.54
(1.94)c
Market Adjusted ie f3=1 0.77 -0.26 0.50
(4.60)a (-1.65)C (1.74)C
Note: ll ' b 'c indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively.
6.1.1 MARKET ADJUSTED (13 =1) VERSUS OLS
UNADJUSTED 13's
We note that unadjusted ps produce results that are closer to the results produced
by adjusting 13s by the Dimson/Scholes and Williams methods. Thus we conclude
that using unadjusted 13s may be preferable to using market adjusted Ps, despite
the thin trading present. It is important to note, from Table 6.3, that, on day -1,
the levels of significance produced by all methods are very close. This suggests
a lack of sensitivity to different abnormal return generating methods when
average residual is of a large magnitude relative to the market return and the
time period is short e.g. one day.
6.1.2 DIMSON VERSUS SCHOLES AND WILLIAMS
METHODS
We now look at the difference in CARs from using Ps adjusted by the Dimson,
and Scholes and Williams methods as presented in Table 6.3. Comparing the
cumulative abnormal returns produced for the days (-2 to 0) by both methods
we find the difference in CARs (-2 to 0) between the two methods is 0.08%
Similarly the difference in ARs for day -1 and day 0 of either method is only
0.04%. This confirms that there is hardly any change in the magnitude of our
results obtained under either of these two p adjustment methods. The impact of
the Dimson versus Scholes and Williams I3s on a daily basis may be assessed
from tables in the Appendix to this thesis.
6.2 CHOICE OF PREDICTION MODEL
The Mean Adjusted Model was not used due to systematic bias in our events
caused by clustering over al985-1986 stock market boom period. Brown and Warner
(1980, p232-235) demonstrate the relative unfavourable performance of Mean
Adjusted Returns in the presence of clustering. Abnormal returns are calculated
for the CAPM Model to see the impact of such change of prediction model on our
earlier results. The risk free rate is taken to be the 3-month-Treasury bill rate.
6.2.1 MARKET MODEL VERSUS CAPM
We now consider for the difference in means of the cumulative abnormal
returns over the period (days -2 to 0) in order to establish if the market and
CAPM models lead to different results concerning the divestment
announcements. Dimson adjusted Ps are used in both cases. The difference in
CARs over days (-2 to 0) is 0.003% which seems hardly significant. Therefore
we conclude that choosing CAPM as prediction model in preference to the market
model would have very little impact on our results and one might safely opt for
the simpler market model for convenience. The difference in AR's for day - 1
and for day 0 between the two samples is also not significant. The Table 6.4
summarises the results for the CAPM and Market Model both under the
dependence assumption and using Dimson Ps:
Table 6.4- Comparision of CAR' s between the Market
Model and the CAPM - Dependence Assumption.
Interval
(Days)
Market Model
CAR(%)
CAPM
CAR(%)
-40 to +40 0.242 0.143
-40 to 0 0.664 0.610
-10 to 0 1.520 1.507
-2 to 0 0.683 0.680
-2 0.032 0.031
-1 0.853 0.852
0 -0.202 -0.203
Note: None of the differences between the respective CARs is significant.
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6.3 IMPACT OF DEPENDENCE/INDEPENDENCE
ASSUMPTION.
The t-statistics reported so far through Chapters 5 and 6 were based on the
dependence assumption (see Chaper 4). Under the dependence assumption the
statistical tests allow for the possible cross-sectional dependence of abnormal
returns. Cross-sectional dependence of the security-specific excess returns could
exist if there are common influences on excess returns such as industry influences.
Serial dependence is ignored as Brown and Warner (1985, p.19) do not find benefits
arising from adjusting for serial dependence.
In the case of the independence assumption, the daily abnormal returns for
each security are divided by the standard deviation of that security to yield a
standardised abnormal return. Tables 6.5 and 6.6 provide a comparison of results
of the dependence/independence assumption for days (-2 to 0) and day (-1)
respectively using the full sample of 178 firms.
Table 6.5 shows that for the period surrounding the event day, -2 to 0 days,
CARs obtained according to the independence assumption are considerably smaller
than under the dependence assumption. Testing the whole sample adopting the
independence assumption demonstrates a downward shift in t-statistic level of
significance, for CAR(-2 to 0), from the 5% to the 10% level. Independence
assumption t-tests are run for:
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1) Market Model, Dimson I3s
2) Market Model, Scholes and Williams ps
3) Market Model, Unadjusted 13s
4) CAPM Model, Dimson Ps and
5) Market Adjusted Model p = 1.
The results of the above tests are reflected in Table 6.6. There is a downward
shift in the magnitude of abnormal returns and t-statistics when the independence
assumption is made. This finding is the same across all the return generating models
in the table. Although the downward shift is substantial, the significance level of
abnormal returns is still at the 1% level. This is due to our already highly positive
and significant results for day (-1). Since the systematic risk may not completely
abstract all of the intercorrelations among security returns, the abnormal residuals
are likely to be correlated. In the light of this the dependance assumption is probably
more plausible.
Results for the AR on day (-1), that is the actual event day, demonstrate that
irrespective of choice of prediction models and choice and/or treatment of thin
trading, sell-off announcements produce positive abnormal returns significant at
the 1% level. This finding may provide some comfort to other researchers in sell-off
studies.
In this chapter we demonstrated the impact of various methodologies on the
results reported in Chapter 5. It was shown that the choice of the Scholes and
Williams' method as compared with the Dimson method made very little difference
in the results. The unadjusted Ps and market adjusted ps reduced the magnitude of
abnormal returns and significant levels but altered neither the general direction of
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the results nor the conclusions. The choice of CAPM as a prediction model compared
with OLS-market model did not seem worthwhile as the results of both methods
were highly close. However application of dependence and independence
assumptions noticeably altered the magnitude of abnormal returns and the levels of
significance.
Chapter 7 reports the impact of contextual variables, such as financial strength,
relative size and completion/intention announcement, on market reaction to
sell-offs.
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Table 6.5- Comparision of CAR (-2,0) with Dependence versus Independence
Assumptions -All 178 Firms.
Dependence
Assumption
CARs(%)
(z)
Independence
Assumption
CARs(%)
(z)
Market Model, Dimson Ps 0.683 0.188
(2.40" (1.44)
Market Model, Scholes & 0.600 0.154
Williams PS (2.13)" (1.77)c
CAPM, Dimson Ps 0.680 0.184
(2.40)b (1.41)
13=11 0.504 0.121(1.74)c (0.931)
Market Model, Unadjusted 0 0.539 0.146
(1.94)c (1.12)
Note: Numbers in parentheses denote t-statistics.
b' c indicate 5% and 10% significant levels
Table 6.6 - Comparison of AR on day-1 with Dependence versus
Independence Assumptions.
Dependence
Assumption
CARs(%)
(t)
Independence
Assumption
CARs(%)
(t)
_
Market Model, Dimson 13s 0.853 0.269
(5.23)a (3.59)a
Market Model, Scholes & 0.813 0.266
Williams Ps (5.00)a (3.55)a
CAPM, Dimson I3s 0.852 0.268
(5.22)a (3.58)a
13 = 1 0.773 0.234(4.60)a (3.13)a
MarketModel,Unadjusted fis 0.786 0.261
,
(4.89)a (3.41)a
Note: Numbers in parentheses denote t-statistics.
° indicates 1% significant level.
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Chapter 7: IMPACT OF CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES ON MARKET
REACTION TO SELL-OFFS
7.1 RELATIVE SIZE AND FINANCIAL STRENGTH
To deepen our understanding of the market reaction to sell-off announcements,
we adopt a multiple regression approach to assess the impact on shareholder wealth
of firm disclosure of different pieces of information associated with the sell-off. In
particular, we explore the impact of relative size of divestiture and whether the
financial strength of the divesting firm is an important explanatory variable.
Specifically, regression equations are developed to explore the relationship between
excess return on the event day, completion/intention announcement, price
disclosure/non-disclosure, relative size and financial status of parent.
Relative size of the divestiture is measured by the ratio of transaction price to
market value of the divesting firm at the end of the month prior to the press day.
Table 7.1 provides the distribution of relative sizes for the 142 cases where price
was disclosed. As can be seen, in 69 cases, the sell-off price was 10% or less of
the divestor's market valuation. Because of the highly skewed nature of the
distribution and the presence of extreme outliers, analysis is focused on a binary
variable set to 0 if relative size 5..10% and to 1 if relative size >10%.
Financial strength is measured by the divesting firm's z-score, calculated using
the last available published accounts prior to the sell-off (Taffler, 1983), as explained
in Chapter 4. If the company has a negative z-score it has financial characteristics
resembling previously failed firms and the lower the z-score the more financially
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distressed the firm. Conversely, the more positive the score the stronger the firm.
Since it was not possible to compute z-scores for all firms due to business activities
in certain cases being outside the scope of the two models employed, the sample
size is reduced from 178 to 147.
Table 7.1: Distribution of Relative Size of Divestment
RELATIVE SIZE n %
<10% 98 69
10 - 30% 26 18
30 - 60% 8 6
>60% 10 7
Total: 142 100
NOTE: This excludes 7 extreme cases with relative size above 80%.
( mean=10% and median 4.4%)
Table 7.2 presents the various regression models with event day i.e. day 0. AR
as dependent variable. Model 1 in the table provides the results of the regression
of excess return on the intention/completion announcement, the price disclosure
binary variable and the z-score. The only statistically significant variable is z-score,
with negative coefficient, which implies that the weaker the firm, the greater is the
event day abnormal return - supportive of the "good news" interpretation of sell-offs
by sick firms. The completion and price disclosure variables, although not
significant, have signs in the direction consistent with uncertainty reduction.
In Model 2 of Table 7.2, where size replaces the Z-score as a variable, we note
that it is significant at 5%. This means that larger relative size sell-offs produce
larger abnormal returns on day (-1).
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In Model 3 of Table 7.2, both size and z-score are included as explanatory
variables. We find that z-score is significant at 10%. The
relative size level of significance is, however, just under 10%. This shows that both
relative size and z-score seem to be important factors in explaining size of abnormal
returns.
Table 7.2 Regression of Event Day (-1) AR on Sell-off Characteristics:
Completion, Price Disclosure, Relative Size and Z-score.
Model 1:
Model 2:
Model 3:
AR = 00 +13 1x +132Price	 +p4z + 8
AR =130 +13 1IC	 +133Size +E
AR = 130 ± 13 1/C	 -1-133Size + [34Z -I- E
Model Sample
Size
CONSTANT
Po
IC
Pi
PRICE
132
SIZE
,	 P3
Z-SCORE
04
/72 Fop
1 147 0.38
(0.31)
1.25
(1.43)
0.69
(0.61)
-0.22b
(-2.21)
0.03 2.51'
(3,143)
2 142 -0.19
(-0.24)
1.08
(1.18)
1.97b
(2.02)
0.02 4.09b
(2,139)
3 120 0.36
(0.39)
1.43
(1.35)
1.86
(1.62)
-0.20'
(-1.68)
0.04 2.65b
(3,116)
Notes:
1) Z is z-score. The explanatory variables except Z are dummy variables:
IC equals 0 if Intention announced and 1 if Completion announced.
Price equals 1 if price disclosed and 0 otherwise.
Size equals 0 if relative size of divestment is <=10% and 1 otherwise.
2) Figures in parentheses except in the last column are t-statistics.
3) df = degrees of freedom.
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4) 11 ' 13 'c indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance.
Table 7.3 shows the Model 1 regressions with the abnormal returns over
different intervals surrounding the divestment announcement as alternative
dependent variables.
According to Table 7.3 regressing day (-1) and (-2 to -1) abnormal returns against
z-score, Completion/Intention and Price/No-Price dummies show the z-score, with
a negative sign, to be significant at the 5% level; but neither of the other two variables
is significant. Day(0) abnormal returns regressed in Model 1 and 3 show significant
levels of 5% and 10% for z-score respectively. This confirms our earlier findings
for regressions of abnormal returns on day (-1). Therefore we conclude that the
financial health of the divestor is negatively related to the excess return earned by
stockholders incident on the sell-off announcement. This empirical finding may be
consistent with the bankruptcy avoidance motive or "good news" argument about
management actions and future performance.
Table 7.3: Regression of CARs on Intention/Completion, Price Disclosure, Z-score
for differing periods (n=147).
DAYS CONSTANT
Po
(t)
IC
131
(t)
PRICE
132
(t)
Z-SCORE
133
(t)
R-2 F
(4P
0 -0.10 -0.60 -0.10 0.10' 1.28
(-.235) (-1.023) (-.173) (1.65) .005 (3,143)
-1 0.38 1.25 0.69 -0.22b 2.51'
(.31) (1.42) (.61) (-2.20) .030 (3,143)
(-1,0) 0.1 0.60 0.50 0.10 1.17
(.195) (.960) (.640) (-1.41) .003 (3,143)
(-2,-1) 0.60 0.60 1.01 -0.2a 2.63b
(.502) (.643) (.875) (-2.64) .032 (3,143)
-
(-2,0) 1.30 0.04 0.42 -0.10 1.61
(.451) (-.001) (.976) (-1.81) .012 (3,143)
Note: a'b and indicate significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
7.1.1 MULTI-COLLINEAVITY PROBLEMS
Multi-collineavity between our independent variables is studied using pairwise
correlation coefficients between independent variables i.e. Relative Size (SIZE),
Intention/Completion (IC), Price Disclosure (PRICE) and Z-score. These results
are reported in Table 7.4.
TABLE 7.4 - Correlation Coefficient between Independent Variables Size IC,
Price and Z.
VARIABLE SIZE IC PRICE Z
SIZE 1
IC 0.025 1
PRICE N/A -0.044 1
Z -0.133 0.025 -0.136 1
It appears that collinearity among the independent variables is very low with the
correlation coefficient being -0.093 between Relative Size (SIZE) on z-score
(Z). For definition and interpretation of multi-collinearity reference could be
made to R.S. Pindyck and D.L. Rubinfield (1981).
The introduction of Z-score in Model 3 of Table 7.2 leads to a small decline in
the coefficient of SEE compared to Model 2 in the same table (from 1.97 to
1.86). However, the standard error of that coefficient changes very little from
0.0166 in Model 2 to 0.0169 in Model 3. We are therefore inclined to suggest
that multicollinearity is not affecting our results in any significant way.
7.2 TESTS OF HYPOTHESES CONCERNING RELATIVE
SIZE
In Chapter 4 we set out the following hypothesis about the impact of relative size
on abnormal returns produced:
H4: Size of divestment relative to size of parent is not related to change in
divestor shareholder wealth.
Based on the assumption that price disclosure has information content for the
market and may, therefore, lead to abnormal returns for stockholders on a sell-off
announcement, this hypothesis posits that the price disclosure perse rather than the
relative size of sell-off is relevant to market participants' perception.
The Model 2 regression results show relative size to be significant at the 5%
level. This clearly rejects the above null hypothesis. We therefore can conclude:
a) that the relative size of divestment is an important factor in determining the
impact on share prices of sell-off announcements and b) that the niarket reaction is
positively related to that factor. This finding is in harmony with the results of Klein
(1986) who finds the relative size of sell-off to be positively correlated with excess
return and of both Hearth and Zaima (1984) and Klein (1986) who find their portfolios
of large divestitures significantly outperforming their portfolios of small divestitures
in terms of abnormal returns produced. Our results are also in line with those of
Hite and Owers (1983) and Miles and Rosenfeld's (1983) on the impact of relative
size in the case of spin-offs.
One of the motives for sell-offs is the need for cash and bankruptcy avoidance
(see Section 2.1.2). In such cases the release of financial pressures on the parent
might have also triggered the positive market reaction. This leads us to our next
hypothesis which cocems the financial strength of divestor.
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7.3 TEST OF HYPOTHESIS CONCERNING DIVESTOR'S
FINANCIAL STRENGTH
Here we examine the relationship between potential financial distress of the
divestor, as measured by the z-score, and abnormal returns on announcements. Our
hypothesis as set in Chapter 4 is:
H5: The financial strength of the divestor does not affect market reaction to
announcement of a sell-off.
This hypothesis relates to the "bankruptcy avoidance" motive, that is, the motive to
raise cash in an attempt to ensure survival. Our results from the Model 1 regression
show that the z-score is significant at 5% level. Therefore the above hypothesis is
rejected and there is evidence that some of the abnormal returns produced may be
due to release of financial pressure on the divestor.
This result is in harmony with the findings of Hite, Owers and Rogers (1987)
who find total liquidation of the firm, the extreme case of corporate divestiture, to
generate very substantial gains for shareholders. They demonstrate that in these
cases, the market value of the divested pieces was greater in total than the market
value of the firm as a whole. They, however, point out that these firms were not
experiencing negative abnormal returns on the stock market, due to financial
problems, prior to announcment.
From the rejection of the above hypothesis, and the negative coefficient of z
in Model 1, we may also conclude that the sell-off is taken, by the market, as
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signalling that the company's management is taking strong action to improve firm
performance. For instance, the management may be selling-off loss making
divisions. Such a decision would be regarded as a positive NPV decision.
7.4 RELATIVE SIZE AND FINANCIAL STRENGTH
RELATIONSHIP
From our regressions, Model 1 and Model 3, we note that with the inclusion
of both relative size and z-score in one regression the significance level of the z-score
as an explanatory variable is reduced from 5% to 10%. This suggests some degree
of collinearity between relative size and z-score. We have already found both z-score
and relative size to be significant at 5% in separate regressions. The importance of
each of these variables is plausible on the grounds explained. Logically, one would
also expect a relatively large divestment in a financially distressed firm to produce
positive abnormal returns by releasing the financial pressures on the firm on a
significant scale.
Relatively large divestments in financially distressed fimis would, therefore,
be plausible. Such action would not only reduce the size of the company and thus
make it more manageable but it would possibly provide substantial cash for the
remaining part.
7.5 INTERACTION BETWEEN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Our choice of variables in the regression stems from the connection we expect
between these variables and market reaction to sell-off announcement. However,
we also expect following interactions between our independent variables:
i. Z-score and relative size (SIZE) might be negatively related since with high risk
of potential bankruptcy more drastic measures will be needed to rescue the company.
Thus a larger sell off might be required to generate sufficient cash for the parent.
ii. Intention/Completion (IC) and Price Disclosure (PRICE) could also be related
as completion would only take place if an agreement on price is reached. If the
price agreed is so low that it is regarded as bad news then it may not be disclosed
along with the completion news. Such suspicion by the market is reflected in CAR' s
results for the Completion No-Price Group in Table 5.11 where negative abnormal
returns are produced prior to and after day (-1). Day (-1) abnormal returns are only
0.25% and statistically insignificant. CAR's for days (0 to +5) are -2.68% and
significant at the 1% level.
Fearing such a negative market reaction divestors may disclose the price on
completion. In our sample of 92 completion announcements only 19 choose not to
declare price. We could therefore expect a positive relation between
Intention/Completion (IC) and Price Declaration (PRICE).
iii. Price Declaration (PRICE) and Relative Size (SIZE) may also be related as the
importance of the price information for the market increases with the magnitude of
sell-off. A small sell-off is expected to produce little market reaction and its price
disclosure at the time of announcement may not be regarded as vital information.
However, in our data compilation we have treated Price Declaration (PRICE) as a
dummy variable and have calculated Relative Size (SIZE) for all sell-offs with
price information.
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iv. Z-score and Intention/Completion (IC) variables may be related. Companies
with a high risk of bankruptcy may tend to announce their intention to divest before
completion is reached as such an announcement would demonstrate their will to
turn themselves around and thereby elecit a positive market reaction. On the other
hand, in the absence of an agreed price and sales details the divestor may hesitate
to make an intention announcement if it is felt that the market may react negatively
to an unclear sell-off event.
7.6 POSSIBLE OMITTED VARIABLES
US sell-off studies have explored the impact of a number of variables on the
magnitude of abnormal returns. Some of these variables that were omitted in our
study and could be incorporated in future UK studies of sell-offs are noted here:
1. Identity of Buyer:
This variable has been studied by a number of researchers. Jain (1985) and Rosenfeld
(1984) find significantly positive abnormal return gains accruing to buyers as well
as sellers on announcement. Sicherman and Pettway (1987) find that the acquisition
of related assets enhances the shareholder wealth of the acquiring firm. The
acquisition of unrelated divested assets, however, affects shareholder wealth
negatively.
Sicherman and Pettway (1992) confirm that buyers and sellers of divested assets
earn positive abnormal returns on announcement of a divestiture. Furthermore they
find that these gains are affected by seller's financial condition and by disclosure
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of the transaction price. Seller's financial condition is measured by a variable called
'DOWNGRADE' which is equal to one if the divesting firm's credit rating has been
downgraded prior to the sell-off announcement, and zero otherwise.
An additional variable called 'INTERACTION' is also introduced by Sicherman
and Pettway (1992) as the product of 'PRICE' and 'DOWNGRADE' to capture the
joint effect of downgraded sellers and transaction price disclosure. It was found
that CAR's were greater for selling firms that did not have credit downgrades during
the two years prior to announcing sell-offs, than for downgraded divestors. The
wealth gains to the seller and buyer of divested assets may be better assessed if the
identity of the buyer is noted and variables such as financial strength or downgrading
are measured for the buyer and the seller and then incorporated in the same equation.
Financial information on the buyer is important as financial strength can affect
bargaining position in agreeing a price and consequently the level of abnormal
returns to the divestor.
The way the abnormal return gains are shared between the same seller and buyer is
also affected by their relatedness of activities, that is, if they are within the same
industry and the way the deal has been justified. This issue is addressed under "Fit
and Focus" further on in this section. Assessment of the identity of the buyer within
the framework of financial strength and relatedness of industry may explain the size
of abormal returns.
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2. Use of Proceeds
Lang, Poulsen and Stulz (1993) argue that if management values firm size, or its
diversification, one expects it to be reluctant to sell assets for efficiency alone. The
need for cash can be a powerful incentive. In exploring the market reaction to
divestor's use of funds, they investigate the abnormal return performance incident
on announcement within sub-samples of sellers that have used the funds to repay
debts to the claim holders and those that have retained the proceeds. They find that
for a sample of large asset sales the stock-price reaction is significantly positive
only for those firms that plan to pay out the proceeds to claimholders. Therefore
use of proceeds would seem an appropriate variable to include in the analysis of
abnormal returns in sell-off studies.
3. Agency costs
Management discretion in sell-offs and use of proceeds could cause a potential
agency cost problem. However, Lang, Paulsen and Stulz (1993) do not find a direct
link between abnormal returns and proxies for the agency cost of managerial
discretion - such as decision to pay off the debts or keep the proceeds of divestment.
On the other hand, Tehranian, Traylos and Waegelein (1987) demonstrate that only
sell-offs by a divesting firm compensating its executives with a long term plan is
associated with a favourable security market reaction (see page 58). It, therefore,
seems that proxies for agency cost or elements that mitigate the agency problem,
such as long term performance plan could justifiably be included among the
variables explaining the size of abnormal returns incident on sell-off announcement.
4. Insider trading
It can be argued that management could be expected to purchase company shares
prior to a sell-off announcement if positive market reaction is expected on
announcement (See page 56). Hirschey and Zaima (1989) find that market reaction
runs from very favourable for closely held firms with insider net-buy activity to
neutral for widely held firms with insider net-sell activity prior to announcement.
As such insider trading could be an additional variable in explaining market reaction
to sell-offs.
5. Lenders and Bank Creditors.
Recent US and UK studies have explored the frequency and effectiveness of
divestment in corporate financial distress. Brown, James and Mooradian (1991),
point out that in their study of sell-offs by financially distressed firms, 37% of their
sample firms that entered Chapter 11 sold assets prior to filing. Furthermore, only
20% of their sample firms successfully avoided bankruptcy through private debt
restructuring. Similarly Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) find that only 3
out of 21 companies in their sample that sell over 20% of their assets go bankrupt.
Lasfer, Sudarsanam and Taffler (1994) demonstrate that, on average, sell-offs by
potentially bankrupt firms experience significantly higher abnormal returns on
announcement than do healthy firms. Furthermore, they find that these positive
abnormal returns are significantly related to the divestors levels of debt. Potentially
bankrupt firms with high levels of debt experience larger abnormal returns than
- 166 -
similar companies with low levels of debt over the event days (-1 to 0). They suggest
that such high abnormal returns point to the effective monitoring of managerial
decisions by lenders.
Similarly, Hirschey et al (1990) argue that the presence of bank debt adds credibility
to management's divestment decision by increasing the probability that proceeds
will exceed the NPV of continued ownership of the divested asset by the divestor.
In other words, lender's influence is seen to reduce agency cost.
In view of the above studies one would be inclined to suggest that the level of bank
lending can be added as an explanatory variable to our regressions of abnormal
returns against various independent variables.
6. Fit and Focus
One of the concepts that has been developed to explain the abnormal return
performance on announcement is 'fit or focus'. The divested asset may have a better
strategic fit with the buyer's business than with the seller's. Thus with the sell off,
the asset will be put to a higher valued use. The resulting added value can then be
shared between the seller and buyer. Divestment may also reduce the negative
synergy that the divested asset has contributed to the divestor's business thereby
increasing the strategic and operational focus of the remaining business.
Explanations offered for positive market reaction to sell-off announcement by
Alexander et al (1984) and Hite et al (1987) are along this line. That is, a sell-off
implies a better fit for the buyer. Comment and Jarrell (1992), Bhagat, Shleifer and
Vishny (1990), and Lang and Stulz (1992) suggest that gains in market value stem
from increased focus on remaining assets.
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John and Ofek (1992) aim to find the share of abnormal return gains from 'fit' and
'focus' elements individually. They identify firms that fall into either of fit or focus
category and find support for the notion that gains can stem from better 'fit' or
'focus'. Such findings suggest that proxies for 'fit' and 'focus' can be incorporated
in our regression models and may help to explain market reaction to sell-offs.
7.7 CONSISTENCY OF HYPIOTHESIS
With reference to the consistensy of our five hypotheses the following explanations
would seem justified at this point.
The first hypothesis is about the stock market reaction to divestment announcements
in general whereas the remaining four hypotheses are concerned with the impact of
additional information characterising divestors and the divestment process on such
reaction.
Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 4 are about how price disclosure and the consequent
estimation of the relative size of divestment condition market reaction. Such
disclosure may accompany other information e.g. mere intention to divest or
completion of divestment. The impact of the latter is the subject of our Hypothesis
3. Finally, the stock market may read information about price, relative size, intention
or completion in conjunction with information about the financial condition of the
divestor. The impact of the latter is the subject of our Hypothesis 5.
Our Hypotheses 2 to 5 are not mutually inconsistent since they relate to different
attributes of the divestment process all of which can co-exist. However, market
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reaction to divestments may be determined by these attributes in an interactive,
rather than a linear additive, fashion. For example, assuming that divestment by
financially distressed firms will be favourably received by the stock market, we
may expect that the larger the relative size of divestment the more favourable the
market reaction. Similarly, price disclosure and completion/intention, or financial
distress and completion/intention may have an interactive effect on market reaction.
The interactive effects of price disclosure and completion/intention are explored in
detail by stratifying our sample into different subsamples:
Intention with price disclosed;
Intention without price disclosure;
Completion with price disclosed;
Completion without price disclosure.
We also examine whether, within the same subsample of price declarers, there is
differential market reaction to divestors announcing intention or completion. This
analysis is repeated for the subsample of all non-price declarers. A similar analysis
is carried out by grouping all divestors who announce only intention but differ in
terms of price declaration. Grouping all divestors who announce completion but
differ in terms of price disclosure is also explored. Investigation of the market
reaction in these sub-samples sheds light on the interaction between price
information and information about the certainty of the divestment process.
The interaction between price declaration, relative size or intention/completion with
divestor financial condition is examined in our regression models by including the
relevant interactive terms. However no statistically significant relationship is found
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between any of these interactive terms. The following interactive terms, i.e. product
of two variables, are introduced into the regression model in addition to the three
explanatory variables in Model 3, Table 7.2: (1) The interaction between Financial
Strength (z-score) and Intention/Completion (IC), (2) interaction between Relative
Size (Size) and Intention/Completion (IC), and (3) the interaction between Financial
Strenght (z-score) and Relative Size (Size). However, none of the interactive terms
except IC x R is significant. R is insignificant compared to its marginal significance
at t = 1.62 in Model 3. The adjusted R2 of 5.3% represents a small improvement.
When the event day abnormal return is regressed against the first two variables
z-score and Size x IC, the z-score is negatively significant at 10% level (t = 1.66)
and (IC x Size) is significant at 1% level (t = 2.86) - the adjusted R 2 is 7.5%. These
results suggest that the impact of the z-score and Relative Size is to some extent
modified by the accompanying information about completion and intention.
7.8 REVIEW OF RESULTS
In Chapter 5 we found the magnitude and significance of abnormal returns on
announcement day for various sub-samples of U.K. sell-offs are larger for
sub-samples of price-declared and completion announcements. These findings shed
light on the importance of certainty afforded by price and completion
announcements.
Chapter 6 examined the effect of changes of methodology on our results, namely,
methodology for calculation of beta and return generating models. The choice of
methodology seemed to affect the magnitude of our results but not their general
direction.
In Chapter 7 we aimed to identify the possible variables that explain the size of
already measured abnormal returns on announcement. Relative size and z-score
appeared significant at the 5% level if regressed in separate models against abnormal
returns. However, if both relative size and z-score were regressed against abnormal
returns in the same model the significance of these variables would reduce to
around the 10% level.
Our investigation of multicollinearity does not alter our earlier results and
interpretations.
Chapter 8: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
8.1 GENERAL RESULTS
This study explores a number of issues relating to corporate divestment activity
in the UK in the light of various competing theories. We find firstly that sell-offs
in aggregate are associated with an increase in shareholder wealth of 0.85% on the
event day although pre- and post-market reaction is conflicting. Unlike the majority
of US-based studies we find no significant excess returns accruing to stockholders
in the 81 trading day period surrounding the announcement date, although
differences in sample selection criteria may be partly the reason. However, these
broad empirical results appear to mask the important contribution of underlying
sub-sample characteristics that may serve to augment our understanding of the
contingent nature of market reaction to the corporate divestment process.
Transaction price may well be an important piece of information used in
assessing the impact of the sell-off on a divestor with consequent shareholder wealth
implications. Also, whether the first announcement of the sell-off relates to a signed
agreement or not seems to influence market reaction. Size of the divestment relative
to the size of parent may also be an important determinant of investors' perceptions.
In addition, the financial health of the divestor immediately prior to the sell-off may
shape the market's interpretation of the motivation and exigency of the firm's
divestment decision and condition the consequent market reaction. Our more
detailed findings may be summarised as follows.
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8.2 STOCK MARKET REACTION TO PRICE
ANNOUNCEMENT
One in five of our sample companies does not declare price on sell-off
announcement and we find a significant difference in abnormal returns between
price declarers and non-price declarers. In fact, there is no apparent stock market
reaction on event day to sell-off announcements by firms not providing price
information. However, over a longer interval surrounding the announcement (-10
to +10 days), we find some statistical evidence of positive revaluation in the case
of price declarers and the converse in the case of price non-declarers. The actual
price disclosure decision would appear to convey market relevant information.
8.3 STOCK MARKET REACTION TO STATUS OF
DIVESTITURE
Just over half our sample relates to divestments which have been completed,
whereas in the other cases only the intention to dispose of operating assets to a
named third party is announced. In the latter case uncertainty about final
consummation of the deal and presumably the price may be substantial. As such
we would expect abnormal returns for the Completion sample to be higher than
those for the Intention only sample of firms and such expectations are confirmed
on the event day by our results, but not for other periods. It would appear that the
degree of certainty attached to the sell-off announcement has relevance for the
market pricing of the divestor.
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8.4 INTERACTION BETWEEN PRICE DISCLOSURE AND
STATUS OF DIVESTITURE ANNOUNCEMENT
To explore the interaction between price/no-price disclosure and
completion/intention, market price response to divestiture announcement for each
of four sub-samples is examined. Overall the Completion sample with price
information disclosed earns a significantly larger event day average excess return
than the equivalent Intention-Price sample. The two small, No-Price samples exhibit
minimal event day reaction. The Completion-No price group under-performs every
other sub-group, thus emphasising the importance of price disclosure.
8.5 THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL STRENGTH OF THE
DIVESTOR ON MARKET REACTION
Little detailed attention has been paid to date in the literature to the "bankruptcy
avoidance" motive for corporate sell-offs, an issue of interest both for theoretical
and for empirical reasons. To examine the hypothesis that firms may divest in
order to avoid bankruptcy, we employ the z-score measure of bankruptcy risk
derived from a firm's published accounts. If an enterprise's z-score is negative it
has financial characteristics similar to those of previously failed firms and itself is
at risk of failure. If it is positive there is no immediate concern over its financial
health. Regressing event day abnormal return against z-score and
Completion/Intention and Price/No-Price dummies shows the z-score, with a
negative sign, to be significant at the 5% level but neither of the other two variables
significant. This suggests that the financial health of the divestor is negatively
related to the excess return earned by stockholders incident on the sell-off
announcement. This empirical finding may be consistent with the bankruptcy
avoidance motive or "good news" argument about management actions and future
performance.
8.6 RELATIVE SIZE OF SELL-OFF AND SHAREHOLDER
WEALTH
The ratio of size of divestment to size of parent, providing a measure of the
economic significance of the proposed sell-off, may also be an important predictor
of market reaction to a sell-off announcement. To explore this issue event day
abnormal return is regressed against a relative size binary variable and the
completion/intention dummy. We find relative size, with positive coefficient, to
be significant at the 5% level, but the other variable non-significant. There is thus
evidence supportive of the argument that the larger the disposal, the greater the
increase in shareholder wealth.
8.7 IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE METHODOLOGIES
Choice of the Scholes and Williams method for correcting for thin trading bias
in market model estimates compared with the Dimson method does not alter the
thrust of our results. The results from using betas without any correction for thin
trading in general are closer to those from the use of market adjusted betas. Using
abnormal returns based on the assumption of cross-sectional independence reduces
the significance, but does not alter the direction, of our results obtained under the
dependence assumption.
It is interesting to conclude that although there are variations in the magnitude
of abnormal returns and t-statistics, when applying different methodologies, the
direction of the results is the same. Furthermore, as far as day (-1) results are
concerned, all of the prediction models, irrespective of dependence/independence
assumption and methodology for treatment of thin trading, produce abnormal returns
significant at the 1% level. This finding should provide some comfort to researchers
in sell-off studies concerned about the robustness of their results to differences in
methodology.
8.8 COMPARISON OF RESULTS WITH OTHER STUDIES
This study concentrates on sell-offs only. The overall results are in harmony
with other studies reviewed in Chapter 3 (e.g. Jain, 1985; Zaima and Hearth, 1985;
Hite and Owers, 1987; Hearth and Zaima, 1984 and 1986; and Klein, 1986). That
is, statistically positive abnormal returns are detected on or around the
announcement day for the overall sample. Our results for the sub-sample of Intention
only firms are in line with Alexander et al (1984)'s overall results.
As with Klein (1986), we find that price declaration on announcement has a
statistically significant impact on magnitude of abnormal returns produced (see
Section 5.5). The impact of the announcement of a completed sell-off is explored
by comparing the results for initial announcement of intention with that of
completion. Completion announcement is found to produce a statistically
significant impact on abnormal returns on announcement day (-1), (see Section
5.7) but not the intention announcement. Neither Klein (1986) nor Zaima and Hearth
(1985) undertake such analysis. Klein (1986) examines whether price declaration
is used as a proxy for the probability of the deal reaching completion. Zaima and
Hearth (1985) study the movements of abnormal returns between initial
announcement and subsequent completion.
We also explore the impact of relative size of divestiture on the excess returns
and find larger sell-offs produce larger abnormal returns. Our study of relative size
confirms the findings of Klein (1986) and Zaima and Hearth (1985).
Financial strength has not been studied in the same manner as it has been by
Zaima and Hearth (1985), where the relation between abnormal returns and current
strength of divestor, as measured by the Standard Poor's rating, is found to be
positive, thus demonstrating advantages to those divesting from a strong financial
position. We use the more appropriate z-score measure of bankruptcy risk and our
regression analysis suggests higher abnormal returns are enjoyed by divestors with
high risk of bankruptcy assessed on this basis. Sicherman and Pettway (1987) do
not study the abnormal return to divestors with strong and weak financial positions
directly. They explore the relationship between the worsening of the financial
condition of the divestor, and thus a potential weakening in its negotiation position,
and the gains earned by the acquiring firm using downgrading by Moody's and/or
Standard Poor's within two years of the divestiture announcement. Their results
were insignificant. They do, however, find that 42 out of their 147 divestors were
downgraded by Moody's and/or Standard and Poor's Investment Services during
the two years prior to announcement. This downgrading, which was not reversed
before the announcement, was considered a signal of worsening in the firm's
financial condition. Our results also confirm that the market has regarded divestiture
as a good solution to the worsening in the firms' divesting financial position.
Several issues studied by previous researches (see Chapter 3) have not been
examined in this study, such as: insider trading and ownership structure (Hirschey
and Zaima 1989), long term performance plans (Tehranian et al, 1987), management
motives (Denning, 1987), confounding effects (Denning and Shastri, 1990), and
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factors influencing the divestment decision (Duhaime and Grant, 1984). However,
the results reported in this study are more detailed in terms of sub-samples of price
declaration and completion announcements, choices of prediction models, thin
trading treatment and dependence and independence assumptions for statistical tests
of significance (see Chapters 5,6 and 7). In addition an explicit test of the bankruptcy
avoidance hypothesis is made.
8.8.1 LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY
This study concentrates on studying abnormal returns on divestment
announcement within sub-samples of price declared and/or completion declared
as well as our over all sample. Our examination attempts to explore the impact
of price and completion information on the market reaction. We also evaluate
the impact of relative size of divestment and financial strength (measured by
Z-score) on the magnitude of abnormal returns. These factors have appeared
important in explaining the level of abnormal returns.
Our study although forming a sound basis for future studies of U.K. sell-offs is
limited in many respects. Some of the questions which have not been addressed
in our study but have already been raised and examined within U.S. sell-offs
studies are outlined below:
i. What factors influence the divestment decision? For instance: Do parents
divest a division that is underperforming its budgetted targets (unit strength)?
Do parents choose to divest divisions that are less dependent upon other divisions
in their firms (unit interdependence)? Do managers tend to divest divisions that
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they have less personal attachment to (managerial attachment)? Do the general
economic conditions have any impact on the parent 's choice of divestment?
These factors are studied by Duhaime and Grant (1984) for U.S. firms.
ii. Can management motives for divestment affect the magnitude of abnormal
returns? For instance, has the divestment taken place to make the overall parent
more manageable or was it intended to rescue the parent from financial crisis.
Six management motives have been studied by Denning (1988), see Chapter 3,
p.58.
iii. Will the market react more positively to divestments made by managers
whose salary and rewards are linked to the long term profitibility of the parent?
Tehranian et al (1987) study the impact of long term performance plans on
abnormal returns and suggest that firms with long term performance plans do
attract positive abnormal returns on announcement of divestments.
Conversely, divesting firms that do not compensate their executives with long
term performance plans experience an insignificant negative stock market
reaction at the announcement of their sell-off proposals. These findings provide
support for the hypothesis that long-term performance plans provide important
incentives that can reduce agency costs by improving the alignment of managers'
and stockholders' interests.
iv. Will the market respond more favourably to divestments by firms whose
managers hold some shares and have made further purchases recently? The
impact of insider trading on sell-off announcement has been examined by
Hirschey and Zaima(1989). See page 56 Section 3.5.
v. Does the use of proceeds effect abnormal return. See Section 7.6-2.
iv. Is the degree of debt related to the level of abnormal returns? Lasfer,
Sudarsanam and Taffler (1994) demonstrate such positive relation using the data
base of this study.
vii. How much of the market's positive reaction can be attributed to fit or focus
element? See Section 7.6 - 6.
viii. Our sample in this study was restricted to a two year period, 1985 to 1986.
Will a study over a longer time period confirm similar findings?
8.9 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FIELD
The areas in which this thesis has attempted to contribute to the field of
corporate divestments research can be outlined briefly as follows:
1- UK sell-off experience is studied for the first time using similar criteria and
methodology to those employed in US studies and comparative results
evaluated. The construction of UK-based daily abnormal return data proved to
be a major task. Such data is readily available to US researchers.
2- The impact of different methodologies is analysed for the first time in a sell-off
study to allow for variation in :
a) the choice of methods for correcting for the thin trading bias in the
traditional market model,
b) the choice of return generating process,
c) the choice of models with cross-sectional dependence as well as
independence among the residuals.
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3- Abnormal returns are calculated for various sub-groups of firms classified on
various criteria to explore differences in market reaction to each sub-group.
Such analysis has shed light on some differences in the results reported by other
studies. Alexander et al's (1984) results, which are contrary to those of most
other sell-off studies, are similar to the results obtained from our Intention
sub-sample. Our results for the whole sample are, at the same time, in harmony
with those of other sell-off studies. Alexander et al (1984) do specify that their
sample is made up of first announcements of 'sell-offs' of either "greed to sell"
or "agreed in principle". Such a definition is the same as our definition of
intention sub-sample. We would like to highlight this definition and sample
characteristics as the reason for the compatibility of Alexander et al's (1983)
finding, with those of other studies. We would also suggest that the differences
in abnormal return magnitude and distribution pattern over an observation
period may be a function of the idiosyncratic sample characteristics.
4- The impact of price announcement and completion announcement is studied
for various sub-groups as well as the entire sample.
5- The impact of complete certainty on stock market valuation is assessed for the
first time by comparing sub-samples of Completion Price and Intention - No
Price sell-offs. This, we believe, gives a clearer picture of the market impact
of information on sell-offs.
6- Z-score is employed as a means of assessing financial strength and support is
found for the postulated bankruptcy avoidance motive for corporate
divestments.
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8.10 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH.
8.10.1 MOTIVES FOR PRICE DISCLOSURE AND
COMPLETION ANNOUNCEMENT.
An area that seems to warrant further research is the area of the economic
and managerial motives for :
a) declaring or not declaring the price on announcement,
b) delaying the announcement of divestment until reaching completion.
8.10.2 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DIVESTMENT
DECISION IN THE UK
It would seem appropriate to conduct a UK based research study similar to
that of Duhaime and Grant (1984) in the US. Such a study would examine the
factors that induce a sell-off and its characteristics. Such factors might include:
financial status of dives tor, inter-dependency among the divisional units of the
divestor, including the divested part, managerial attachment to a divested unit
and the general economic conditions ruling at the time of divestment.
8.10.3 LONG TERM PERFORMANCE PLANS.
A UK based research along the lines of Tehranian et al (1987) might also
demonstrate the impact of the existence of long term performance plans within
the parent on abnormal returns earned on announcement of divestment.
8.10.4 FINANCIAL STATUS
This study finds a significant relationship between financial distress,
measured by the z-score, and gains to shareholders following sell-off
announcement. Given that the need for cash seems to be one of the causes of
divestment, it would seem appropriate to study market reaction to financially
distressed firms in isolation from financially healthy firms. Such a study would
throw light on shareholder gains due to avoidance of direct and indirect costs
associated with bankruptcy or financial distress.
8.10.5 EFFECT OF MOTIVATION
Motivations behind divestment are shown to affect the magnitude of abnormal
returns produced according to Denning (1988) as explained in Chapter 3.
Divestment could be a solution to a financial crisis, agency cost problem or
financial under performance. Market reactions to different motivations behind
sell-offs in the U.K. would provide further insight into the nature of abnormal
returns on announcement date.
8.10.6 EFFECT ON ACQUIRERS
As explained in Section 7.6-1, it would be appropriate to conduct a study of the
impact on the share price performance of the acquirers of U.K. sell-offs. This
would then bring U.K. studies of divestments more in line with U.S. studies such
as Rosenfeld (1984), Hite et al (1987), and Jain (1985) and Sicherman and Pettway
(1987). Movements in abnormal returns (if any) of the acquiring party over the
announcement period would be of interest. Relative financial strength and
bargaining power of the acquirer may also be of interest.
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TABLE A.1 - DAILY (AR) AND CUMULATIVE (CAR) ABNORMAL RETURNS:
DIMSON VERSUS SCHOLES & WILLIAMS METHOD VERSUS UNADJUSTED BETAS
-DEPENDENT ASSUMPTION.
DAY
DINSON METHOD
	 (11178)
%AR	 %CAR
SCHOLES & WILLIAMS METHOD
	 (N:178)
DAY	 %AR	 %CAR
UNADJUSTED BETAS
	 (N:178)
DAY	 %AR	 %CAR
-40
-0.0882
-0.0882 -40 -0,0817 -0.0817 -40 -0.0562 -0.0562
-39 0.0401 -0.0481 -39 0.0316 -0.0501 -39 0.0270 -0,0292
-38
-0.1806
-0.2287 -38 -0.1761 -0.2262 -38 -0.1688 -0.1980
-37 0.0432
-0.1855 -37 0.0023 -0.2239 -37 -0.0384 -0.2364
-36 0.1944 0.0090 -36 0.1295 -0.0944 -36 0.1528 -0.0836
-35 0.2319 0,2409 -35 0.1853 0.0909 -35 0.1910 0.1074
-34
-0.1082 0.1326 -34 -0.1507 -0.0598 -34 -0.1592 -0.0518
-33
-0.1528
-0.0202 -33 -0.1425 -0.2023 -33 -0.1629 -0.2147
-32
-0.1585
-0.1787 -32 -0.1501 -0.3524 -32 -0.1646 -0.3793
-31
-0,0751
-0.2538 -31 -0.0551 -0.4075 -31 -0.0368 -0.4161
-30
-0.0276
-0.2814 -30 -0.0753 -0.4828 -30 -0.0872 -0.5034
-29 0.1614
-0.1200 -29 0.2087 -0.2741 -29 0.2528 -0.2506
-28 0.1887 0,0687 -28 0.1351 -0,1390 -28 0.1200 -0.1306
-27 0.0469 0.1157 -27 0.0449 -0.0940 -27 0.0462 -0,0844
-26 0.1267 0.2423 -26 0.0833 -0,0107 -26 0.1020 0.0176
-25
-0.2925
-0.0502 -25 -0.2972 -0.3079 -25 -0.2753 -0.2577
-24 0.0817 0.0315 -24 0.0650 -0,2429 -24 0.0829 -0,1748
-23
-0.0003 0,0313 -23 -0.0016 -0.2444 -23 -0.0190 -0.1939
-22
-0.3306
-0.2993 -22 -0.3779 -0.6224 -22 -0.3697 -0.5635
-21
-0.0144
-0.3137 -21 -0.0854 -0.7078 -21 -0.0654 -0.6289
-20 -0.2602
-0,5740 -20 -0.2125 -0.9204 -20 -0.1909 -0.8198
-19 0.1896
-0.3844 -19 0.1220 -0.7983 -19 0.1155 -0,7043
-18 -0.2899
-0.6743 -18 -0.2446 -1,0430 -18 -0.2381 -0.9424
-17 0.2789
-0.3954 -17 0.2771 -0.7659 -17 0.2844 -0.6580
-16
-0.1975 -0,5930 -16 -0.1739 -0.9397 -16 -0.1867 -0.8446
-15
-0.1976 -0.7906 -15 -0.1497 -1.0894 -15 -0.1657 -1.0103
-14 0.0459 -0,7447 -14 0.0532 -1.0362 -14 0,0550 -0.9553
-13 0,0378
-0.7068 -13 -0.0149 -1,0511 -13 -0.0303 -0,9866
-12 0.0532
-0.6536 -12 0.0481 -1.0030 -12 0.0408 -0.9448
-11 -0.2731
-0,9267 -11 -0.2639 -1.2669 -11 -0.2582 -1.2030
-10 0.0708
-0.8558 -10 0.0384 -1.2286 -10 0.0370 -1.1660
-9 0.4810 -0,3749 -9 0,4975 -0.7310 -9 0.5250 -0,6411
-8 0.0722
-0,3027 -8 0.0835 -0.6476 -8 0.0844 -0.5566
-7 -0.0386 -0.3413 -7 -0.0328 -0.6803 -7 -0.0094 -0.5660
-6 0.0286 -0.3127 -6 0,0451 -0.6352 -6 0.0717 -0.4943
-5 -0,0803 -0.3930 -5 -0.0881 -0.7234 -5 -0.0974 -0.5917
-4 0,0868 -0.3062 -4 0.0765 -0.6469 -4 0.0863 -0.5055
-3 0.2868 -0.0194 -3 0.3191 -0.3278 -3 0.3376 -0.1679
-2 0,0325 0.0132 -2 0.0146 -0.313-2 -2 0.0185 -0.1494
-1 0.8539 0.8671 -1 0.8080 0.4948 -1 0.7865 0.6372
0 -0.2026 0.6645 0 -0.2391 0.2558 0 -0.2651 0.3721
1 -0.2285 0.4360 1 -0.1963 0,0594 1 -0.1635 0,2086
2 -0.2617 0.1743 2 -0.2748 -0.2154 2 -0,2591 -0.0505
3 -0.1517 0.0226 3 -0,1676 -0.3830 3 -0.1556 -0,2061
4 -0.1985 -0.1759 4 -0.1609 -0.5439 4 -0.1707 -0.3768
5 -0.1520 -0.3279 5 -0.1619 -0.7057 5 -0.1667 -0.5434
6 -0.0559 -0.3838 6 -0.0958 -0.8015 6 -0.0916 -0.6350
7 0,2311 -0.1526 7 0.2054 -0.5962 7 0.1855 -0.4496
8 0.2705 0.1178 8 0.2645 -0.3317 8 0.2528 -0.1967
9 0.0768 0,1947 9 0.0351 -0.2966 9 0.0345 -0.1623
10 -0.2644 -0.0698 10 -0,2986 -0.5951 10 -0.3185 -0.4807
11 -0.0361 -0.1059 11 -0.0196 -6.6147 11 -0.0309 -0.5116
12 -0.2560 -0.3619 12 -0.2578 -0,8724 12 -0.2216 -0.7332
13 -0.1113 -0.4732 13 -0.0773 -0,9497 13 -0.0680 -0.8012
14 0,1215 -0.3517 14 0.1600 -0.7897 14 0.1836 -0.6176
15 0.0295 -0.3222 15 0,0445 -0,7452 15 0.0710 -0.5466
16 0.1040 -0.2182 16 0.1059 -0.6393 16 0.1139 -0.4327
17 -0.0001 -0.2183 17 0.0035 -0.6358 17 0.0417 -0.3910
18 0.0234 -0.1949 18 -0.0363 -0.6721 18 -0.0106 -0.4016
19 0.1168 -0,0781 19 0.1049 -0.5672 19 0.1219 -0.2798
20 0.0893 0.0112 20 0.0928 -0,4744 20 0.0883 -0.1914
21 0.0256 0.0368 21 -0.0103 -0.4847 21 -0.0185 -0.2099
22 0.4242 0.4610 22 0.4201 -0.0646 22 0.4518 0.2418
23 -0.0246 0.4364 23 -0.0331 -0.0977 23 -0.0120 0,2298
24 0.1223 0.5587 24 0.1197 0.0220 24 0.1642 0.3940
25 0.0112 0.5699 25 0.0339 0.0559 25 0.0802 0.4742
26 0.1214 0,6913 26 0.1340 0.1899 26 0.1784 0.6526
27 0.1928 0.8840 27 0.1757 0.3656 27 0,2238 0.8764
28 -0.1757 0.7083 28 -0.2300 0.1355 28 -0.2158 0.6606
29 0,1795 0.8878 29 0.1563 0.2919 29 0,1604 0.8211
30 -0.0984 0.7893 30 -0.1051 0.1867 30 -0.0728 0,7482
31 0.1190 0.9084 31 0.1230 0.3098 31 0.1173 0.8656
32 -0,2578 0.6505 32 -0.2305 0,0792 32 -0.2100 0.6556
33 -0.0319 0.6186 33 -0.0045 0.0747 33 0.0044 0.6600
34 -0.3223 0.2963 34 -0.2909 -0.2162 34 -0.2410 0.4190
35 -0.1368 0.1595 35 -0.1528 -0.3690 35 -0.1370 0.2820
36 -0.2351 -0.0756 36 -0.2248 -0.5938 36 -0.2237 0.0583
37 0,2432 0.1676 37 0.2358 -0.3579 37 0.2329 0.2912
38 -0.0514 0.1162 38 -0.0629 -0,4208 38 -0.0270 0.2641
39 0.0878 0.2040 39 0.0805 -0.3403 39 0.1210 0.3851
40 0.0384 0.2424 40 0.0331 -0.3072 40 0.0395 0.4247
TABLE A.2 - T-TESTS OVER DIFFERENT RANGES OF DAYS:
DIMSON VERSUS SCHOLES & WILLIAMS METHOD VERSUS UNADJUSTED BETAS
-DEPENDENT ASSUMPTION.
DIRSON METHOD	 (N:178)
Range	 T-Test
from	 to
SCHOLES & WILLIAMS METHOD (N:178)
Range	 T-Test
from	 to
UNADJUSTED BETAS 	 (N=178)
Range	 T-Test
from	 to
-40 40 0.1650 -40 40 -0.2102 -40 40 0,2939
-30 30 0.8182 -30 30 0.4684 -30 30 0.9287
-20 20 0.3109 -20 20 0.2244 -20 20 0.4257
-10 10 1.1455 -10 10 0.9026 -10 10 0.9819
-5 5 -0.0281 -5 5 -0.1309 -5 5 -0.0922
-4 4 0.4433 -4 4 0.3683 -4 4 0.4464
-3 3 0.7612 -3 3 0.6141 -3 3 0.7049
-2 2 0,5305 -2 2 0.3095 -2 2 0,3270
-2 -1 3.8400 -2 -1 3.5813 -2 -1 3.5462
-1 -1 5.2314 -1 -1 4,9748 -1 -1 4.8999
-1 0 2.8214 -1 0 2.4769 -1 0 2,2971
-1 1 1.4954 -1 1 1,3245 -1 1 1.2875
0 0 -1.2413 0 0 -1.4720 0 0 -1.6514
-2 0 2.4187 -2 0 2.0743 -2 0 1.9420
-2 1 1.3947 -2 1 1.1920 -2 1 1,1726
-3 0 2.9732 -3 0 2.7788 -3 0 2.7334
-3 1 2.0332 -3 1 1.9449 -3 1 1.9893
-3 2 1.2016 -3 2 1.0847 -3 2 1.1571
-4 0 2.8971 -4 0 2.6960 -4 0 2.6851
-4 1 2,0732 -4 1 1.9677 -4 1 2.0354
-4 2 1.3135 -4 2 1.1822 -4 2 1.2744
-4 3 0.9000 -4 3 0,7409 -4 3 0.8494
-5 0 2.4439 -5 0 2.2396 -5 0 2.2036
-5 1 1.7335 -5 1 1,6166 -5 1 1,6551
-5 2 1.0548 -5 2 0.9139 -5 2 0.9776
-5 3 0.6846 -5 3 0.5176 -5 3 0.5986
-5 4 0.2650 -5 4 0.1778 -5 4 0,2317
-7 -1 2.7086 -7 -1 2.6585 -7 -1 2,8109
-6 -1 3.0222 -6 -1 2.9539 -6 -1 3.0600
-5 -1 3.2323 -5 -1 3.1116 -5 -1 3.1524
-4 -1 3.8597 -4 -1 3.7502 -4 -1 3.8278
-3 -1 4.1498 -3 -1 4.0586 -3 -1 4.1097
-2 -1 3.8400 -2 -1 3.5813 -2 -1 3.5462
-1 -1 5.2314 -1 -1 4.9748 -1 -1 4.8999
-7 0 2.0948 -7 0 1.9664 -7 0 2.0455
-6 0 2.3288 -6 0 2.1784 -6 0 2.2088
-5 0 2.4439 -5 0 2.2396 -5 0
2.2036
-4 0 2.8971 -4 0 2.6960 -4 0 2.6851
-3 0 2.9732 -3 0 2.7788 -3 0
2.7334
-2 0 2.4187 -2 0 2.0743 -2 0 1,9420
-1 0 2.8214 -1 0 2,4769 -1 0
2.2971
0 0 -1.2413 0 0 -1.4720 0
0 -1.6514
- 200 -
0 5 -2,9887 0 5 -3.0178 0 5 -3.0026
0 10 -1.7305 0 10 -2.0234 0 10 -2,0998
0 15 -1.8215 0 15 -1.9087 0 15 -1.8436
0 20 -1.1442 0 20 -1,3023 0 20 -1,1264
0 30 -0.0856 0 30 -0.3407 0 30 0.1243
0 40 -0.5977 0 40 -0.7712 0 40 -0.2067
TABLE A.3 - DAILY (AR) AND CUMULATIVE (CAR) ABNORMAL RETURNS:
PRICE GROUP VERSUS NO-PRICE GROUP
-DEPENDENT ASSUMPTION.
DAY
PRICE GROUP (N:142)
%AR	 %CAR
NO-PRICE GROUP
	 (1436)
DAY	 %AR	 %CAR
-40 -0.1639 -0,1639 -40 0.2106 0.2106
-39 0.0446 -0.1193 -39 0.0211 0.2317
-38 -0.2015 -0,3209 -38 -0.0965 0.1353
-37 0.0470 -0.2739 -37 0.0299 0.1652
-36 0.1263 -0.1476 -36 0.4623 0.6275
-35 0.2276 0.0800 -35 0.2472 0.8747
-34 -0,1118 -0.0318 -34 -0.0921 0.7826
-33 -0.1716 -0,2034 -33 -0.0802 0.7024
-32 -0.0904 -0.2938 -32 -0.4278 0.2746
-31 -0.0418 -0.3356 -31 -0.2057 0.0689
-30 -0,0492 -0.3848 -30 0.0272 0.0961
-29 0.2482 -0.1366 -29 -0.1524 -0.0563
-28 0.3108 0.1742 -28 -0.2948 -0.3511
-27 0.0760 0.2502 -27 -0,0678 -0,4189
-26 0.1088 0.3590 -26 0.1976 -0.2212
-25 -0.4133 -0.0542 -25 0.1836 -0.0377
-24 0.1198 0.0656 -24 -0.0697 -0.1073
-23 -0.2808 -0.2153 -23 1.1069 0.9996
-22 -0.3784 -0.5936 -22 -0,1403 0.8592
-21 -0.0531 -0,6467 -21 0.1415 1.0007
-20 -0.3467 -0.9934 -20 0.0848 1.0854
-19 0.2133 -0,7801 -19 0.0961 1.1816
-18 -0.3524 -1.1325 -18 -0.0429 1.1387
-17 0.2590 -0.8734 -17 0.3611 1.4998
-16 -0.2024 -1,0759 -16 -0.1802 1.3196
-15 -0.1916 -1.2675 -15 -0.2229 1.0968
-14 0.0538 -1,2137 -14 -0.0435 1.0532
-13 0.0658 -1,1479 -13 -0.0132 1.0400
-12 0.0287 -1,1192 -12 0.1504 1.1904
-11 -0.3562 -1.4754 -11 0.0512 1.2415
-10 0.0860 -1,3894 -10 0.0133 1.2548
-9 0.5996 -0.7898 -9 0.0124 1.2672
-8 0.2514 -0.5384 -8 -0.6362 0.6310
-7 0.0335 -0.5049 -7 -0,3266 0.3044
-6 0.0538 -0,4511 -6 -0,0709 0,2336
-5 0.1386 -0.3125 -5 -0,9454 -0.7119
-4 0.1791 -0.1335 -4 -0.2776 -0.9895
-3 0.2691 0,1357 -3 0,3565 -0.6330
-2 0.0970 0.2327 -2 -0.2228 -0.8558
-1 1,0561 1.2887 -1 0.0576 -0.7982
0 -0.1811 1.1077 0 -0.2886 -1.0868
1 -0.4068 0,7009 1 0.4731 -0,6137
2 -0.2251 0.4757 2 -0.4333 -1.0471
3 -0.0124 0.4633 3 -0.6746 -1,7217
4 -0.0398 0.4235 4 -0.8262 -2.5479
5 -0,3827 0.0408 5 0.7576 -1.7903
6 -0.0483 -0.0075 6 -0.1528 -1.9431
7 0.2778 0.2703 7 0.1131 -1.8300
8 0.2986 0,5690 8 0,1561 -1.6739
9 0.1457 0.7146 9 -0,1949 -1.8688
10 -0.2085 0.5062 10 -0.4855 -2,3544
11 -0.0897 0,4165 11 0.1711 -2.1833
12 -0.1450 0.2715 12 -0.6953 -2.8786
13 0.0337 0.3051 13 -0.6808 -3.5593
14 0.1426 0.4477 14 0.0163 -3.5431
15 0.0258 0.4736 15 0.0638 -3.4793
16 0.1101 0.5836 16 0.0815 -3.3977
17 0.0717 0.6553 17 -0.2812 -3.6789
18 -0.0059 0.6494 18 0.1374 -3.5415
19 0.2555 0.9048 19 -0.4323 -3.9738
20 0.1717 1.0766 20 -0,2365 -4.2104
21 0.1186 1.1952 21 -0.3425 -4.5529
22 0,2395 1.4347 22 1.0369 -3.5160
23 0.0111 1.4458 23 -0.0542 -3.5702
24 0.0780 1.5238 24 0.2941 -3.2760
25 -0.1141 1.4096 25 0.5074 -2.7687
26 0.1773 1.5869 26 -0.1004 -2.8691
27 0.1655 1.7524 27 0.3018 -2.5673
28 -0.2311 1.5214 28 0.0419 -2.5254
29 0.1865 1.7079 29 0.1496 -2.3759
30 -0,0235 1.6843 30 -0.3966 -2.7725
31 0.1265 1.8108 31 0.0897 -2.6828
32 -0.3384 1.4724 32 0,0630 -2.6198
33 -0.0227 1.4497 33 -0.0653 -2.6851
34 -0.3495 1.1001 34 -0.2170 -2.9021
35 -0.1529 0.9472 35 -0.0740 -2.9761
36 -0.3985 0.5487 36 0.4103 -2.5658
37 0.1367 0.6854 37 0.6555 -1.9103
38 0.0775 0.7629 38 -0,5866 -2.4969
39 0.2374 1.0003 39 -0.4708 -2.9677
40 0.1000 1.1003 40 -0.2066 -3.1743
TABLE A.4 - DAILY (AR) AND CUMULATIVE (CAR) ABNORMAL RETURNS:
COMPLETION GROUP VERSUS INTENTION GROUP -DEPENDENT ASSUMPTION.
DAY
COMPLETION GROUP 	 (N : 92)
%AR	 %CAR
INTENTION GROUP	 (N=86)
DAY	 %AR	 %CAR
-40 -0.1815 -0.1815 -40 0.0109 0.0109
-39 -0.0030 -0.1845 -39 0.0856 0.0965
-38 0.0029 -0.1816 -38 -0.3768 -0.2803
-37 0.0050 -0.1766 -37 0.0848 -0.1955
-36 0.0555 -0.1211 -36 0.3242 0.1287
-35 0,3791 0.2580 -35 0.0913 0,2200
-34 0.0306 0.2885 -34 -0.2563 -0.0363
-33 -0.4566 -0.1681 -33 0.1723 0.1360
-32 -0.1651 -0.3332 -32 -0.1519 -0.0159
-31 -0.2008 -0.5340 -31 0,0592 0.0433
-30 0.1336 -0.4003 -30 -0.2137 -0.1704
-29 0.3864 -0.0139 -29 -0,0665 -0.2369
-28 0,3941 0.3802 -28 -0.0322 -0.2691
-27 0.3525 0.7327 -27 -0,2801 -0.5492
-26 0.3382 1,0708 -26 -0.0995 -0.6488
-25 -0.2978 0.7731 -25 -0.2874 -0.9361
-24 0.4311 1.2041 -24 -0.2924 -1.2285
-23 -0.2054 0.9987 -23 0.2119 -1.0167
-22 -0.5160 0.4827 -22 -0.1242 -1.1409
-21 -0.1866 0.2961 -21 0.1704 -0,9704
-20 0.0492 0,3453 -20 -0.5894 -1.5598
-19 0.1895 0.5348 -19 0.1892 -1.3707
-18 -0.2069 0.3279 -18 -0.3779 -1,7486
-17 0.3103 0.6383 -17 0.2471 -1.5015
-16 -0.2588 0.3795 -16 -0.1323 -1.6333
-15 -0.2284 0.1511 -15 -0.1653 -1.7991
-14 -0.1241 0,0270 -14 0.2282 -1.5709
-13 0.1202 0.1472 -13 -0.0492 -1.6201
-12 0.3645 0.5117 -12 -0.2794 -1.8996
-11 -0.4670 0.0448 -11 -0.0663 -1.9659
-10 0.3334 0.3782 -10 -0.2100 -2.1759
-9 0.5220 0.9002 -9 0.4370 -1.7389
-8 0.1037 1.0039 -8 0.0377 -1.7012
-7 -0.0129 0.9910 -7 -0.0711 -1.7723
-6 -0.0567 0.9343 -6 0.1243 -1.6480
-5 -0.3901 0.5442 -5 0.2514 -1.3966
-4 -0.0322 0,5120 -4 0.2137 -1.1829
-3 0.2712 0.7832 -3 0.3040 -0.8788
-2 -0.2887 0,4945 -2 0.3756 -0.5032
-1 1.4499 1.9444 -1 0.2169 -0.2863
0 -0.5725 1.3719 0 0.1925 -0.0938
1 -0,1935 1.1784 1 -0,2671 -0,3609
2 -0.3022 0.8763 2 -0.2192 -0.5802
3 -0.3095 0.5667 3 0.0170 -0,5631
4 -0,0656 0,5011 4 -0.3415 -0,9047
5 -0.4429 0.0582 5 0.1590 -0.7457
6 -0.0853 -0.0271 6 -0.0241 -0.7698
7 0.2175 0.1904 7 0.2455 -0.5242
8 0.4616 0.6520 8 0.0652 -0.4591
9 0.2320 0.8841 9 -0.0896 -0.5486
10 -0.2798 0,6043 10 -0.2476 -0,7963
11 0.0095 0,6138 11 -0.0861 -0.8824
12 -0.3644 0.2494 12 -0.1406 -1.0230
13 -0.0963 0.1531 13 -0.1266 -1.1496
14 0.3310 0.4840 14 -0.1118 -1.2614
15 0.0879 0.5719 15 -0.0253 -1.2868
16 0,2364 0.8084 16 -0.0373 -1.3241
17 0.1453 0.9536 17 -0.1554 -1.4795
18 0.1271 1.0807 18 -0.0884 -1.5679
19 -0.0910 0.9897 19 0.3166 -1.2513
20 0.3034 1.2932 20 -0.1415 -1.3928
21 -0.0454 1.2477 21 0.1233 -1.2694
22 0.4313 1.6791 22 0.3677 -0.9017
23 0.1056 1.7847 23 -0.1171 -1.0188
24 0.1723 1.9570 24 0.0668 -0.9521
25 -0.0433 1.9137 25 0.0701 -0.8820
26 0.2242 2,1379 26 0.0103 -0.8717
27 0.1976 2.3355 27 0.1877 -0.6841
28 -0.2469 2.0886 28 -0,1002 -0.7842
29 0.1735 2.2621 29 0.1847 -0.5995
30 0,0365 2,2987 30 -0.2441 -0.8436
31 0.2019 2.5005 31 0.0306 -0.8130
32 -0.5786 1.9219 32 0.0871 -0.7259
33 0.1008 2.0227 33 -0.1724 -0.8983
34 -0.3924 1.6304 34 -0.2487 -1.1469
35 -0.0362 1,5942 35 -0.2453 -1,3922
36 -0,0490 1.5452 36 -0.4338 -1,8261
37 0.2245 1.7697 37 0.2603 -1.5658
38 -0.1257 1.6440 38 0,0299 -1.5359
39 0.1114 1.7554 39 0.0621 -1.4738
40 -0.0268 1.7286 40 0.0770 -1.3968
TABLE A.5 - DAILY (AR) AND CUMULATIVE (CAR) ABNORMAL RETURNS:
DEPENDENT VERSUS INDEPENDENT ASSUMPTION.
DEPENDENT ASSUMPTION	 (N : 178)
DAY	 %AR	 %CAR
INDEPENDENT ASSUMPTION (N=178)
DAY	 %AR	 %CAR
-40 -0.0817 -0.0817 -40 0.0268 0.0268
-39 0.0316 -0.0501 -39 -0.0252 0.0017
-38 -0.1761 -0.2262 -38 -0.0629 -0.0613
-37 0.0023 -0,2239 -37 0.0345 -0.0268
-36 0.1295 -0.0944 -36 0.0499 0.0231
-35 0.1853 0.0909 -35 0.1167 0.1398
-34 -0.1507 -0.0598 -34 -0.0716 0.0682
-33 -0.1425 -0.2023 -33 0.0080 0,0762
-32 -0.1501 -0.3524 -32 -0.0078 0.0685
-31 -0.0551 -0.4075 -31 -0.0212 0.0473
-30 -0.0753 -0.4828 -30 -0,0210 0.0263
-29 0.2087 -0.2741 -29 0.1305 0,1568
-28 0.1351 -0.1390 -28 0.0410 0.1978
-27 0.0449 -0.0940 -27 0.0370 0.2348
-26 0.0833 -0.0107 -26 0.0460 0,2808
-25 -0.2972 -0.3079 -25 -0.1432 0.1376
-24 0.0650 -0.2429 -24 0.0363 0.1739
-23 -0.0016 -0,2444 -23 -0.0303 0.1436
-22 -0.3779 -0.6224 -22 -0.1258 0.0178
-21 -0.0854 -0,7078 -21 -0.0105 0.0073
-20 -0.2125 -0.9204 -20 -0.1062 -0.0989
-19 0.1220 -0.7983 -19 0.0201 -0.0788
-18 -0,2446 -1.0430 -18 -0.0810 -0.1598
-17 0.2771 -0.7659 -17 0.1038 -0.0560
-16 -0.1739 -0.9397 -16 -0.0704 -0.1264
-15 -0.1497 -1.0894 -15 -0.0292 -0,1555
-14 0.0532 -1.0362 -14 0.0655 -0.0900
-13 -0.0149 -1.0511 -13 -0.0580 -0.1480
-12 0.0481 -1.0030 -12 0.0405 -0.1075
-11 -0.2639 -1.2669 -11 -0.1119 -0,2194
-10 0.0384 -1.2286 -10 -0.0426 -0.2620
-9 0.4975 -0.7310 -9 0.1721 -0.0899
-8 0.0835 -0.6476 -8 0.1232 0.0333
-7 -0.0328 -0.6803 -7 -0.0601 -0.0267
-6 0.0451 -0.6352 -6 0.0609 0.0342
-5 -0.0881 -0,7234 -5 -0.0861 -0.0519
-4 0,0765 -0.6469 -4 -0.0054 -0.0573
-3 0.3191 -0.3278 -3 0.2134 0.1561
-2 0.0146 -0.3132 -2 -0.0346 0.1215
-1 0.8080 0,4948 -1 0,2663 0.3878
0 -0.2391 0.2558 0 -0,0789 0,3089
1 -0.1963 0.0594 1 -0,1616 0.1473
2 -0.2748 -0.2154 2 -0.1234 0.0240
3 -0.1676 -0.3830 3 -0.1292 -0.1052
4 -0.1609 -0.5439 4 -0.1243 -0.2295
5 -0.1619 -0,7057 5 -0.0930 -0.3225
6 -0.0958 -0,8015 6 -0.0721 -0.3946
7 0.2054 -0.5962 7 0.0958 -0.2988
8 0.2645 -0.3317 8 0.0971 -0.2016
9 0.0351 -0,2966 9 0.0101 -0.1916
10 -0,2986 -0.5951 10 -0.1145 -0.3060
11 -0.0196 -0.6147 11 -0.0003 -0.3063
12 -0.2578 -0.8724 12 -0.1445 -0.4509
13 -0.0773 -0.9497 13 0.0344 -0.4165
14 0.1600 -0.7897 14 0.0790 -0.3374
15 0.0445 -0.7452 15 0.0296 -0.3078
16 0.1059 -0.6393 16 -0.0293 -0.3371
17 0.0035 -0.6358 17 -0.0177 -0.3548
18 -0.0363 -0.6721 18 -0.0015 -0.3563
19 0.1049 -0.5672 19 0.0286 -02IS
20 0.0928 -0.4744 20 0,0420 -0,2855
21 -0.0103 -0.4847 21 0.0522 -0.2332
22 0.4201 -4.0646 22 b.1292 4.10k1
23 -0.0331 -0.0977 23 -0.0619 -0.1660
24 0.1197 0.0220 24 0.0938 -0,0722
25 0.0339 0.0559 25 0,0182 -0.0540
26 0.1340 0.1899 26 0.1464 0,0924
27 0.1757 0.3656 27 0.0640 0.1564
28 -0.2300 0.1355 28 -0,1322 0,0242
29 0.1563 0.2919 29 0,0304 0.0546
30 -0.1051 0,1867 10 -0,0331 P.9215
31 0.1230 0.3098 31 0.0288 0.0503
32 -0.2305 0.0792 32 -0.1190 -0,0687
33 -0.0045 0,0747 33 -0.0425 -0.1113
34 -0.2909 -0.2162 34 -0,1317 -0.2429
35 -0.1528 -0.3690 35 -0,0982 -0.3411
36 -0.2248 -0,5938 36 -0.1332 -0,4744
37 0.2358 -0.3579 37 0.0834 -0.3910
38 -0.0629 -0.4208 38 0,0066 -0.3844
39 0.0805 -0.3403 39 0.0605 -0.3239
40 0.0331 -0,3072 40 0.0242 -0.2997
TABLE A.6 - T-TESTS OVER DIFFERENT RANGES OF DAYS:
DEPENDENT VERSUS INDEPENDENT ASSUMPTION.
DEPENDENT ASSUMPTION	 (N : 178)
Range	 T-Test
from	 to
INDEPENDENT ASSUMPTION
	 (N=I78)
Range	 T-Test
from	 to
-40 40 0.2102 .-40 40 -0.4443
-30 30 0.4684 -30 30 -0.0441
-20 20 0.2244 -20 20 -0.6101
-10 10 0.9026 -10 10 -0.2522
-5 5 0.1309
-5 5 -1.4350
-4 4 0.3683 -4 4 -0.7899
-3 3 0.6141 -3 3 -0.2413
-2 2 0.3095 -2 2 -0.7881
-2 -1 3.5813 -2 -1 2.1861
-1 -1 4.9748 -1 -1 3.5532
-1 0 2.4769 -1 0 1.7682
-1 1 1.3245 -1 1 0.1992
0 0 -1.4720 0 0 -1.0526
-2 0 2.0743 -2 0 1.1772
-2 1 1.1920 -2 1 -0.0583
-3 0 2.7788 -3 0 2.4430
-3 1 1.9449 -3 1 1.2211
-3 2 1.0847 -3 2 0.4428
-4 0 2,6960 -4 0 2.1527
-4 1 1.9677 -4 1 1.0851
-4 2 1.1822 -4 2 0.3826
-4 3 0,7409 -4 3 -0.2513
-5 0 2.2396 -5 0 1.4962
-5 1 1.6166 -5 1 0.5705
-5 2 0.9139 -5 2 -0.0482
-5 3 0.5176 -5 3 -0.6198
-5 4 0.1778 -5 4 -1.1126
TABLE A.7 - DAILY (AR) AND CUMULATIVE (CAR) ABNORMAL RETURNS:
CAPM VERSUS MARKET MODEL VERSUS MARKET ADJUSTED BETAS (BETA =1).
DAY
CAPH-DIMSON BETAS	 (N=178)
%AR	 %CAR DAY
BETAS=1	 (N : 178)
%AR	 %CAR
MARKET HODEL-DIHSON BETAS
	 (N:178)
DAY	 %AR	 %CAR
-40 -0,0895 -0.0895 -40 -0.0876 -0.0876 -40 -0.0882
-0.0882
-39 0.0387 -0.0507
-39 0.0344 -0.0531 -39 0.0401 -0.0481
-38 -0.1819 -0.2327
-38 -0.1224 -0.1755 -38 -0.1806 -0.2287
-37 0.0419 -0.1908 -37 -0.0077 -0.1832
-37 0,0432 -0.1855
-36 0.1931 0.0024 -36 0,0999 -0.0833 -36 0.1944 0.0090
-35 0.2306 0.2329 -35 0.1836 0.1003 -35 0.2319 0,2409
-34 -0.1095 0.1234 -34 -0.1296 -0.0293 -34 -0.1082 0.1326
-33 -0.1541 -0.0307 -33 -0.1352 -0.1645 -33 -0.1528 -0.0202
-32 -0.1598 -0.1906 -32 -0.1595 -0.3240 -32 -0.1585 -0.1787
-31 -0.0764 -0.2670 -31 -0.0566 -0.3806 -31 -0.0751 -0.2538
-30 -0.0289 -0.2959 -30 -0.0347 -0,4153 -30 -0.0276 -0.2814
-29 0.1601 -0.1358 -29 0.2558 -0.1595 -29 0.1614 -0.1200
-28 0.1874 0,0516 -28 0.1556 -0.0039 -28 0.1887 0.0687
-27 0,0456 0.0972 -27 0.0131 0.0093 -27 0.0469 0.1157
-26 0.1254 0.2226 -26 0,1311 0.1404 -26 0.1267 0.2423
-25 -0.2938 -0.0713 -25 -0.2846 -0,1442 -25 -0.2925 -0.0502
-24 0.0804 0.0091 -24 0,1049 -0.0393 -24 0.0811 0.0315
-23 -0.0016 0.0076 -23 0.0194 -0,0199 -23 -0.0063 0.0313
-22 -0.3319 -0.3243 -22 -0.3436 -0,3635 -22 -0.3306 -0.2993
-21 -0.0157 -0.3400 -21 -0.0353 -0.3988 -21 -6 6144 -0.3137
-20 -0.2615 -0.6016 -20 -0.1844 -0.5832 -20 -0.2602 - 0 5740
-19 0.1883 -0.4133 -19 0.1521 -0.4311 -19 0.IESi -6.3844
-18 -0,2912 -0.7045 -18 -0.2315 -0.6626 -18 -0.2899 -0.6743
-17 0.2775 -0.4270 -17 0.2560 -0.4066 -17 0.2789 -0.3954
-16 -0.1988 -0.6258 -16 -0.1955 -0.6021 -16 -0.1975 -0,5930
-15 -0.1989 -0.8247 -15 -0.1710 -0.7731 -15 -0.1976 -0.7906
-14 0.0446 -0.7801 -14 0.1090 -0.6640 -14 0.0459 -0.7447
-13 0.0365 -0.7436 -13 -0.0064 -0.6704 -13 0.0378 -0.7068
-12 0.0519 -0.6916 -12 0.0322 -0.6382 -12 0.0532 -0,6536
-11 -0.2744 -0.9660 -11 -0.2460 -0.8842 -11 -0.2731 -0.9267
-10 0.0695 -0.8965 -10 0.0497 -0.8346 -10 0.0708 -0.8558
-9 0.4797 -0.4168 -9 0.4440 -0.3906 -9 0.4810 -0,3749
-8 0.0709 -0.3459 -8 0.1169 -0.2737 -8 0,0722 -0.3027
-7 -0.0399 -0.3857 -7 -0.0076 -0,2813 -7 -0.0386 -0.3413
-6 0.0273 -0,3584 -6 0.0746 -0.2067 -6 0.0286 -0.3127
-5 -0.0816 -0.4400 -5 -0.1170 -0.3238 -5 -0.0803 -0.3930
-4 0.0855 -0.3545 -4 0,0912 -0.2325 -4 0.0868 -0,3062
-3 0.2855 -0,0690 -3 0.3105 0.0780 -3 0.2868 -0.0194
-2 0.0312 -0.0378 -2 -0.0058 0.0722 -2 0.0325 0,0132
-1 0.8526 0,8148 -1 0.7730 0.8452 -1 0.8539 0.8671
0 -0.2039 0.6109 0 -0.2642 0.5810 0 -0.2026 0.6645
1 -0.2298 0.3811 1 -0.1704 0.4106 1 -0.2285 0.4360
2 -0.2630 0,1181 2 -0,2792 0.1315 2 -0.2617 0.1743
3 -0.1531 -0.0350 3 -0.1197 0.0117 3 -0.1517 0.0226
4 -0.1999 -0.2349 4 -0,1602 -0.1484 4 -0.1985 -0,1759
5 -0.1534 -0,3884 5 -0.1001 -0.2485 5 -0.1520 -0.3279
6 -0.0572 -0.4455 6 -0,0949 -0.3434 6 -0.0559 -0,3838
7 0.2298 -0.2157 7 0.1847 -0.1587 7 0,2311 -0.1526
8 0.2691 0.0534 8 0.2262 0.0675 8 0.2705 0.1178
9 0.0756 0.1290 9 0.0422 0.1097 9 0.0768 0.1947
10 -0.2655 -0.1365 10 -0.2799 -0.1702 10 -0,2644 -0.0698
11 -0.0374 -0.1739 11 -0.0518 -0.2220 11 -0.0361 -0.1059
12 -0.2572 -0.4311 12 -0.2316 -0.4535 12 -0.2560 -0.3619
13 -0.1125 -0.5436 13 -0.0667 -0.5203 13 -0,1113 -0.4732
14 0.1202 -0.4234 14 0.1833 -0.3370 14 0.1215 -0.3517
15 0,0282 -0.3952 15 0,0589 -0.2781 15 0,0295 -0.3222
16 0.1028 -0.2925 16 0.1202 -0.1579 16 0.1040 -0.2182
17 -0,0013 -0.2938 17 -0.0270 -0.1849 17 -0.0001 -0,2183
18 0.0222 -0.2716 18 0.0124 -0.1725 18 0.0234 -0.1949
19 0.1155 -0.1561 19 0.0537 -0.1189 19 0.1168 -0.0781
20 0.0883 -0.0678 20 0.0945 -0.0244 20 0.0893 0.0112
21 0,0245 -0.0433 21 -0.0479 -0.0723 21 0.0256 0.0368
22 0.4231 0.3799 22 0.4281 0,3558 22 0.4242 0.4610
23 -0.0257 0.3542 23 -0.0304 0.3254 23 -0.0246 0.4364
24 0.1213 0.4754 24 0.1180 0.4435 24 0.1223 0.5587
25 0.0101 0.4855 25 0.0295 0.4730 25 0.0112 0.5699
26 0.1204 0.6059 26 0.1453 0.6183 26 0.1214 0.6913
27 0.1918 0.7976 27 0.2306 0.8489 27 0.1928 0,8840
28 -0.1767 0,6209 28 -0.2626 0.5862 28 -0.1757 0.7083
29 0.1785 0.7994 29 0.1247 0.7110 29 0.1795 0.8878
30 -0.0994 0.6999 30 -0.1449 0.5661 30 -0.0984 0.7893
31 0.1180 0.8180 31 0.1521 0.7181 31 0.1190 0.9084
32 -0.2588 0.5591 32 -0.2345 0.4837 32 -0.2578 0.6505
33 -0.0329 0.5262 33 -0.0415 0,4422 33 -0.0319 0,6186
34 -0,3233 0.2030 34 -0,2730 0.1692 34 -0.3223 0.2963
35 -0.1378 0.0652 35 -0.1542 0.0150 35 -0.1368 0.1595
36 -0.2360 -0.1708 36 -0.2985 -0.2835 36 -0.2351 -0.0756
37 0,2423 0,0715 37 0.2177 -0.0658 37 0.2432 0.1676
38 -0.0523 0.0192 38 -0.0604 -0.1262 38 -0.0514 0,1162
39 0.0869 0.1061 39 0,0380 -0.0883 39 0.0878 0.2040
40 0.0374 0.1436 40 0.0292 -0.0591 40 0.0384 0.2424
